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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays in international finance. The first two essays study
emerging market sovereign risk with a focus on local currency denominated sovereign bonds.
The third essay examines econometric tools for robust inference in the presence of missing obser-
vations, an issue frequently encountered by researchers in international finance.
Most emerging market sovereign borrowing is now denominated in local currencies. In Chap-
ter 1, we introduce a newmeasure of sovereign risk, the local currency credit spread, defined as the
synthetic dollar spread on a local currency bond after using cross currency swaps to hedge the cur-
rency risk of promised cash flows. Compared with traditional sovereign risk measures based on
foreign currency denominated debt, we find that local currency credit spreads have lower means,
lower cross-country correlations, and are less sensitive to global risk factors. We rationalize these
findings with a model allowing for different degrees of integration between domestic and external
debt markets.
Chapter 2 documents new empirical evidence on the rapid growth of foreign ownership of
emerging market local currency sovereign debt over the past decade. We study risk of nominal
bonds without hedging away the currency risk. We show that local currency nominal bond risks
differ across countries and are highly correlated with sovereign credit default swap spreads on
foreign currency external debt. Using data on investors’ forecasts of inflation and growth, we find
that perceived differences in the cyclicality of monetary policy help explain the cross-sectional
and time series variation in nominal bond risk as well as the development of local currency debt
markets. Guided by these observed empirical patterns, we develop a simple general equilibrium
model with an endogenous issuance decision between local and foreign currency debt.
Chapter 3 proposes two simple consistent heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent co-
variance estimators for time series with missing data. First, we develop the AmplitudeModulated
iii
estimator by applying the Newey-West estimator and treating the missing observations as non-
serially correlated. Secondly, we develop the Equal Spacing estimator by applying the Newey-
West estimator to the series formed by treating the data as equally spaced. We show asymptotic
consistency of both estimators for inference purposes and discuss finite sample variance and bias
tradeoff.
iv
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1. LOCAL CURRENCY SOVEREIGN RISK1
1.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, sovereign debt crises are concentrated in the
developed world. This itself is a remarkable development. It is even more remarkable when
one considers that following the Lehman bankruptcy, some emerging market currencies lost more
than half their value against the dollar. Yet even as their currencies plummeted, these countries
were able to continue their debt payments. This represents a major break from past crises. In the
1980’s and 1990’s the developing world borrowed in currencies that they did not have the right
to print, and currency mismatch was the center of past emerging market sovereign crises.2 After
a decade of rapid development of local currency (LC) sovereign bond markets in the wake of the
Asian Financial Crisis, major emerging markets entered the most recent period of global financial
turmoil with an increasing fraction of their debt in their own currencies and have weathered the
shocks without triggering major sovereign debt crises.3
Yet, despite the increasingly important role of local currency debt in emerging market gov-
ernment finance, LC debt markets are little understood and LC sovereign risk measures are ab-
sent from the academic literature. Our paper fills this gap by introducing a new measure of LC
sovereign risk, the LC credit spread, defined as the difference between the nominal yield on an LC
bond and the LC risk-free rate implied from the cross currency swap (CCS) market. While gov-
ernment bond yields are often used directly as the risk-free rate for developed country currencies,
they cannot be used as the risk-free rate in emerging markets where the risk of sovereign default
1 Joint with Jesse Schreger, Harvard University
2 Prominent examples are Mexico (1994), the Asian Financial Crises (1997-98), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998, 2002),
Turkey (2000-01) and Argentina (2001-02).
3 Sovereign defaults have occurred in four developing countries since 2008: Ecuador, Seychelles, Jamaica and Belize.
Except for Jamaica, the other three countries do not have local currency debt markets. Ecuador is a fully dollarized
economy and Seychelles and Belize have population less than 500,000.
1
and capital controls are non-negligible.4 Instead, we use the dollar risk-free rate combined with
the long-term forward rate implied from the currency swap markets as the risk-free benchmark in
each LC. From a dollar investor’s perspective, the LC credit spread is equivalent to the synthetic
dollar spread on an LC bond over the U.S. Treasury rate with the currency risk of promised cash
flows fully hedged using cross currency swaps. By holding an LC bond and a currency swap with
the same tenor and promised cash flows, the dollar investor can lock in the LC credit spread even
if the value of the currency plummets as long as explicit default is avoided. From the sovereign
issuer’s perspective, the LC credit spread measures the synthetic dollar borrowing cost in the LC
debt market.
The bulk of the literature on emerging market LC debt has focused on why these emerging
markets cannot borrow abroad in their own currency, the question of “original sin” surveyed in
Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005). While it is true that emerging market sovereigns rarely issue
LC bonds in global markets, this no longer means that foreigners do not lend to them in their own
currencies. Instead foreigners are increasingly willing to purchase LC debt issued under domestic
law. According to volume surveys conducted by the Emerging Market Trading Association, the
share of LC debt in total offshore emerging market debt trading volume has increased from 35
percent in 2000 to 71 percent in 2011, reaching 4.64 trillion U.S. dollars (Figure 1.1). Emerging
Market Portfolio Research reports that even among offshore mutual funds which had historically
invested overwhelmingly in FC denominated Eurobonds5 and Brady bonds, the cumulative fund
flow into LC emerging market debt securities has outpaced the flow into debt securities in hard
currencies (Figure 1.2).
The growing importance of LC debt markets is in stark contrast to the declining role of FC
sovereign financing. This shift is rendering conventional measures of sovereign risk increasingly
obsolete. In many emerging markets, government policy is to retire outstanding FC debt and end
new FC issuance.6 The popular country-level JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI),
commonly used in academic research to measure sovereign risk, is today forced to track a dwin-
4 A similar point applies to many euro area countries.
5 Throughout this paper we use eurobonds to mean foreign currency bonds issued offshore, but not necessarily in
euros.
6 For example in Mexico, the 2008 guidelines for public debt management is to “Continue emphasis on the use of
domestic debt to finance the entire federal government deficit and the stock of external debt” (SHCP, 2008)
2
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Figure 1.1: Offshore Trading Volume by Instrument Types (Trillions of USD). This figure plots total trad-
ing volumes of emerging market debt by instrument type in trillions of dollars. In addition to
FC bonds, the ‘Brady, Option, Loans” category also refers to debt instruments denominated in
foreign currencies. The survey participants consist of large offshore financial institutions.
Source: Annual Debt Trading Volume Survey (2000-2011) by Emerging Market Trading Associ-
ation
dling number of outstanding FC eurobonds with declining liquidity and trading volume. In coun-
tries such as Egypt, Thailand, Malaysia, Morocco, South Korea and Qatar, FC debt has shrunk
to the point that EMBI+ has been forced to discontinue these countries’ indices. In addition to
FC credit spreads, sovereign CDS spreads are used as an alternative measure of sovereign risk.
However, defaults on local currency bonds governed under domestic law do not constitute credit
events that trigger CDS contracts in emerging markets.7 As a result, sovereign CDS also offers an
incomplete characterization of emerging market sovereign risk.
Using newdata and a newmeasure, we document a new set of stylized facts about LC sovereign
risk. To construct LC and FC sovereign credit spreads, we build a new dataset of zero-coupon LC
and FC yield curves and swap rates for 10 major emerging markets at the daily frequency for a
common sample period from 2005 to 2011. Using the 5-year zero-coupon benchmark, we find that
LC credit spreads are significantly above zero, robust to taking into account the bid-ask spread
on the swap rates. This result demonstrates the failure of long-term covered interest rate par-
ity between government bond yields in emerging markets and the United States. Removing the
7 This is different from the case of developed country sovereign CDS for which a default on local bonds would trigger
CDS contracts (ISDA, 2012).
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Figure 1.2: Cumulative Flows of Offshore Emerging Market Funds (Billions of USD). This figure plots
cumulative flows of offshore mutual funds designated to emerging market debt since 2005, mea-
sured in billions of USD. Monthly fund flow is measured as end-of-month assets - beginning-
of-month assets - portfolio change - FX change. The total cumulative flow is broken down by
currency type. LC Fund refers to funds that invest 75 percent or more in local currency debt;
FC Fund refers to funds that invest 75 or more in hard currency debt; and Blend Fund refers to
funds that invest in a combination of both, less than 75 percent for either of the above categories.
Source: Emerging Market Portfolio Research
currency risk highlights an important credit component in LC yields, as shown by the positive
correlation between the LC credit spread and the conventional sovereign risk measure, the FC
credit spread.
Despite a positive correlation, LC and FC credit spreads are different along three important di-
mensions. First, while LC credit spreads are large and economically significant, they are generally
lower than FC credit spreads. The gap between LC and FC credit spreads significantly widened
during the peak of the crisis following the Lehman bankruptcy. Second, FC credit spreads are
much more correlated across countries than LC credit spreads. Over 80% of the variation in FC
spreads is explained by the first principal component. In contrast, only 53% of the variation in
LC credit spreads is explained by the first principal component, pointing to the relative impor-
tance of country-specific factors in driving LC spreads. Third, FC credit spreads are much more
correlated with global risk factors than are LC credit spreads. These ex-ante results in the yield
spread space are mirrored ex-post in the excess return space, as excess holding period returns on
FC bonds over U.S. Treasuries load heavily on global equity market returns while hedged LC ex-
4
cess holding period returns load heavily on local equity market returns. In other words, despite
the common perception of emerging market LC debt as extremely risky, we find that swapped LC
debt is actually safer than FC bonds for global investors measured in terms of global equity betas.
The removal of currency risk is central to this finding, as the currency unhedged LC excess returns
have larger betas with global equity returns than FC excess returns.
After documenting the differences between LC and FC credit spreads, we turn to examining
the sources of these credit spread differentials. We build a parsimonious model that attributes the
credit spread differential to the differential cash flow risks between LC and FC debt and differen-
tial investor bases between the two debt markets. FC bonds may have higher cash flow risk than
LC for several reasons. These include a government’s option to print money to service LC debt,
the danger that a sudden exchange rate depreciation may increase the real burden of servicing FC
debt, and the political economy costs of defaulting on your own citizens relative to defaulting on
foreign investors. On the other hand, foreign holders of LC debt face several risks not present in
FC eurobonds, including convertibility risk, as well as the risks of changing taxation and regula-
tion and more uncertain debt restructuring process under the domestic law. In addition, LC and
FC credit spreads can be different due to unhedged covariance between the exchange rate and the
default process. From a dollar investor’s perspective, swapped LC debt can have lower cash flow
risk if investors expect to gain profits from unwinding the swap position in the event of an LC
bond default.
In addition to differential cash flow risk, LC and FC debt markets have different investor bases.
While an increasing fraction of LC debt is being purchased by foreign investors, the majority is still
owned by domestic residents, commercial banks, and pension funds. These investors have few
investment opportunities outside of domestic government bonds because of domestic financial
underdevelopment or legal restrictions on their overseas investments. This can give rise to a
distinct local demand factor in pricing LC debt that is absent from FC debt, which is issued in
major international capital markets and purchased by diversified global investors. The existence
of local clientele potentially dampens the sensitivity of LC credit spreads to fundamentals and
global investor risk aversion shocks.
We study a model that allows for both differential cash flow risk and local clientele demand ef-
fects by introducing credit risk in the style of of Duffie and Singleton (1999) into a preferred habitat
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model that builds on Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) and Vayanos and Vila (2009). While allow-
ing the arrival rate of credit events for FC and LC to respond differently to a local and global risk
factor, we study a market structure where diversified global investors are the primary clientele for
FC debt, domestic investors are the primarily clientele for LC debt, and risk-averse arbitrageurs
partially integrate the two markets. In this framework, the equilibrium LC credit spread is an
endogenous outcome of arbitrageurs’ optimal portfolio demand and local clientele demand, with
the equilibrium impact of LC clientele demand depending on on the size of the position the arbi-
trageur is willing to take. This, in turn, depends on the arbitrageur’s risk aversion, the asset return
correlation, and the size and elasticity of local clientele demand.
Guided by the model’s predictions and comparative statics, we highlight the importance of
differential risk premia arising from the differential investor bases in pricing swapped LC and FC
bonds. The key mechanism we highlight is how changes in global risk aversion directly affect
FC spreads but are only partially transmitted into LC spreads by risk-averse arbitrageurs. Con-
sistent with the model’s predictions, we first show that global risk aversion, as proxied by VIX,
has a larger contemporaneous impact on FC credit spreads than on LC credit spreads, robust to
a large set of determinants of sovereign risk identified by the existing literature. Differential sen-
sitivity to VIX alone accounts for 25.6 percent of the within-country variation in the credit spread
differentials and 60 percent of total explained variation after controlling for a host of economic
fundamentals. Furthermore, differential contemporaneous impacts of VIX on LC and FC credit
spreads generate differential predictability of excess returns through the risk premium channel.
We show that high levels of VIX significantly forecast negative swapped LC over FC excess re-
turns. As predicted by the theory, we also find that LC credit spreads are more sensitive to global
risk aversion in countries with more correlated swapped LC and FC bond returns.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by explaining this paper’s place in the existing
literature. Section 1.2 explains the mechanics of cross currency swaps and formally introduces the
LC credit spread measure. Section 1.3 presents new stylized facts on LC sovereign risk. Section
1.4 lays out a no-arbitrage model of partially segmented markets with risky credit arbitrage. Sec-
tion 1.5 performs regression analysis to test several key predictions of the model and Section 1.6
concludes.
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1.1.1 Relation to the Literature
Ourwork is related to several distinct strands of literature: the enormous sovereign debt litera-
ture in international macroeconomics, the empirical sovereign and currency risk premia literature,
the literature on currency-specific corporate credit spreads, and the segmented market asset pric-
ing literature.
Recent work by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff demonstrates (Reinhart and Rogoff
2008, 2011) that LC sovereign borrowing and default are not new phenomena. Building on their
work, which focuses primarily on quantities, we focus on prices and jointly examine LC and FC
credit spreads. Prior to our work, the pricing of LC debt was rarely examined with exception
of Burger and Warnock (2007) and Burger, Warnock, and Warnock (2012), who studied ex-post
returns on LC bonds using the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Government Bond Index (EM-GBI)
index.
Using our dataset of daily yield curves and currency swaps, we document a series of new styl-
ized facts that we believe are important to integrate into the quantitative sovereign debt literature
that builds on Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). Given that an increasing fraction
of sovereign borrowing is in LC, our findings on how LC credit spreads behave differently than
FC credit spreads highlight the importance of moving away from the standard assumption in this
literature that governments borrow solely from foreign lenders using real debt.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on FC sovereign risk premia and currency risk
premia. Borri and Verdelhan (2011) demonstrate that FC spreads can be explained by modeling a
risk-averse investor who demands risk premia for holding sovereign debt because default gener-
ally occurs during bad times for the global investors. Using data on credit default swaps (CDS)
denominated in dollars, Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) show that global risk fac-
tors explain more of the variation in CDS spreads than do local factors. Our analysis confirms
these findings. In addition, we find support for the results of Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) and
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2012) that there is a common global factor in currency returns.
This motivates our use of cross currency swaps to separate this currency risk from the credit risk
on LC sovereign debt.
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Cross currency swaps have previously been used to test long-term covered interest parity
among government bond yields in developed countries. Popper (1993) and Fletcher and Taylor
(1994, 1996) document some deviations from covered parity, but they are an order of magnitude
smaller and much less persistent than those we document in our dataset of emerging markets.
Currency-dependent credit spreads implied from cross currency swaps have also received atten-
tion in the empirical corporate finance literature. McBrady and Schill (2007) demonstrate that
firms gauge credit spread differentials across different currencies when choosing the currency
denomination of their debt. Jankowitsch and Stefan (2005) highlight the role of the correlation
between FX and default risk in affecting currency-specific credit spreads. Lowenkron and Garcia
(2005) document that currency and credit risk, the so-called “cousin risk”, are positively linked in
some emerging markets, but not in others.
Finally, our theoretical model builds on the asset pricing literature on investors’ preferred
habitats and the limits to arbitrage. Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), building on Vayanos and
Vila (2009), examine the effect of increases in bond supply across the yield curve for U.S. Trea-
suries. The framework assumes that different maturities have different clienteles and each type of
investor invests only in a certain range of maturities (their “preferred habitat”). We study an en-
vironment where preferred habitats correspond to currencies and markets rather than maturities,
building on the cross-asset arbitrage theory presented by Gromb and Vayanos (2010), and solving
analytically for the endogenous LC bond price.
1.2 Cross Currency Swaps and Sovereign Credit Spreads
1.2.1 Cross Currency Swaps
For short-term instruments, FX forward contracts allow investors to purchase foreign exchange
at pre-determined forward rates. Beyond one year, liquidity is scarce in the forward markets and
long-term currency hedging via forwards is very costly. CCS contracts, on the other hand, allow
investors to conveniently hedge long-term currency risk. A CCS is an interest rate derivative con-
tract that allows two parties to exchange interest payments and principal denominated in two
currencies. A real-world example of hedging currency risk of an LC bond using CCS is given
in Appendix A.1. For emerging markets, CCS counterparties are usually large offshore financial
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institutions. To mitigate the counterparty risk embedded in CCS contracts, the common market
practice is to follow the Credit Support Annex of the International Swap and Derivative Associa-
tionMaster Agreement, which requires bilateral collateralization of CCS positions, and thus coun-
terparty risk is fairly negligible. For countries with non-deliverable FX forwards, CCS contracts
are cash settled in dollars based on LC notional amount and are free from currency convertibility
risk.
For our cross-country study, it is cumbersome to deal with coupon bearing bonds and par
swap rates due to the mismatch in coupon rates and payment dates between bonds and swaps.
We can extract the long-term FX forward premium (the zero-coupon swap rate) implicit in the
term structure of par swaps. Intuitively, a fixed for fixed LC/dollar CCS package can always be
considered as the sum of two interest rate swaps. First, the investor swaps the fixed LC cash flow
into a floating U.S. Libor cash flow8 and then swaps the floating U.S. Libor cash flow into a fixed
dollar cash flow. We can exploit the fact that the receiver of U.S. Libor must be indifferent between
offering a fixed LC or a fixed dollar cash flow. The difference in the two swap rates thus implies
the long-term currency view of the financial market. After performing this transformation, a CCS
is completely analogous to a standard forward contract. The specifics are given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Given implied log spot rates r˜LCτ,t from the fixed LC for U.S. Libor CCS and r˜USDτ,t from the
fixed dollar for Libor interest rate swap, the implicit long-term forward premium is equal to
ρnt ≡ 1τ ( f˜nt − st) = r˜
LC
nt − r˜USDnt ,
where f˜n is the pre-determined log forward exchange rate at which a transaction between LC and dollars
takes place n years ahead.
1.2.2 LC and FC Credit Spreads
The core of our dataset is daily zero-coupon yield curves and swap curves for LC and FC
sovereign bonds issued by 10 different emerging market governments from January, 2005 to De-
8 For Mexico, Hungary, Israel and Poland in our sample, this step itself combines two interest rate swaps: an onshore
plain vanilla LC fixed for LC floating interest rate swap and a cross-currency LC floating for U.S. Libor basis swap.
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cember, 2011. We use a benchmark tenor of 5 years. The choice of countries is mainly constrained
by the lack of sufficient numbers of FC bonds outstanding. Furthermore, all 10 sample countries
belong to the J.P. Morgan EM-GBI index, an investable index for emerging market LC bonds. The
length of the sample period is constrained by the availability of long-term currency swap data.
All data on cross currency swaps are collected from Bloomberg.9 Zero coupon yield curves are
collected or estimated from various data sources. The details on the yield curve construction are
given in Appendix A.2.
We work with log yields throughout the paper. To fix notations, we let y∗nt denote the n-year
zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bond yield, the long-term risk-free rate used throughout the paper.
Nominal LC and FC yields are denoted by yLCnt and yFCnt , respectively. We let ρnt denote the zero-
coupon swap rate, the implicit forward premium as defined in Proposition 1. All yields and swap
rates are for the n-year zero-coupon benchmark at date t. The conventional measure of sovereign
risk, the FC credit spread, measures the difference between the yield on FC debt and the U.S.
Treasury yield:
sFC/USnt = y
FC
nt − y∗nt.
Our newmeasure for LC sovereign risk, the LC credit spread, is defined as the nominal LC spread
over the the U.S. Treasury yield, minus the zero-coupon swap rate:
sSLC/USnt = y
LC
nt − y∗nt − ρnt,
or the deviation from long-term covered interest rate parity between the government bond yields.
There are two ways to interpret this measure. First, the dollar investor can create a swapped LC
bond by combining an LC bond with a CCS with the same promised cash flows. The synthetic
9 Extremely illiquid trading days with bid-ask spreads over 400 basis points on CCS are excluded from the analysis
(mainly for Indonesia during the 2008 crisis). All main results are not affected by including these extreme values. We
compare the difference in 1-year forward premia implied by the swap and the forward markets in Table A.1. The mean
correlation is 99 percent. Using annualized bid-ask spreads as a proxy for liquidity,swap contracts are, on average,
more liquid than short-term forward contracts (Table A.2) .
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dollar yield on the swapped LC bond is given by
ySLCnt = y
LC
nt − ρnt.
The LC credit spread is therefore equal to the dollar spread on this synthetic asset:
sSLC/USnt = (y
LC
nt − ρnt)− y∗nt = ySLCnt − y∗nt.
Hence, by holding the swapped LC bond to maturity, the LC credit spread gives the promised
dollar spread on the LC bond to dollar investors even if the LC depreciates, provided that explicit
default is avoided. In the event of default, the dollar investor can choose to unwind the swap
with an unmatched LC bond payment, which could result in additional FX profits or losses from
the swap. Second, investors valuing their returns in LC can combine a U.S. Treasury bond with
a fixed for fixed CCS to create an LC risk-free bond. The sum of the dollar risk-free and the CCS
rate gives the LC risk free rate
y∗LCnt = y∗nt + ρnt,
and thus the LC credit spread measures the yield spread of the LC bond over the LC risk-free rate:
sSLC/USnt = y
LC
nt − (y∗nt + ρnt) = yLCnt − y∗LCnt ,
and is a pure credit spread measure for local currency. Finally, the LC over FC credit spread
differential measures the spread between the yield on the synthetic dollar asset combining an LC
bond and CCS over the FC bond yield:
sSLC/FCnt = y
LC
nt − ρnt − yFCnt = sSLC/USnt − sFC/USnt .
From the issuer’s perspective, it gives the the difference between the synthetic dollar borrowing
cost in the local market and the actual dollar borrowing cost in the external market.
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1.3 New Stylized Facts on LC Sovereign Risk
1.3.1 Deviations from Long-Term CIP
If long-term covered interest parity holds for government bond yields, LC credit spreads
should equal zero in the absence of transaction costs. As a starting point, Figure 1.3 plots the
5-year swapped UK Treasury yield in dollars and the U.S. Treasury yield from 2000 to 2011. The
difference between the two curves, the UK LC credit spread, averages 10 basis points for the
full sample and 6 basis points excluding 2008-2009. Long-term CIP holds quite well between the
U.S. and the UK Treasury yields excluding 2008-2009. At the peak of the Global Financial Crisis
around the Lehman bankruptcy, the UK credit spread temporarily increased to 100 basis points
but returned to normal in a few months.
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Figure 1.3: 5-Year U.S. and Swapped UK Treasury Yields in percentage points. The green solid line plots
the 5-Year zero-coupon U.S. Treasury yield. The blue dash-dotted line plots the 5-year zero-
coupon swapped UK Treasury yield after applying a cross currency swap package consisting
of two plain vanilla interest rate swaps (dollar and sterling) and the U.S. and UK Libor cross-
currency basis swap. The orange dashed line plots the yield spread of the swapped UK Treasury
yield over the U.S. Treasury. The mean of the yield spreads is 10 basis points with standard
deviation equal to 16 basis points. The minimum spread is equal to negative 25 basis points
and the maximum spread is equal to 106 basis points during the peak of the crisis. Excluding
2008-2009, the mean spread is 6 basis points with standard deviation equal to 10 basis points.
Source: The U.S. zero-coupon yield is from St. Louis Fed. The UK zero-coupon yield is from
Bank of England. Swap rates are from Bloomberg.
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LC credit spreads in emerging markets offer a very different picture. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 1.4, where the 5-year zero-coupon yield spreads are plotted for our sample countries, large
persistent deviations from long-term covered interest parity are the norm rather than the excep-
tion. Column 1 in Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for 5-year LC spreads for the sample
period 2005-2011 at daily frequency. LC credit spreads, sSLC/US, have a cross-country mean of
128 basis points, calculated using the mid-rates on the swaps. Brazil records the highest mean
LC spreads equal to 313 basis points and Mexico and Peru have the lowest means about 60 basis
points. All mean LC credit spreads are positive and statistically significantly different from zero
using Newey-West standard errors allowing for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.10 Pos-
itive mean LC spreads are robust to taking into account the transaction costs of carrying out the
swaps. Column 4 provides summary statistics for liquidity of the cross currency swaps, baCCS/2,
defined as half of the bid-ask spread of cross currency swap rates, with the sample average equal
to 19 basis points. We perform statistical tests and find that LC credit spreads remain significantly
positive for every country after subtracting one half of the bid-ask spread on the CCS in order to
incorporate the transaction costs. Positive LC credit spreads suggest that emerging market nom-
inal LC sovereign bonds are not free from credit risk from the investor’s perspective. Although
the government has the option to print the domestic currency, inflation is not costless and explicit
repudiation of LC debt has happened in the past, such as Russia’s default on its Treasury bills in
1998.
10 Following Datta and Du (2012), missing data are treated as non-serially correlated for Newey-West implementa-
tions throughout the paper.
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Figure 1.4: 5-Year U.S. and Swapped UK Treasury Yields in percentage points. Each figure plots 10-day
moving averages of zero-coupon LC and FC spreads over the U.S. Treasury at 5 years. LC/US
denotes the LC yield over the U.S. Treasury yield. FC/US denotes the FC yield over the U.S.
Treasury yield. Zero-coupon swap rate is the zero-coupon fixed for fixed CCS rate implied from
par fixed for floating CCS and plain vanilla interest rate swap rates. Swapped LC/US denotes
the swapped LC over U.S. Treasury yield spread.
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Figure 1.4: (Continued) 5-Year U.S. and Swapped UK Treasury Yields in percentage points. Each figure
plots 10-day moving averages of zero-coupon LC and FC spreads over the U.S. Treasury at 5
years. LC/US denotes the LC yield over the U.S. Treasury yield. FC/US denotes the FC yield
over the U.S. Treasury yield. Zero-coupon swap rate is the zero-coupon fixed for fixed CCS rate
implied from par fixed for floating CCS and plain vanilla interest rate swap rates. Swapped
LC/US denotes the swapped LC over U.S. Treasury yield spread.
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1.3.2 Mean Levels of Credit Spreads
To compare the sovereign’s dollar borrowing costs using FC debt with the synthetic dollar bor-
rowing costs using LC debt, we perform an ex-ante credit spread comparison. FC credit spreads,
sFC/US, reported in Column 2 in Table 1.1 have a mean of 195 basis points, 67 basis points higher
than LC credit spreads based on the mid-rates for CCS. The difference increases to 86 basis points
after taking into account the transaction cost of carrying out the swaps. In Column 3, we compute
the difference between LC and FC credit spreads by country. The swapped LC over FC spread,
sSLC/FC, is significantly negative for all of our sample countries except Brazil. Although all our
sample countries have LC bond markets open to foreign investors, foreigners may still need to
incur transaction costs to buy in into LC markets. For 9 out of 10 countries with negative LC
swapped over FC spreads, the promised dollar spread on LC bonds is unambiguously lower than
that on FC bonds, since swapped LC over FC spreads would become more negative after taking
into account positive taxes on LC bonds.
Brazil offers an important exception. As a country offering one of the highest nominal interest
rates in the world, Brazil has implemented various measures to curb portfolio investment flows
and cross-border derivative trading as macro-prudential and exchange rate policy. The Imposto so-
bre Operaçoes Financieras (IOF), or tax on financial transactions, is currently set at 6 percent upfront
for all fixed income capital inflows into the country. Fortunately for our analysis, Brazil con-
ducted four large issuances of eurobonds denominated in reals traded at the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange. These bonds give offshore investors direct access to real-denominated sovereign rates
without paying the onshore taxes. In addition, these bonds are payable in dollars and thus foreign
investors are free from currency convertibility risk. Figure 1.5 shows that two long-term offshore
real-denominated bonds are traded at significantly lower spreads than 10-year onshore bonds.
Applying the CCS to the offshore LC yield generally gives a negative LC over FC spread. Be-
sides Brazil, Colombia and the Philippines, more recently, have also issued several LC eurobonds
payable in dollars. All the offshore LC bonds are currently traded at least 100 basis points tighter
than onshore bonds, which suggests that taxes and convertibility risk are important components
of the LC credit spread from the offshore investors’ perspective.
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Figure 1.5: Brazil Onshore andOffshore Yield Comparison. This figure plots nominal yieldsminus 10-year
zero-coupon real/dollar swap rates on two Eurobonds denominated in Brazilian reals traded at
the Luxembourg Stock Exchangewithmaturity years 2022 and 2028 (BRL 2022 by the green long-
dashed line and BRL 2028 by the blue short-dashed line). Offshore swapped yields are compared
with the 10-year zero-coupon onshore LC swapped yield plotted by the orange dash-dotted line
and the offshore FC dollar yield plotted by the red solid line.
Source: The onshore LC zero-coupon yield is obtained from ANBIMA. The FC zero-coupon
yield is estimated from Bloomberg BFV par yield curve. LC Eurobond yields are provided by
the Luxembourg Stock Exchange.
Despite the level difference in credit spreads, one might expect LC and FC credit risks to be
correlated within countries, as in downturns a country could find it more tempting to explicitly
default on both types of debt. Column 5 confirms this conjecture. The within-country correla-
tion between LC and FC credit spreads is positive for every country with a mean of 54 percent.
However, there is significant cross-country heterogeneity. The correlation is highest for Hungary
at 91% and lowest for Indonesia at 18%. This cross-country heterogeneity is a source of variation
that we will later use to argue for the importance of incomplete market integration in the relative
pricing of the two types of debt.
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Table 1.1: Mean LC and FC Credit Spread Comparison, 2005-2011. This table reports sample starting date,
mean and standard deviation of 5-year log yield spreads at daily frequency. The variables are
(1) sSLC/US, swapped LC over U.S. Treasury spread; (2) sFC/US, FC over U.S. Treasury spread; (3)
sSLC/FC , swapped LC over FC spread, or column (2) - column (1). (4) baCCS/2 , half of bid-ask
spread of cross-currency swaps. Standard deviations of the variables are reported in the parenthe-
ses. We test significance of means using Newey-West standard errors with 120-day lags. Standard
errors are omitted. Test results are reported for columns (1), (2) and (3), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Since the bid-ask spread is always nonnegative, significance tests are not performed for
column 4. Two additional tests are conducted for hypotheses (1) sSLC/US − baCCS/2 = 0 and
sSLC/FC − baCCS/2/2 = 0, both tests can be rejected at 5 percent or lower confidence levels for
all countries using Newey-West standard errors with 120-day lags. Column (5) reports within-
country correlations between sSLC/US and sFC/US.
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Country Start sSLC/US sFC/US sSLC/FC baCCS/2 Corr(SLC,FC)
Brazil Jul. 2006 3.13*** 1.78*** 1.35*** 0.32 0.56
(1.13) (0.91) (0.94) (0.13)
Colombia Jun. 2005 1.47*** 2.03*** -0.56*** 0.16 0.34
(0.69) (1.01) (1.01) (0.10)
Hungary Jan. 2005 1.69*** 2.15*** -0.47** 0.19 0.91
(1.23) (2.01) (1.03) (0.14)
Indonesia Apr. 2005 1.14*** 2.52*** -1.38*** 0.38 0.18
(0.73) (1.59) (1.61) (0.23)
Israel Feb. 2006 0.86*** 1.12*** -0.26*** 0.12 0.84
(0.43) (0.42) (0.21) (0.03)
Mexico Jan. 2005 0.60*** 1.44*** -0.83*** 0.09 0.66
(0.40) (0.79) (0.60) (0.06)
Peru Jul. 2006 0.55*** 1.97*** -1.42*** 0.16 0.34
(0.80) (1.05) (1.09) (0.07)
Philippines Mar. 2005 1.25*** 2.31*** -1.07*** 0.28 0.34
(0.80) (1.04) (1.07) (0.14)
Poland Mar. 2005 1.04*** 1.29*** -0.25** 0.12 0.78
(0.60) (1.01) (0.62) (0.08)
Turkey May 2005 1.46*** 2.57*** -1.12*** 0.11 0.78
(1.19) (1.20) (0.81) (0.08)
Total Jan. 2005 1.28*** 1.95*** -0.67*** 0.19 0.54
(1.06) (1.23) (1.22) (0.15)
Observations 13151 13151 13151 13151
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1.3.3 Widening Credit Spread Differentials During the Crisis
Despite the relatively short sample period, the years 2005-2011 cover dynamic world economic
events: the end of the great moderation, the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent recovery.
Figure 1.6 plots the difference in LC and FC credit spreads, sSLC/FC, across 10 countries over the
sample period. While swapped LC over FC spreads largely remain in negative territory (with the
exception of Brazil), the spreads significantly widened during the peak of the crisis following the
Lehman bankruptcy. The maximum difference between LC and FC credit spreads for any country
during the crisis was negative 10 percentage points for Indonesia.
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Figure 1.6: Swapped LC over FC spreads. This figure plots 30-day moving averages of 5-year zero-coupon
swapped LC over FC spreads (the difference between LC and FC credit spreads) using 5-year
cross currency swaps for all 10 sample countries.
Table 1.2 quantitatively documents the behavior of the credit spreads during the crisis peak
(defined approximately as the year following the Lehman bankruptcy from September 2008 to
September 2009), measured as the increase in spreads relative to their pre-crisis means. FC credit
spreads significantly increase in all countries and LC credit spreads increase significantly in 8 out
of the 10 sample countries, with the exceptions of Indonesia and Peru. However, the increase
in swapped LC spreads are generally less than the increase in FC spreads, as LC over FC credit
spread differentials are reduced for all countries except Brazil. The divergent behavior of these
19
credit spreads during the crisis peak highlights significant differences between LC and FC bonds,
and offers a key stylized fact to be examined in Sections 1.4 and 1.5.
Table 1.2: Changes in Credit Spreads During Crisis Peak (09/01/08 - 09/01/09). This table reports the mean
and standard deviation of changes in LC and FC credit spreads during the peak of the Global
Financial Crisis (09/01/2008-09/01/2009) relative to their pre-crisis means. (1) ∆sSLC/US is the
increase in swapped LC over U.S. Treasury spreads; (2) ∆sFC/US is the increase in the FC over
U.S. Treasury spreads; (3) ∆sSLC/FC is the increase in swapped LC over FC spreads, or column (2)-
column (1); and (4) ∆baCCS/2 is the increase in one half of bid-ask spreads. Standard deviations
of variables are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance of the means are tested using
Newey-West standard errors with 120-day lags. Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country ∆sSLC/US ∆sFC/US ∆sSLC/FC ∆baCCS/2
Brazil 1.93*** 1.82*** 0.11 0.26***
(1.13) (0.99) (0.66) (0.13)
Colombia 0.64*** 2.31*** -1.66*** 0.10***
(0.67) (1.21) (0.82) (0.18)
Hungary 2.70*** 3.80*** -1.10** 0.31***
(1.12) (2.17) (1.48) (0.22)
Indonesia 0.07 3.67*** -3.61*** 0.45***
(0.65) (2.17) (2.41) (0.39)
Israel 0.54*** 0.68*** -0.15*** 0.05***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.21) (0.04)
Mexico 0.60*** 1.97*** -1.38*** -0.03***
(0.30) (0.87) (0.80) (0.01)
Peru -0.05 2.21*** -2.26*** 0.07***
(0.95) (1.12) (0.81) (0.08)
Philippines 0.36*** 1.91*** -1.55*** 0.18***
(0.40) (1.28) (1.33) (0.22)
Poland 1.26*** 2.35*** -1.09*** 0.17***
(0.58) (0.92) (1.01) (0.09)
Turkey 1.89*** 2.70*** -0.81*** -0.06***
(1.44) (1.47) (0.86) (0.07)
Total 0.91*** 2.30*** -1.40*** 0.14***
(1.16) (1.48) (1.51) (0.22)
Observations 2058 2058 2058 2058
1.3.4 Cross-Country Correlations of Credit Spreads
In Table 1.3, we conduct a principal component (PC) analysis to determine the extent to which
fluctuations in the LC and FC credit spreads are driven by common components or by idiosyn-
cratic country shocks. In the first column, we see that the first principal component explains less
than 54% of the variation in LC credit spreads across countries. This is in sharp contrast to the FC
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Table 1.3: Cross-Country Correlation of Credit Spreads, 2005-2011. This table reports summary statistics of
principal component analysis and cross-country correlationmatrices of monthly 5-Year LC and FC
credit spreads and sovereign credit default swap spreads. The variables are (1) sSLC/US, swapped
LC over U.S. Treasury spreads; (2) sFC/US, FC over U.S. Treasury spreads; (3) 5Y CDS five-year
sovereign CDS spreads. The rows “First”, “Second”, “Third” report percentage and cumulative
percentage of total variations explained by the first, second and third principal components, re-
spectively. The row“Pairwise Corr.” reports the mean of all bilateral correlations for all country
pairs. All variables are end-of-the-month observations.
(1) (2) (3)
Principal sSLC/US sFC/US 5Y CDS
Components percentage total percentage total percentage total
First 53.49 53.49 81.52 81.52 80.02 80.02
Second 16.30 69.78 11.70 93.22 15.34 95.36
Third 10.17 79.95 3.68 96.90 2.06 97.41
Pairwise Corr. 0.42 0.78 0.77
spreads (Column 2) where over 81% of total variation is explained by the first PC. The first three
principal components explain slightly less than 80% of the total variation for LC credit spreads
whereas for FC credit spreads they explain about 97%. In addition, we find that the average pair-
wise correlation of LC credit spreads between countries is only 42%, in contrast to 78% for FC
credit spreads. These findings point to country-specific idiosyncratic components as important
drivers of LC credit spreads, in contrast to the FC market where global factors are by far the most
important.11
To link these results to the literature using CDS spreads as a measure of sovereign risk, we
perform the same principal component analysis for 5-year sovereign CDS spreads. The results, in
Column 3, are very similar to the FC results in Column 2: the first principal component explains
80 percent of total variation of CDS spreads and the pairwise correlation averages 77 percent. Our
result that an overwhelming amount of the variation in CDS spreads is explained by the first PC
supports the finding of Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), which shows that 64% of
CDS spreads are explained by the first principal component of 26 developed and emerging mar-
11 To assess how measurement errors in LC credit spreads relative to FC affect these results, we start with the null
hypothesis that LC and FC credit spreads are the same and then introduce i.i.d. Gaussian shocks to FC credit spreads
using simulations. We show that the variance of shocks to FC credit spreads need to be at least 90 basis points to match
the observed cross-country correlation in LC credit spreads, which corresponds to 6 times of the standard deviation of
observed one-way transaction costs (half of the observed bid-ask spread on cross currency swaps). These simulation
results are available upon request.
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kets. The sample period for their study is 2000-2010, but the authors find in the crisis subsample
of 2007-2010 that the first principal component accounts for 75% of the variation.
1.3.5 Correlation of Sovereign Risk with Global Risk Factors
Credit Spreads
After identifying an important global component in both LC and FC credit spreads, we now
try to understand what exactly this first principal component is capturing. In Table 1.4, we first
examine the correlation of the first PC’s of credit spreads with each other and with global risk
factors. The global risk factors include the Merrill Lynch U.S. BBB corporate bond spread over
the Treasuries, BBB/T, the implied volatility on S&P options, VIX, and the Chicago Fed National
Activity Index, CFNAI, which is the first PC of 85 monthly real economic indicators. Panel (A)
indicates that the first PC of FC credit spreads has remarkably high correlations with these three
global risk factors, 93% with VIX, 88% with BBB/T and 76% with global macro fundamentals
(or, more precisely, US fundamentals) proxied by the CFNAI index. The correlation between the
first PC of LC credit spreads and global risk factors are lower, but still substantial, with a 76%
correlation with VIX, 71% with BBB/T and 57% with CFNAI.
Table 1.4: Cross-Country Correlation of Credit Spreads, 2005-2011. This table reports correlations among
credit spreads and global risk factors. Panel (A) reports correlations between the first principal
component of credit spreads and global risk factors. Panel (B) reports average correlations be-
tween raw credit spreads in 10 sample countries and global risk factors. Panel (C) reports corre-
lations between global risk factors only. The three credit spreads are (1) sSLC/US, 5-year swapped
LC over U.S. Treasury spread; (2) sFC/US, 5-year FC over U.S. Treasury spread; and (3) 5Y CDS,
5-year sovereign credit default swap spread. The three global risk factors are (1)BBB/T, Merrill
Lynch BBB over 10-year Treasury spread; (2) -CFNAI, negative of the real-time Chicago Fed Na-
tional Activity Index, or the first principal component of 85 monthly economic indicators (positive
CFNAI indicates improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals), and (3) VIX, implied volatility
on the S&P index options. All variables use end-of-the-month observations.
(A) First PC of Credit Spreads (B) Raw Credit Spreads (C) Global Risk Factors
sSLC/US sFC/US 5Y CDS sSLC/US sFC/US 5Y CDS BBB/T -CFNAI VIX
sSLC/US 1.00 1.00
sFC/US 0.81 1.00 0.49 1.00
5Y CDS 0.80 0.94 1.00 0.48 0.91 1.00
BBB/T 0.71 0.88 0.89 0.38 0.66 0.62 1.00
-CFNAI 0.57 0.76 0.75 0.33 0.58 0.52 0.87 1.00
VIX 0.76 0.93 0.87 0.41 0.70 0.61 0.80 0.68 1.00
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Furthermore, since the first PC explains much more variation in FC credit spreads than in LC
credit spreads, the cross-country average correlation between raw credit spreads and global risk
factors is much higher for FC than for LC debt (Panel B). Notably, VIX has a mean correlation of
70 percent with FC credit spreads, but only 41 percent with LC credit spreads. This leads us to
conclude that the observed global factors are more important in driving spreads on FC debt than
on swapped LC debt. Unsurprisingly, the correlations between the global factors and the CDS
spread are very similar to the correlations between these factors and the FC spread.
Excess Returns
Having examined the ex-ante promised yields in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, we next turn to ex-post
realized returns. The natural measures to study are the excess returns of LC and FC bonds over
U.S. Treasury bonds. In particular, we run a series of beta regressions to examine how LC and FC
excess returns vary with global and local equity markets. Before turning to these results, we first
define the different types of returns. Since all yields spreads are for zero-coupon benchmarks, we
can quickly compute various excess returns for the holding period ∆t.12 The FC over US excess
holding period return for an n-year FC bond is equal to
rxFC/USn,t+∆t = ns
FC/US
nt − (n− ∆t)sFC/USn−∆t,t+∆t,
which represents the change in the log price of the FC bond over a U.S. Treasury bond of the same
maturity. Similarly, the currency-specific return differential of an LC bond over a U.S. Treasury
bond is given by
rxLC/USn,t+∆t = ns
LC/US
nt − (n− ∆t)sLC/USn−∆t,t+∆t.
Depending on the specific FX hedging strategies, we can translate rxLC/USn,t+∆t into three types of dollar
excess returns on LC bonds. First, the unhedged LC over US excess return, uhrxLC/USn,t+∆t , is equal to
the currency-specific return differential minus the ex-post LC depreciation:
uhrxLC/USn,t+∆t = rx
LC/US
n,t+∆t − (st+∆t − st),
12 For quarterly returns, ∆t is a quarter and we approximate sn−∆t,t+∆t with sn,t+∆t.
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where st denotes the log spot exchange rate. Second, the holding-period hedged LC over US excess
return, hrxLC/USn,t+∆t , is equal to the currency-specific return differential minus the ex-ante holding
period forward premium:
hrxLC/USn,t+∆t = rx
LC/US
n,t+∆t − ( ft,t+∆t − st),
where ft,t+∆t denotes the log forward rate at t for carrying out FX forward transaction ∆t ahead.
Third, swapped LC over US excess returns, srxLC/USn,t+∆t , is equal to the currency-specific return dif-
ferential minus the return on the currency swap:
srxLC/USn,t+∆t = rx
LC/US
n,t+∆t − [nρnt − (n− ∆t)ρn−∆t,t+∆t].
All three LC excess returns share the same component measuring the LC and US currency-specific
return differential. Depending on the specific FX hedging strategy, the ex-post LC depreciation, ex-
ante holding period forward premium and ex-post return on the currency swap affect unhedged,
hedged and swapped excess returns, respectively.13
Table 1.5 presents panel regression results for excess bond returns over local and global equity
excess returns. Global equity excess returns are defined as the quarterly return on the S&P 500
index over 3 month U.S. Treasury bills. We define two measures of LC equity excess returns
(holding-period hedged and long-term swapped) so that a foreign investor hedging her currency
risk in the local equity market has the same degree of hedging on her bond position. We find that
FC excess returns have significantly positive betas on both global and hedged LC equity returns,
with the loading on S&P being greater. Hedged and swapped LC excess returns do not load on
the S&P, but have a significantly positive beta on local equity returns. In contrast, FX unhedged
LC excess returns have positive betas on both the S&P and local equity returns.
We therefore conclude that, for foreign investors, the main risk of LC bonds is that emerging
market currencies depreciate when returns on global equities are low. This supports the results of
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) that common factors are important drivers of currency
13 The hedged excess return is a first-order approximation of the mark-to-market (MTM) dollar return on money mar-
ket hedging strategy by combining the LC bond with a long position in the domestic risk-free rate and a short position
in the dollar risk-free rate over the U.S. Treasury bond. The swapped excess return is the first order approximation of
the MTM dollar return on the bond and the CCS over the U.S. Treasury bond. The hedging notional is equal to the
initial market value of the LC bond and is dynamically rebalanced. All the empirical results of the paper are robust to
using the exact MTM accounting for the quarterly holding period.
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Table 1.5: Regressions of Bond Excess Returns on Equity Returns, 2005-2011.This table reports contempo-
raneous betas of bond quarterly excess returns on global and local equity excess returns. The de-
pendent variables are (1) and (4) rxFC/US, FC over U.S. Treasury bond excess returns; (2) hrxLC/US,
hedged LC over U.S. Treasury bond excess return using 3-month forward contracts; (3) and (6)
uhrxLC/US, unhedged LC over U.S. Treasury bond excess returns; and (5) srxLC/US, swapped LC
over U.S. Treasury bond excess returns All excess returns are computed based on the quarterly
holding period returns on 5-year zero-coupon benchmarks (annualized). The independent vari-
ables are S&P $rx, quarterly return on the S&P 500 index over 3-month U.S. T-bills; LC equity
hedged $rx, quarterly return on local MSCI index hedged using 3-month FX forward over 3-month
U.S. T-bills; and LC equity swapped $rx, quarterly return on local MSCI index combined with a 5-
year CCS over 3-month U.S. T-bills; All regressions are run at daily frequency with country fixed
effects using Newey-West standard errors with 120-day lags and clustering by date following
Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Significance levels are denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rxFC/US hrxLC/US uhrxLC/US rxFC/US srxLC/US uhrxLC/US
S&P $rx 0.17*** -0.023 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.0011 0.42***
(0.060) (0.057) (0.081) (0.055) (0.025) (0.086)
LC equity hedged $rx 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.33***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.049)
LC equity swapped $rx 0.066*** 0.099*** 0.19***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.047)
Observations 12,122 12,122 12,122 12,122 12,122 12,122
R-squared 0.485 0.314 0.498 0.438 0.159 0.416
returns. Our new result, however, is that once currency risk is removed, LC debt appears to be
much less risky than FC debt in the sense that it has significantly lower loadings on global equity
returns than FC debt.
1.3.6 Summary of Stylized Facts
We briefly summarize the results of Section 1.3. We first establish that emerging markets are
paying positive spreads over the risk-free rate on their LC sovereign borrowing. This result indi-
cates the failure of long-term covered interest parity for government bond yields between our ten
emergingmarkets and the United States. With themean LC credit spread equal to 128 basis points,
the failure is so large as to make clear the importance of credit risk on LC debt, rather than only
pointing to a temporary deviation from an arbitrage relationship as documented in developed
markets. Positive within-country correlations between LC credit spreads and the conventional
measure of sovereign risk, FC credit spreads, also highlight the role of sovereign risk on LC debt.
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Despite the positive correlation, LC and FC credit spreads differ along three important di-
mensions. First, while LC credit spreads are large and economically significant, they are gen-
erally lower than FC credit spreads. The difference between LC and FC credit spreads signifi-
cantly widened during the peak of the crisis following the Lehman bankruptcy. Second, FC credit
spreads are much more correlated across countries than LC credit spreads. Over 80% of the vari-
ation in FC spreads is explained by the first principal component. In contrast, only 53% of the
variation in LC credit spreads is explained by the first principal component, pointing to the rel-
ative importance of country-specific factors in driving LC spreads. Third, FC credit spreads are
much more correlated with global risk factors than LC credit spreads. We find that FC spreads are
very strongly correlated with global risk factors, including a remarkable 93% correlation between
the first PC of FC credit spreads and VIX. These results are mirrored in the return space, as excess
holding period returns on FC debt load heavily on global equity returns while excess returns on
swapped LC debt do not load on global equity returns once local equity returns are controlled.
The differences between LC and FC credit spreads have important implications. Given the
fact that the bulk of emerging market sovereign borrowing takes the form of LC debt, conven-
tional measures of sovereign risk based on FC credit spreads and CDS spreads no longer fully
characterize the costs of sovereign borrowing, the cross-country dependence of sovereign risk,
and sensitivities of sovereign spreads to global risk factors. Understanding why LC and FC credit
spreads differ is the main focus of the next two sections.
1.4 A No-Arbitrage Model with Risky Credit Arbitrage
1.4.1 Differential Cash Flow Risk and Investor Bases
Having documented a series of new stylized facts on the differential behavior of LC and FC
credit spreads, we now turn to explaining them. One natural explanation for the credit spread
differential is that swapped LC and FC bonds have differential cash flow risks. First, the sovereign
may have differential incentives to repay the debt. Since FC debt is mainly held by global investors
whereas LC bonds are mainly held by local pension funds and commercial banks, the government
may be more inclined default on FC obligations. On the other hand, if the sovereign cares more
26
about reputational costs among international creditors and the access to global capital markets,
they may have more incentive to default on local creditors.
Second, in terms of capacity to repay, sovereigns can print local currency and collect most of
their revenue in local currency. During periods of sharp exchange rate depreciation, it is easier for
the sovereigns to service LC debt than FC debt. However, given that LC debt now represents the
bulk of sovereign borrowing, defaulting on LC debt can be a more effective way to reduce debt
burden.
Third, since nearly all LC debt is issued under domestic law, LC debt is subject to the risk of
changing taxation, regulation, and custody risk, as well as a more uncertain bankruptcy proce-
dure. Offshore investors also face convertibility risk whereby a government prevents the repa-
triation of funds by introducing capital controls while avoiding technical default. FC bonds, on
the other hand, are predominantly governed under international law and are therefore free from
withholding taxes and from local government regulations.
Finally, even if the two types of debt always have the same recovery of face value upon de-
fault, there could potentially exist a wedge between credit spreads depending on FX depreciation
upon default. From a dollar investor’s perspective, when default on LC debt occurs, the investor
holding the swapped LC debt can unwind the swap contract with an unmatched LC principal
payment. This might result in additional profits in the swap position if the spot exchange rate de-
preciates relative to the ex-ante forward exchange rate upon default. On the other hand, if the spot
exchange rate depreciates upon default less than the ex-ante forward exchange rate, there would
be additional loss on the swap position. The covariance between default and FX risk is referred to
as the quanto adjustment.14
In addition to differential cash flow risk, the differential investor bases in domestic and ex-
ternal debt markets can also matter for the relative pricing of the two types of debt. FC bonds
are issued offshore,mainly targeting global investors. Although there has been increasing foreign
ownership in LC debt markets, the bulk of the LC debt is still held by local investors, such as
local pension funds, insurance companies, commercial banks and other government agencies. In
14 To remove the covariance term, the investor would need to enter a currency swap contract with a floating notional
linked to the LC bond payment (or a quanto swap). However, since EM LC bonds are not deliverable, LC credit linked
quanto swaps are rarely quoted in the market.
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emerging markets, these domestic entires are often required by law to hold a large fraction of their
portfolios in LC treasury bonds, which gives rise a distinct local clientele demand that is absent
from the external debt market.15 This local clientele demand can have equilibrium impacts in the
presence of frictions that create limits to arbitrage.
1.4.2 Environment
We formalize a parsimonious model allowing for different degrees of market integration via
risky credit arbitrage. The model builds on the preferred habitat framework presented in Vayanos
and Vila (2009), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) and Hamilton and Wu (2012), and surveyed in
Gromb and Vayanos (2010). Following Duffie and Singleton (1999), we take a reduced form ap-
proach to model arrival rates of credit events and allow them to depend on a local and a global
factor. We introduce partial market segmentation through threemain building blocks. First, we as-
sume that FC bonds are priced by risk-averse diversified global investors with a complete-market
stochastic discount factor (SDF) that only depends on the global factor. Global risk aversion shocks
affect FC credit spreads directly through FC bonds’ systematic exposure to the global shock. Sec-
ond, we allow for the existence of local clientele demand, modeled as downward sloping outside
demand with respect to the price of swapped LC bonds. Third, we assume that a risk-averse
credit arbitrageur integrates LC and FC markets by equalizing the price of risk across the two
markets adjusting for the onshore and offshore pricing wedge. As a result, the equilibrium LC
credit spread is an endogenous outcome of the arbitrageurs’ optimal portfolio demand and local
clientele demand. The equilibrium impact of the risky arbitrage depends the size of the position
the arbitrageur is willing to take, which in turn depends on the arbitrageur’s risk aversion, the
asset return correlation, and the size and elasticity of local clientele demand.
We begin by specifying a reduced form default process for the bonds. We define νi as the time
when bonds of type j = LC, FC issued by country i default, and the conditional survival intensity,
Ii,jt+1 as the probability that the bond does not default in period t+ 1 conditional on the fact that it
has not yet defaulted by period t. We let the survival intensity for bond j in country i depend on
15 Kumara and Pfau (2011) document stringent caps faced by emerging market pension funds in investing in local
equities and overseas assets.
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local
￿
zit
￿
and global (zwt ) factors:
Ii,jt+1 = P(ν
j
i > t+ 1|νji > t) = exp[−(λi,j0 + λjczit + λjwzwt + σjλcξ it+1 + σjλwξwt+1)].
For simplicity, we assume zero-recovery upon default. The local and global factors follow two
AR(1) processes:
zit+1 = ς
c + φczit + ξ
i
t+1
zwt+1 = ς
w + φwzwt + ξ
w
t+1,
where ξwt+1 and ξ
i
t+1 are independent standard normal innovations, ς
c and ςw are AR(1) drifts, and
φc and φw are the autoregressive coefficients. We interpret an increase in the factors as worsening
macroeconomic fundamentals that make default more likely. The global SDF is given by
− logMt+1 = −m∗t+1 = ψ0 − ψzwt − γξwt+1,
where γ indicates the risk aversion of global investors. The one-period risk-free rate is therefore
y∗1t = − log Et(Mt+1) = ψ0 − ψzwt − γ2/2.
1.4.3 Pricing FC and LC Bonds
In the case of one period bonds when defaulted bonds have zero recovery rates, the survival
process fully determines the bond returns. The variance of one-period log returns for bond j is
equal to (σj1)
2 ≡ (σjλc)2 + (σjλw)2. Given the global SDF and the one-period survival rate, the
one-period log FC spread over the risk-free rate is given by
sFC1t = − log Et(Mt+1 Ii,FCt+1 )− y∗1t = λFC0 + λFCw zwt + λFCc zit − (σFC1 )2/2+ γσFCλw .
The first set of terms λFC0 + λ
FC
c zit + λFCw zwt is the expected default loss of the bond conditional on
the factors. The term (σFC1 )
2/2 is the Jensen’s inequality correction from working with log yields.
The third term is the risk premium on the FC bond. When σλw > 0, defaults are more likely in
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the bad states of the world for the global investor, leading the FC bond to carry a positive risk
premium due to its systematic exposure to global shocks. This is the empirically relevant case as
demonstrated in Borri and Verdelhan (2011).
Now suppose that the local bond market has an outside clientele demand, i.e., local pension
funds, and there are risk-averse arbitrageurs who arbitrage between LC and FC markets. The
arbitrageurs take the FC spread priced by the global investor as given. The LC credit spread is an
equilibrium outcome of arbitrageurs’ portfolio demand and local clientele demand. Assume that
the arbitrageurs have power utility over next-period wealth with constant relative risk aversion
γa. As demonstrated in Campbell and Viceira (2002), the first-order condition of an arbitrageur’s
optimal portfolio decision is given by
Etr1t+1 − y∗1t + 12σ
2
t = γaVαt
where r1t+1 is a column vector of one-period log returns of the swapped LC and FC bonds, σ2t is
the variance of log excess returns, V is the variance-covariance matrix of log excess returns, and
αt is a column vector with the arbitrageur’s portfolio weights in LC and FC debt.
We conjecture that the LC credit spread sSLC/US1t is affine in the local and global factors z
i
t and
zwt and is given by
sSLC/US1t = (b10 + λ
SLC
0 − σ2SLC/2) + (b1c + λSLCc )zit + (b1w + λSLCw )zwt
where the spread parameters b10, b1c, and b1w will be solved for in the equilibrium. The expected
dollar return on swapped LC bonds is then equal to
EtrSLC1t+1 − y∗1t + σ2SLC/2 = (b10 + b1czit + b1wzwt )− (τ10 − q10),
where τ10 is the transaction cost (e.g. taxes on capital inflows) for offshore investors and q10 is
the quanto adjustment due to covariance between the exchange rate and the default process that
cannot be hedged away. We refer τ10 − q10 as the offshore pricing wedge because this valuation
adjustment only applies to offshore dollar investors. By inverting the variance-covariance ma-
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trix V, we can calculate the arbitrageur’s optimal portfolio weights in local and foreign currency
bonds, αSLCt and α
FC
t from the first-order condition:
 αSLC1t
αFC1t
 = 1
γa(1− ρ2r1)(σSLC1 )2(σFC1 )2
 (σFC1 )2 −ρr1σSLC1 σFC1
−ρr1σSLC1 σFC1 (σSLC1 )2
 (b10 + b1czit + b1wzwt )− (τ10 − q10)
γσFCλw
 ,
where ρr1 ≡ (σSLCλw σFCλw + σSLCλc σFCλc )/(σSLC1 σFC1 ) is the correlation in log returns. When log returns
are positively correlated, ρr1 > 0, the arbitrageur takes offsetting positions in LC and FC bonds to
hedge risk.
Following Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), we close the model by positing a downward slop-
ing excess clientele demand for LC bonds dSLCt (normalizing the supply of LC bonds to zero),
which is decreasing in the price of the swapped LC bond, pSLC1t ,
dSLC1t /W = κ1(−pSLC1t − β1),
with κ1 > 0. Local investors care about the price of the swapped LC bond because it can be
translated into how much the LC bond yields relative to the LC risk-free rate. Following Hamil-
ton and Wu (2012), we normalize the clientele demand by the level of arbitrageur’s wealth, W.
Furthermore, we assume that β1 is affine in factors and takes the form:
β1 =
￿
θ10 + λ
SLC
0 − (σSLC1 )2/2
￿
+ (θ1c + λ
SLC
c )z
i
t + (θ1w + λ
SLC
w )z
w
t + y
∗
1t.
In the absence of arbitrage, the market clearing condition requires that excess demand is zero,
and thus ySLCt = β1 and the expected excess return on swapped LC bonds is then equal to θ10 +
θ1czit + θw1wz
w
t . This parametrization of β1 allows us to conveniently summarize local demand as
the deviation from zero expected excess returns on swapped LC bonds that would occur in the
absence of arbitrage. Negative values of θ1c and θ1w dampen the sensitivity of the LC credit spread
to local and global shocks.
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Equilibrium requires that asset markets clear, or the arbitrageur’s optimal portfolio demand
exactly offsets local clientele demand:
αSLC1t + d
SLC
1t /W = 0.
Using the above equilibrium condition, we can solve for the equilibrium spread parameters b10,
b1c and b1w in closed forms as follows:
b10 = ω1θ10 + (1−ω1)(τ10 − q10) + δSLC1 γ, b1c = ω1θ1c and b1w = ω1θ1w, (1.1)
where
ω1 =
κ1
κ1 +
1
γa(1−ρ2r1)(σSLC1 )2
, and δSLC1 ≡
ρr1σSLC1 /σ
FC
1
κ1γa(1− ρ2r1)(σSLC1 )2 + 1
σFCλw .
Therefore, the equilibrium LC credit spread depends on the local demand shifters θ10, θ1c and θ1w,
the offshore pricing wedge τ10 − q10, and the global investor’s risk aversion γ. The exact magni-
tude of these equilibrium effects depend on the arbitrageur’s risk aversion, the return correlation
and the elasticity of local demand. These will be examined in the next subsection.
1.4.4 Comparative Statics
To gain intuition, we perform several comparative statics. First, we study the pass-through of
global risk aversion into the LC credit spread. The pass-through of global risk aversion into the
LC spread is the derivative of the spread sSLC/US1t with respect to risk aversion γ:
δSLC1 ≡
∂sSLC/US1t
∂γ
=
ρr1σSLC1 /σ
FC
1
κ1γa(1− ρ2r1)(σSLC1 )2 + 1
σFCλw , (1.2)
where we refer to δSLC as the pass-though parameter for swapped LC debt. Similarly, for FC debt,
we have that the pass-through of risk aversion γ into FC spreads sFC1t is given by:
δFC1 ≡
∂sFC/US1t
∂γ
= σFCλw .
It is straightforward to establish the following proposition using Equation 1.2:
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Proposition 2. (Pass-through of Global Risk Aversion) If the asset return correlation times the standard de-
viation of swapped LC returns is less than the standard deviation of FC returns
￿
ρr1σSLC1 < σ
FC
1
￿
, the pass-
through of global risk aversion shocks into the swapped LC spread is less than into FC spreads, δSLC1 < δ
FC
1 .
Furthermore, the pass-through into LC spreads is increasing in the return correlation
￿
∂δSLC1 /∂ρr1 > 0
￿
,
decreasing in the arbitrageur’s risk aversion
￿
∂δSLC1 /∂γ
a < 0
￿
, and decreasing in the elasticity of local
demand
￿
∂δSLC1 /∂κ1 < 0
￿
.
Although the price of risk is equalized across the two markets by the arbitrageur, the quantity
of risk can still be different. Under the condition that ρr1σSLC1 < σ
FC
1 , swapped LC bonds have a
lower quantity of risk. We can re-express this condition as βSLC/FC = Cov(rxSLCt+1 , rx
FC
t+1)/Var(rx
FC
t+1) <
1 in the beta regression of running swapped LC excess returns on FC excess returns:
rxSLCt+1 = β0 + βSLC/FCrx
FC
t+1 + ￿t+1.
Due to the lower quantity of risk, swapped LC bonds carry a lower risk premium. In the one-
period model, both ρr1 and σλw are given exogenously by the default processes and do not depend
on the local demands θ1c and θ1w. In Section A.3 of Appendix, we relax this feature of the model
in a multi-period specification in which the price of the bond next period is also uncertain even
in the absence of default and the price sensitivity depends on the local demand parameters. The
mechanism of pass-through of global risk aversion into the LC credit spread is as follows. An
increase in global risk aversion γ increases the FC spread and the expected excess returns on the
FC bond. Holding the arbitrageur’s risk aversion constant, the arbitrageur takes advantage of this
opportunity by going long in FC bonds and hedges her position by shorting swapped LC bonds,
which drives up the swapped LC spread. The pass-through of global risk aversion is lower into
the LC bond if the quantity of risk in LC bonds is lower.
The extent of the trade and its subsequent impact on the LC credit spread depends on three
key parameters. First, the differential pass-through depends on the return correlation ρr1. Higher
correlations increase LC pass-through by allowing the arbitrageur to better hedge her risk and
hence take a larger position. When returns are uncorrelated (ρr1 = 0), the pass-through is zero, and
when returns are perfectly correlated (ρr1 = 1), pass-through achieves its maximum at
σSLC1
σFC1
σFCλw .
Second, the differential pass-through depends on the arbitrageur’s risk aversion γa : an increase
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in arbitrageur risk aversion decreases pass-through. When γa is infinite, pass-through is zero
because the arbitrageur is too risk-averse to make any trades. When γa is zero, meaning that the
arbitrageur is risk-neutral, pass-through ismaximized for a given return correlation, ρr1. Third, the
differential pass-through depends on the elasticity of local clientele demand κ1 : An increase in the
elasticity of local clientele demand decreases pass-though. A more elastic local demand increases
the ability of the LC credit spread to absorb larger positions taken by arbitrageurs. When κ1 is
infinite, local clientele demand is perfectly elastic and therefore the LC credit spread is completely
determined by local conditions, leaving no room for arbitrageurs to play a role. On the other hand,
when κ1 = 0, local clientele demand is zero and thus pass-through is maximized.
In addition to capturing the default intensity and the risk premium, the equilibrium LC credit
spread is a weighted average of the onshore local clientele effects and the offshore pricing wedge.
The pass-through of local clientele effects into the LC credit spread in terms of level (θ10) and
sensitivities (θ1c, θ1w) to shocks is equal to
∂b10
∂θ10
=
∂b1c
∂θ1c
=
∂b1w
∂θ1w
= ω1 =
κ1
κ1 +
1
γa(1−ρ2r1)(σSLC1 )2
Interestingly, the pass-through of the offshore pricing wedge is equal to 1−ω1.
∂b10
∂τ10
= −∂b10
∂q10
= 1−ω1.
The parameter ω1 governs the relative importance of onshore and offshore investors in deter-
mining the equilibrium LC credit spread. Under complete segmentation (ω1 = 1), only the local
clientele matters, leaving no scope for offshore transaction costs or the covariance between the
exchange rate and defaults. On the other hand, under perfect integration (ω1 = 0), local clientele
effects are completely arbitraged away and the credit spread is entirely determined by offshore
credit valuation.
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1.4.5 Empirical Decomposition of Credit Spread Differentials
Using the model, we can decompose the difference in LC and FC credit spreads into three
components:
sSLC/FC1t = (λ˜0 + λ˜iz
i
t + λ˜wz
w
t − σ˜2/2￿ ￿￿ ￿)
differential recovery (convexity)
+ wn(θ10 + θ1czit + θ1wz
w
t ) + (1−ω1)(τ10 − q10)￿ ￿￿ ￿
weighted pricing wedge
+[δSLC1 (ω1)− δFC1 ]γ￿ ￿￿ ￿
risk premium
where x˜ ≡ xSLC − xFC. The first term in the curly bracket measures the difference in default inten-
sity between LC and FC bonds adjusting for convexity in log yields. The second term measures
the weighted onshore and offshore pricing wedges. Finally, the third termmeasures the difference
in risk premia, arising from risky arbitrage between the two markets.
To give an example of perfect market integration, Figure 1.7 shows LC (euro) and FC (dollar)
sovereign credit spreads for Italy. Prior to 2008, the two credit spreads were indistinguishable.
Starting in 2008, the euro credit spread became slightly lower than the dollar credit spread, re-
flecting either expected higher recovery on euro debt or depreciation of euro upon Italian default.
Despite the level difference, the within country correlation between the two credit spreads is 99
percent. On the other extreme, Russia displays extreme market segmentation between LC and
FC debt market during the 2008-09 crisis (Figure 1.8), as the LC credit spread reached negative
10 percentage points during the crisis. While the nominal government bond yield differential
was around 10 percentage points, the ruble/dollar CCS rate increased to 20 percentage points as
offshore investors were concerned that Russia would abandon the euro/dollar peg and devalue.
Local investors continued to hold LC debt despite extremely unattractive yields.
Our sample emerging markets are in between the two extreme cases of perfect integration
and complete segmentation. In the next section, we demonstrate that consistent with theory’s
predictions, differential sensitivities to global risk aversion shocks can explain large cross-sectional
and time series variations in credit spread differentials.
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Figure 1.7: 5-Year Sovereign Credit Spreads in Italy. The solid line FC credit spread plots 5-year yield
spreads of dollar denominated Italian sovereign bonds over U.S. Treasury bonds. The dotted
line LC credit spread plots 5-year yield spreads of euro-denominated Italian sovereign bonds
after swapping into dollars using the euro/dollar CCS over U.S. Treasury bonds. All data are
from Bloomberg.
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Figure 1.8: 5-Year Sovereign Credit Spreads in Russia. The solid line FC credit spread plots 5-year Russian
sovereign credit spread swaps spreads denominated in dollars (Russia does not have enough
dollar bonds outstanding to construct yield curves). The dotted line LC credit spread plots 5-
year yield spreads of Russian ruble-denominated Russian sovereign bonds after swapping into
dollars using the ruble/dollar CCS over U.S. Treasury bonds. Ruble bond yields are from the
Moscow Stock Exchange. All the other data are from Bloomberg.
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1.5 Differential Risk Premia
1.5.1 Benchmark Regressions
To test the model’s predictions on the differential pass-through of global risk aversion (γt)
summarized in Proposition 2, we perform a panel regression with country fixed effects:
sji,t = α
j
i + δ
jγt + λczit + λwz
w
t + ￿
j
it,
where i denotes country and j denote three different spreads, the LC credit spread (SLC), the FC
credit spread (FC), and the swapped LC over FC spread (SLC/FC). We first assume that δj, the
pass-through coefficient of global risk aversion, is the same across all countries, which will be
relaxed in the next subsection. Sensitivity to global and local risk factors is also assumed to be the
same across countries and to be time-invariant. We include a country fixed effect in the regression
to allow each country to have a different intercept for credit spreads. The theory predicts that the
pass-through coefficient of global risk aversion should be lower for LC credit spreads than for FC
credit spreads: δSLC < δFC, and as a result, δSLC/FC < 0. We use VIX as a proxy for the global
risk aversion γt,16 and a host of global and local macroeconomic variables as proxies for zit and
zwt . Table 1.6 reports regression results for (1) the LC credit spread (2) the FC credit spread and (3)
the swapped LC over FC spread, the difference between (1) and (2). By construction, the LC credit
spread is equal to the difference between the nominal LC over US spread and the swap rate. We
thus also report the regression results for the nominal LC over US spread in Column (4) and the
swap rate in Column (5) to better understand the determinants of the LC credit spread. Following
Driscoll and Kraay (1998), all regressions are run at monthly frequency with country fixed effects
using the Newey-West type standard errors with 12-month lags to account for within-country
serial correlation and clustering by month to correct for spatial correlation across countries for the
same month.
As our primary measure of global economic fundamentals, we use the Chicago Fed National
Activity Index (CFNAI), which is the first principal component 85 monthly economic indicators
of the U.S. economy. The next variable baCCS is equal to one half of the bid-ask spread on 5-year
16 We divide the conventional quote of VIX by
√
12 to measure unannualized implied volatility over the next 30 days.
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par cross currency swaps, measured in basis points. Although it is specifically a measure of the
liquidity on swaps, we use it as a proxy for the overall liquidity conditions in emerging mar-
ket fixed income markets, especially in the offshore markets. For local controls, we first include
LC Equity Vol. the realized standard deviation of local equity returns, measured using the daily
local MSCI equity returns for 30-day rolling windows. We expect this measure to reflect omit-
ted local fundamentals and local risk aversion. In addition, we include a set of country-specific
macroeconomic controls that previous literature has emphasized as potentially important in ex-
plaining sovereign spreads. These include the FC debt/GDP ratio, the LC debt/GDP ratio, the
level and volatility of monthly inflation and changes in the terms of trade, as well as monthly
changes in foreign exchange reserves.17
As predicted by the theory, VIX has a smaller impact on the LC credit spread than on the
FC credit spread conditional on macroeconomic fundamentals. The coefficient on VIX for the FC
credit spread is three times as large as the coefficient for the LC credit spread. The coefficient on
VIX in the LC over FC credit spread differential regression (Column 3) is negative and statistically
significant. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that an expected one percentage point in-
crease in the volatility of the S&P 500 over the next 30 days is associated with an 8 basis point
increase in the LC credit spread, a 23 basis point increase in the FC credit spread, and thus a 15
basis point reduction in the LC over FC credit spread differential. This risk aversion pass-through
differential is economically significant. In our estimated sample, a one standard deviation increase
in VIX over its mean decreases the credit spread differential by 45 basis points. The largest spike
in VIX following the Lehman bankruptcy corresponds to a 3.5 standard deviation increase in VIX
over the mean, which can generate a 157 basis point differential in LC and FC credit spreads,
controlling for the worsening local and global economic fundamentals during the crisis.
The importance of VIX in explaining credit spread differentials can also be seen from the R-
squared of regressions. VIX alone explains large fractions of the total variation in all credit spread
regressions, particularly for the FC credit spread. The within R-squared of a panel regression
17 Debt to GDP ratios are computed by aggregating the entire universe of individual sovereign bond issuance in
Bloomberg. Using this index, rather than the aggregated data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), we
obtain a higher frequency measure of the debt outstanding than the quarterly measure produced by the BIS. The corre-
lation between our debt/GDP ratios with the BIS official statistics is 96 percent for FC debt and 80 percent for LC debt.
More details on construction of macroeconomic controls are given in the Appendix Table A.3.
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with VIX as the only regressor is equal to 24.7 for the LC credit spread, 58.5 percent for the FC
credit spread, and 25.6 percent for the credit spread differential. Conditional on macroeconomic
fundamentals, VIX increases the R-squared of the regression from 27.1 to 30.1 percent for the
LC credit spread, from 62.2 to 72.8 percent for the FC credit spread and from 36.4 percent to
42.6 percent for the differential. Therefore, VIX alone accounts for 60 percent of total explained
variations in the credit spread differential. After controlling for fundamentals, VIX accounts for an
increase equal to 15 percent of total explained variations in explanatory power of the benchmark
regression.
Conditional on our host of controls, swap liquidity does not significantly affect the LC credit
spread. Although the bid-ask spread of the swap significantly increases with the swap rate, it is
also associated with a similar increase in the nominal LC over US spread. On the other hand, the
FC credit spread significantly increases with the bid-ask spread, despite the fact that no swaps
are used in the construction of the measure. This supports our use of the bid-ask spread on the
swap as a general measure of liquidity as well as a direct measure of swap liquidity. Furthermore,
we find that worsening global macroeconomic conditions, higher local equity volatility, higher FC
debt/GDP and higher inflation volatility all significantly increase the FC credit spread, but have
either insignificant or smaller impacts on the LC credit spread.
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Table 1.6: Regression of 5-Year Credit Spreads on VIX, 2005m1-2011m12. The dependent variables are
as follows: (1) sSLC/US, swapped LC over U.S. Treasury spread; (2) sFC/US, FC over U.S. Trea-
sury spread; (3) sSLC/FC, swapped LC over FC spread; (4) sLC/US, unhedged LC over US Trea-
sury spread; (5) CCS, 5-year zero-coupon cross-currency swap rate. The independent variables
are: VIX, monthly standard deviation of implied volatility on S&P index options (conventional
quote/
√
12); CFNAI, Chicago Fed National Activity Index; baCCS/s, one half of bid-ask spread
on 5-year par CCS in basis points; LC Equity Vol., realized standard deviation of daily local MSCI
equity returns computed using a moving window of 30 days; ∆IP, monthly percentage change in
country-specific industrial production index; FC Debt/GDP and LC Debt/GDP, monthly LC and FC
debt to GDP ratios aggregating from the entire universe of Bloomberg sovereign bonds outstand-
ing; ∆CPI, monthly percentage change in consumer price index; Std(∆CPI), standard deviation
of ∆CPI for the past 12 months; ∆ToT, monthly percentage change in terms of trade; Std(∆ToT),
standard deviation of ∆ToT for the past 12 months; and ∆Reserve, monthly percentage change in
FX reserves. All regressions are run at monthly frequency with country fixed effects using Newey-
West standard errors with 12-month lags clustered by month following Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sSLC/US sFC/US sSLC/FC sLC/US ccs
VIX 0.088*** 0.23*** -0.15*** 0.16*** 0.070**
(0.029) (0.019) (0.025) (0.043) (0.031)
CFNAI -0.017 -0.16*** 0.15 -0.15 -0.13
(0.082) (0.040) (0.094) (0.14) (0.13)
baCCS 0.0037 0.025*** -0.021*** 0.024*** 0.020***
(0.0049) (0.0025) (0.0056) (0.0092) (0.0058)
LC Equity Vol. 0.12 0.19** -0.065 0.19 0.071
(0.075) (0.082) (0.054) (0.17) (0.12)
∆IP -0.10 -0.076* -0.027 0.084 0.19*
(0.066) (0.040) (0.073) (0.11) (0.096)
Other Controls
FC Debt/GDP -0.026 0.12*** -0.15*** 0.0096 0.035
LC Debt/GDP -0.024 0.011 -0.035*** -0.052*** -0.028***
∆CPI 0.10* 0.033 0.068* 0.32*** 0.21***
Std(∆CPI) 0.39** 0.50*** -0.10 1.09*** 0.69***
∆ToT -0.0086 0.0077 -0.016** 0.011 0.019***
Std(∆ToT) 0.024 0.021 0.0032 0.27*** 0.25***
∆Reserve -0.0013 -0.011 0.010 -0.029** -0.028**
Observations 762 762 762 762 762
Within R-Squared
Full model 0.301 0.728 0.426 0.442 0.308
Without VIX 0.271 0.622 0.364 0.415 0.299
With VIX only 0.247 0.585 0.256 0.266 0.111
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1.5.2 Cross-Country Variation
We now relax the assumption that the pass-through of global risk-aversion into FC debt, δFC,
is the same across all countries. The theory predicts that the ratio of swapped LC to FC pass-
thorough δSLCi /δ
FC
i increases in ρ
i
r. To test this prediction, we obtain estimates of δˆSLCi and δˆ
FC
i from
the coefficients on the interaction terms between country dummies and VIX in the regression:
sji,t = α
j
1,i +∑
i
δ
j
iCiγt + λcz
i
t + λwz
w
t + ￿
j
it, (1.3)
where the country dummy Ci = 1 for country i. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.7 report the coefficient
estimates for δˆSLCi and δˆ
FC
i . For our model to find empirical support, we would expect countries
with a higher ratio δˆSLCi /δˆ
FC
i to have a higher return correlation. As demonstrated by comparing
Column 3, where we compute this ratio country by country, and Column 4, where we present the
return correlations, this is precisely what we find, with the correlation between the two columns
at a remarkable 84 percent. Differential sensitivities to VIX explain the bulk of the cross-sectional
variations in excess return correlations. We present this result visually in Figure 1.9, showing once
again that the strong positive relationship between the pass-through of risk aversion into the LC
credit spread relative to the FC credit spread and the return correlation between the two assets.
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Figure 1.9: Differential Risk Aversion Pass-Though and Return Correlation. This figure plots the ratio of
global risk aversion pass-through into LC credit spreads over the pass-through into FC credit
spreads on the y-axis (Column 3 in Table 1.7) and correlation between swapped LC and FC
quarterly holding period returns over U.S. Treasury bill rates on the x-axis (Column 4 in Table
1.7). The ratio of pass-through is computed based on Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.7. The full
regression specification is given by Equation 1.3.
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Table 1.7: Impact of VIX on Credit Spreads by Country. This table reports results of cross-country vari-
ations in the impact of VIX on credit spreads. Columns (1) and (2) report coefficients on VIX
interacting with country dummies in credit spread regressions with macroeconomic controls, as
specified by Equation 1.3. Column (1) reports the pass-through of VIX into LC credit spreads and
Column (2) reports the pass-through of VIX into FC credit spreads. All controls are the same as
in regression Table 1.6. All regressions are run at monthly frequency with country fixed effects
using Newey-West standard errors with 12-month lags clustered by month following Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (3) computes the ratios of coefficients in
Column (1) over Column (2) and Column (4) reports the correlation between swapped LC and
FC quarterly excess returns over the U.S. T-bill rates. A scatter plot of columns (3) against (4) is
shown in Figure 1.9.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δSLC δFC δSLC/δFC ρir
Brazil 0.19*** 0.14*** 1.33 0.73
(0.044) (0.025)
Colombia 0.046 0.24*** 0.19 0.32
(0.028) (0.020)
Hungary 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.88 0.56
(0.055) (0.059)
Indonesia -0.010 0.39*** -0.03 -0.13
(0.045) (0.076)
Israel 0.051 0.064* 0.79 0.91
(0.045) (0.034)
Mexico 0.066* 0.19*** 0.35 0.39
(0.039) (0.022)
Peru 0.043 0.23*** 0.19 0.16
(0.035) (0.037)
Philippines 0.016 0.24*** 0.07 0.21
(0.045) (0.043)
Poland 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.59 0.62
(0.031) (0.036)
Turkey 0.21*** 0.36*** 0.57 0.48
(0.055) (0.033)
All Macro Controls Yes Yes Correlation (3) and (4)
Observations 762 762 0.84
R-squared 0.404 0.782
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1.5.3 Excess Returns Predictability
We now present evidence on how differential risk premia affect the time series properties of
credit spreads. Since VIX has a contemporaneous positive impact on credit spreads through the
risk premium channel, high levels of VIX are associated with high risk premia, and hence high ex-
cess returns over U.S. Treasury bonds. Since VIX has a differential contemporaneous pass-through
into LC and FC credit spreads, we should also expect VIX to have differential predictive power
for LC and FC excess returns. Consistent with the prediction, we find that high VIX predicts
higher FC excess returns than swapped LC excess returns, and thus negative swapped LC over
FC excess returns. The negative predictive power of VIX for swapped LC over FC excess returns
naturally gives rise to an investment strategy. When global risk aversion is high, an arbitrageur
can long FC bonds and short swapped LC bonds. Since FC spreads are much more sensitive to the
global risk aversion shocks than swapped LC, high risk aversion predicts positive excess returns
on this strategy, which compensates for the risk that the arbitrageur takes. On the other hand,
global macroeconomic fundamentals marginally forecast persistence, rather than mean reversion
in swapped LC over FC excess returns once VIX is controlled. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
predictive power of VIX is due to its correlation with unobserved macroeconomic fundamentals.
In the first panel of Table 1.8, we examine the forecasting power of these variables for annual-
ized excess returns of swapped LC bonds over U.S. Treasury bonds for a quarterly holding period.
In the first regression, we see that high levels of VIX forecast excess returns at the quarterly hori-
zon with an R2 of 4.2%. We next run a second univariate forecasting regression and find that
CFNAI, our measure of local fundamentals, has similar forecasting power as VIX for swapped LC
excess returns. When we run a bivariate forecasting regression including both VIX and CFNAI in
the third row, both lose significance and the increase in forecasting power is marginal compared
to including VIX alone. Including the spread on the cross currency swap rate baCCS/2 and the
volatility on the local equity indices LCVol have little effect, but including industrial production
growth ∆IP leads to a significant increase in forecasting power. Higher industrial production
growth forecasts lower excess returns on swapped LC bonds.
In the second panel of Table 1.8, we repeat this forecasting exercise for excess returns on FC
bonds over U.S. Treasury bonds. In the first row, we see that VIX alone has an R2 of 10.1% and
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the coefficient on VIX is more than double the coefficient on VIX in the univariate regressions for
excess returns on swapped LC bonds, and the R2 is more than doubled as well. In the second
regression, we once again remove VIX to examine the forecasting power of CFNAI alone and
find that, in contrast to the results in the first panel, the R2 is only one quarter the value it is in
the univariate forecast using VIX. In the third row, we see that a forecasting regression with both
VIX and the CNFAI has an R2 less than one percentage point higher than for VIX alone. The
key finding is that conditional on VIX, the global fundamental does not forecast mean reversion
in returns. The magnitude of the coefficient on VIX actually increases by 45 basis points after
controlling for CFNAI, once again in sharp contrast to the forecasting results for swapped LC
excess returns. In the fourth row, we add our liquidity measure to these two variables and find
that the forecasting power of the regression is increased significantly to 15.5%. After adding the
full set of local controls, the coefficient on VIX is significantly positive at 2.82.
Finally, in the third panel, we examine how these variables forecast excess returns of swapped
LC bonds over FC bonds. In the first row, we see that higher levels of VIX forecast a negative
excess return of swapped LC over FC debt, as would be expected since we found in the first two
panels that elevated levels of VIX forecast much higher FC returns than swapped LC returns.
Looking at all 6 forecasting regressions in the third panel, we see that the forecasting strength of
VIX is sharpened as we add in ourmeasures for global fundamentals, global liquidity, local market
conditions, and miscellaneous controls. Because VIX covaries strongly with global fundamentals
and global fundamentals marginally forecast return persistence, the predictive power of VIX is
increased when we condition on fundamentals. Conditional on fundamentals, a one standard
deviation increase in VIX over its mean forecasts negative 6.3 percent annualized excess returns
of swapped LC over FC bonds.
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Table 1.8: Forecasting Quarterly Holding-Period Excess Returns, 2005m1-2011m12. This table reports an-
nualized quarterly return forecasting results for srxLC/USt+3 , swapped LC over U.S. excess returns,
rxFC/USt+3 , FC over US excess returns, and srx
LC/FC
t+3 , swapped LC over FC excess returns. See Ta-
ble 1.6 for definition of predictive variables. All regressions are run at monthly frequency with
country fixed effects using Newey-West standard errors with 12-month lags clustered by month
following Driscoll and Kraay (1998) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
VIX CFNAI baCCS/2 LC Vol ∆IP Other Controls R2
(1) 0.92** No 0.042
(0.41)
(2) -2.95** No 0.037
(1.24)
(3) 0.620 -1.460 No 0.047
(0.43) (1.53)
srxLC/USt+3 (4) 0.600 -1.370 0.0320 No 0.048
(0.45) (1.52) (0.046)
(5) 0.440 0.210 0.0180 1.010 -3.77*** No 0.078
(0.48) (1.25) (0.047) (0.98) (1.24)
(6) 0.710 -0.0770 -0.0210 0.300 -3.45** Yes 0.106
(0.54) (0.98) (0.045) (1.08) (1.50)
(1) 1.95*** No 0.101
(0.66)
(2) -3.330 No 0.025
(2.26)
(3) 2.49** 2.620 No 0.109
(1.07) (3.60)
rxFC/USt+3 (4) 2.21** 3.550 0.33*** No 0.155
(1.01) (3.78) (0.098)
(5) 2.08* 5.100 0.32*** 0.820 -3.69** No 0.170
(1.11) (3.80) (0.090) (1.32) (1.53)
(6) 2.82** 4.790 0.28*** 0.0240 -2.530 Yes 0.212
(1.36) (3.44) (0.065) (1.43) (1.69)
(1) -1.03*** No 0.028
(0.29)
(2) 0.380 No 0.000
(1.32)
(3) -1.87*** -4.09* No 0.047
(0.66) (2.35)
srxLC/FCt+3 (4) -1.61*** -4.93* -0.30*** No 0.085
(0.60) (2.60) (0.11)
(5) -1.64** -4.89* -0.30*** 0.190 -0.0790 No 0.085
(0.67) (2.75) (0.11) (1.05) (0.99)
(6) -2.12** -4.87* -0.30*** 0.270 -0.910 Yes 0.111
(0.86) (2.68) (0.089) (1.05) (0.80)
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1.6 Conclusion
The last decade has seen a remarkable change in emerging market government finance. No
longer do major emerging markets have to borrow in external markets in FC to borrow from
global investors. Instead, global investors are increasingly willing to lend to emerging market
governments by investing in LC debt issued in domestic markets. Despite these major changes,
the academic literature on sovereign risk still remains focused on emerging market debt crises
involving FC debt issued abroad. In this paper, we tried to understand the impact of these changes
by jointly examining the sovereign risk on LC and FC debt. To do so, we introduce a newmeasure
of LC sovereign risk, the LC credit spread, defined as the difference between LC bond yield and
the LC risk-free rate implied from the swap market.
This new measure delivers several key findings. First, emerging market LC bonds promise to
pay a significant positive spread over the risk-free rate, direct evidence for the failure of long-term
covered interest rate parity for government bond yields between emergingmarkets and theUnited
States. Second, LC debt has lower credit spreads than FC debt issued by the same sovereign at
the same tenor. The LC over FC credit spread differential becomes even more negative during
the peak of the crisis. Third, FC credit spreads are very integrated across countries and more
responsive to global risk factors, but LC credit spreads are much less so. From an offshore in-
vestor’s perspective, the commonly perceived systematic risk on LC debt mainly comes from the
currency risk. Once the currency risk is hedged, LC bonds are safer than FC bonds in terms of the
correlations between asset returns and global risk factors.
We rationalize these new empirical findings using a model allowing for partial integration
between domestic and external debt markets. The model features local investors with preferred
habitats in the LC debt and risky credit arbitrage between the domestic and external markets.
The equilibrium LC credit spread is a weighted average of credit valuation of local clienteles and
offshore investors. Consistent with the model’s prediction, we find that differential exposure to
global risk aversion explains a significant portion of the cross-country and time series variations
in credit spread differentials, conditional on a host of macroeconomic variables. The differential
sensitivities of LC and FC credit spreads to global risk aversion shocks sheds light on the degree
of market integration between domestic and external debt markets.
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While our reduced form model captures many of the new stylized facts that we document,
we have abstracted from how the sovereign decides whether to issue LC or FC debt. Integrating
our empirical findings using price data into sovereign issuance patterns using bond supply and
ownership data is part of ongoing research.
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2. THE END OF“ORIGINAL SIN”: NOMINAL BOND RISK IN EMERGING
MARKETS1
2.1 Introduction
Today, emerging markets rarely issue local currency (LC) debt in international markets but
they are borrow from foreign lenders in their own currency. This apparent contradiction comes
from the fact that foreign investors are increasingly investing directly LC sovereign bonds issued
in domestic markets under domestic law. While this may seem to be an insignificant develop-
ment, we argue that it demonstrates the end of a major issue in international economics: “Original
Sin.” In an important and influential paper, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) demonstrated that
emerging markets were particular vulnerable to financial crises because they had all of their exter-
nal liabilities denominated in foreign currency (FC). A large literature followed, emphasizing that
a country’s inability to borrow abroad in their own currency at long tenors, “Original Sin” was a
major source of macroeconomic fragility in emerging markets.
In this paper, we demonstrate just how dramatically this situation has changed over the last
decade and show that local currency now constitutes a large and growing portion of emerging
market sovereign external borrowing. However, countries did not overcome Original Sin by issu-
ing LC debt in international markets. Rather, foreign investors began lending to emergingmarkets
by purchasing bonds in domestic markets, even though this leaves them exposed to capital control
risk, custodial risk, and other risks in addition to the nominal risks of inflation and exchange rate
depreciation. Using a new compiled dataset on foreign participation in domestic sovereign bond
markets, we show that since the mid-2000s, foreign ownership has been growing rapidly and now
stands at over 20 percent of total domestic debt outstanding for many countries, and significantly
higher for several emerging markets. Using more refined ownership data for Brazil, Poland, Peru
1 Joint with Jesse Schreger, Harvard University
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and Mexico, we show that foreigners are particularly interested in holding nominal fixed rate
bonds, even when inflation-linked and floating-rate bonds are available. For many emerging mar-
kets, LC debt not only provides the majority of government finance, but also provides the majority
of financing from foreign investors.
Du and Schreger (2013) study the behavior of the credit component of LC sovereign bonds by
hedging away nominal interest rate risk using currency swaps, and contrast it with dollar credit
spread on the external debt issued by the same sovereign. In this paper, we directly study the
risk of LC nominal bonds without of hedging away the duration risk. We focus on the excess
holding period returns of LC bonds over LC short rates for local investors. From dollar investors’
perspective, this approximates the dollar excess return on LC bonds over the dollar short rate after
hedging away the currency risk of the holding period. Using the systematic exposure of bond
duration risk with local and global equity risk factors, we address the following three questions.
First, how are nominal bond risks different across countries? Second, why are nominal bond risks
different across countries? And third, what is the implication of differential nominal bond risk on
sovereign debt portfolio consisting of local and FC debt?
Examining a sample of 11 developed markets and 20 emerging markets from 2005 to 2012, we
find that while emerging market equity returns are far more correlated with US equity returns
than emerging market bond returns are with US Treasury returns. The lack of synchronization in
nominal bond returns between emerging markets and the U.S. reflects large cross-country vari-
ations in risk of nominal bonds. We define the risk of nominal bonds as the CAPM betas of the
bond excess returns on local and global equity excess returns. We show that nominal bonds in
G10 currencies all have negative betas with local equity and S&P excess returns. In the sample of
emerging markets, local bond betas with local equities exhibit large cross-country heterogeneity,
ranging from -0.14 for Hong Kong to 0.3 for Indonesia.
We then explain the cross-sectional distribution of bond betas in terms of cross country differ-
ences in the conduct of monetary policy. The negative betas of G10 currency bonds for the sample
period is consistent with the finding that in developed countries, government bonds have become
a good hedge for equity investors over the past decade.2 Under countercyclical monetary policy
2 Eurozone countries experiencing sovereign debt crises are obvious exceptions.
50
and procyclical inflation rates, negative macroeconomic shocks lower inflation expectation and
increase expected future real cash flows, giving rise to positive returns on nominal bonds. For
emerging markets, one of the main benefits of being able to borrow using nominal fixed rate LC
debt is that it provides more state contingency compared with FC borrowing. During the bad
states of the world, the government has the option to resort to inflation to reduce the real burden
of the debt. In anticipation of inflationary policy during downturn, nominal bonds may carry
positive inflation risk premium. We document a large degree of heterogeneity across our sample
countries in the degree to which LC debt acts a hedge for the return on the market portfolio.
The risk profile of LC nominal bonds have significant implications on a country’s sovereign
debt portfolios and external default risk. The cross-sectional variation in bond betas are strongly
correlated with the primary external sovereign default risk measure, the sovereign credit default
swap (CDS) spreads. Countries with higher bond betas also have high CDS spreads, with the
cross-sectional correlation at 91 percent. Furthermore, countries with negative or low bond betas
almost exclusively borrow in local currencies, whereas countries with high bond betas rely more
on FC financing.
We test the hypothesis that the risk differential can be explained by the cyclicality of monetary
policy. Using professional forecast data, we compute the sensitivity of revisions to output forecasts
with respect to revisions to inflation forecasts as a proxy for investors’ ex-ante expectation of the
cyclicality of inflation. We show countries with higher expected inflation procyclicality tend to
have lower bond betas. In addition, we show that cross-sectional and time series variation in the
perceived inflation procyclicality are highly correlated with the development of LC nominal bond
markets. The expansion of nominal debt markets coincided over the past decade with a sharp
reduction in the counter-cyclicality of inflation rates.
To better understand these observed empirical patterns, we develop a simple general equilib-
riummodel where the sovereign decides whether to borrow in LC or FC debt. We show that when
the government is unable to commit to repayment or to state-contingent inflation rules, countries
with higher external financing needs tend to have lower fractions of debt financed in LC, higher
default risk, higher inflation levels and inflation risk premia. In an extension with a decision be-
tween financing borrowing domestically or externally, we show that the option to borrow from
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domestic markets can alleviate the time-consistency problem due to external borrowing and shift
the currency composition of the external sovereign debt portfolio toward LC debt.
2.2 Related Literature
In addition to building on recent empirical work on LC domestic debt (Du and Schreger, 2013
and Burger, Warnock, and Warnock, 2012), our paper directly addresses the large literature on
“Original Sin”. This large literature, beginning with Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), points
to the absense of international issuances of long-term fixed coupon LC debt as a missing market.
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) discuss a number or reasons for the absence of this market,
briefly discussing our favored explanation, saying “If a country was able to borrow abroad in its
own currency, it would stand to benefit by depreciating that currency and thus eroding the real
value of its external debts. In anticipation of this, foreigners are unwilling to lend in a denomina-
tion that the borrower can manipulate unless they are compensated to an extent that only those
borrowers planning to devalue are prepared to pay.” We build on this line of thinking, arguing
that the strength of the temptation to inflate away debt ex post will factor into a government’s
optimal choice of the currency composition ex ante. By looking at this issue in general equilib-
rium we show that if a country’s external financing needs are large, a government might shift its
currency composition of debt towards FC debt, eschewing LC debt at higher interest rates.
By collecting a new dataset on foreign holdings of domestic debt, our work fills in an impor-
tant gap in the empirical research on the currency composition of sovereign debt, such as Eichen-
green, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005a). Hausmann and Panizza (2011) also examine foreign par-
ticipation in emerging market LC debt markets using surveys of US investors from 2003-2007.
While these authors presented compelling evidence that emerging markets issued little to no debt
abroad, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2011) present evidence that domestic debt was always an im-
portant part of emerging market government finance. We view our present work as integrating
these two lines of inquiry: while very little debt issued under foreign law and in international mar-
kets is in LC, as demonstrated in the Original Sin literature, we argue that foreign investment in
LC bonds issued in domestic markets under domestic law takes the place of the “missing market”
discussed in Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
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Our paper builds on recent work by Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2013) demonstrating
that the covariance between US Treasury bond returns and stock returns has changed dramatically
the past few decades. Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2013) show that since the mid-1990s
the covariance has become negative, meaning that US nominal bonds are now a hedge for the
domestic equity market. We build on their work by examining the cross-country heterogeneity
in bond/stock covariances in emerging markets and argue that this heterogeneity helps under-
stand the different risk premia embedded in LC debt and the different currency composition of
sovereign portfolios.
Our theoretical framework builds on the optimal debt management literature, in particular the
time consistency argument presented in Bohn (1988, 1991). Bohn (1988) demonstrates that when
taxation is costly, a welfare maximizing government will issue nominal debt to help smooth the
tax burden over time. However, issuing nominal debt worsens the time inconsistency problem in
monetary policy, as existing nominal debt can effectively be treated as an inelastic tax base. Bohn
(1991) illustrates how this time inconsistency problem is worsened in the open economy, as in
addition to tax-smoothing motives, if nominal debt is held by foreigners and the government is
only concerned with domestic welfare, policymakers will be tempted to use surprise inflation to
achieve a real wealth transfer from foreign lenders to domestic residents. Niemann, Pichler, and
Sorger (Forthcoming) quantifies the time inconsistency induced by nominal debt in the closed
economy and demonstrates how the time consistency problem in nominal debt can explain infla-
tion persistence. Our paper builds on this line of research by examining the question in an open
economy and introducing sovereign default. Whereas in Bohn’s work, the government might
find it optimal to overcome the time inconsistency problem by issuing real debt, these papers did
not address the possibility that the government lacked the ability to commit to repaying this real
debt. By introducing a government debt denomination choice along with sovereign default, our
paper addresses how governments can use a mix of debt denomination to try to alleviate the time
inconsistency problem inherent in both types of sovereign borrowing.
Our paper also contributes to the large literature on sovereign default, beginning with Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), and the quantitative models of sovereign default following Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006). Our paper is most similar to Aguiar, Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath (2013), where
the authors also consider defaultable nominal debt and how inflation commitment affects the
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probability of outright default. Our paper differs from Aguiar, Amador, Farhi, and Gopinath
(2013) in a few important ways: first, we examine strategic default rather than rollover crises,
second, we introduce portfolio choice so that only an (endogenous) fraction of the debt is de-
faultable, and third, we introduce domestic creditors as an additional source of financing. Our
paper is also similar to Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) by introducing government portfolio
choice into a quantitative model of sovereign default. While these two papers consider short-term
and long-term debt, and we consider the currency composition, both papers are focused on the
optimal portfolio of defaultable sovereign debt to best hedge against shocks hitting the economy.
Finally, our paper is closely related to Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010) and Broner, Erce, Martin,
and Ventura (2013) on the interaction between domestic and external creditors in the secondary
markets.
2.3 The End of “Original Sin”
We construct a new dataset of ownership of domestic debt in 11 emerging markets from indi-
vidual central banks, finance ministries, and the Asian Development Bank. Our data for Peru and
Poland contain monthly data on the ownership structure at the individual bond level, with data
for both countries coming from the respective Ministries of Finance. For Colombia and Brazil, our
dataset contains monthly ownership data at the level of broader security classes (fixed coupon,
inflation-indexed, floating rate, or foreign exchange linked debt). We have daily data at a similar
level of disaggregation for Mexico from the central bank.3 Data for Hungary and Turkey are also
from the national central banks but are not available at similar levels of disaggregation. Owner-
ship data for Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Japan, Malaysia comes from AsianBondsOnline,
an online data source produced by the Asian Development Bank. For these countries only aggre-
gate LC debt ownership at a quarterly frequency is available. Finally, for the US, UK and European
countries, we use the dataset constructed by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
Contrary to the common belief that emerging markets cannot borrow in their own currency
at fixed nominal rates, Figure 2.1 shows that the share of LC debt owned by foreigners increased
3 The Mexican and Polish data is available on the government websites. We digitized monthly reports (available as
PDFs) online to construct our time series for Peru and Colombia. We received the Brazilian data from the central bank.
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from 9 percent in 2005 to 23 percent in 2011 in the sample emerging markets, now higher than the
share in Japan, comparable with the share in the US and the UK, albeit lower than the share in the
euro area. Figure 2.2 gives the time series of foreign ownership of domestic LC debt during the
past decade. Foreigners started buying into LC bondmarkets in themid-2000s except for Hungary
and Poland where foreign ownership took place earlier. During the peak of the Global Financial
Crisis in 2008-09, foreigners significantly reduced their holdings. The trend rapid growth resumed
shortly after the crisis peak.
Figure 2.1: Foreign Ownership of Government Debt in Emerging and Developed Markets. This figure
displays shares of domestic government debt owned by foreigners in emerging markets and
developed countries. Data sources are described in Section 2.3.
In addition, for countries with ownership data by security class (Mexico, Brazil, Peru and
Poland), we show in Figure 2.3 that foreigners are particularly interested in holding nominal
bonds, even though inflation-linked and floating-rate bonds are available. Peru, a country that
experienced hyperinflation as recently as 1990, now finances more than 60 percent of its LC debt
from foreigners in nominal fixed rate instruments. Figure 2.4 displays this remarkable change in
Peru. The left panel plots the ownership structure of all LC bonds outstanding in February, 2004.
The majority of LC fixed coupon bonds had under three years of remaining maturity and all were
held locally. This picture has completely changed by December, 2012, where most of the debt has
a remaining maturity of more than 10 years and the majority is now foreign-owned.
Putting these new stylized facts together, we can see that foreign investors have a growing
appetite for nominal risk in emerging markets. LC debt is an increasingly important component
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Figure 2.2: Time Series of Foreign Ownership of Government Debt in Emerging Markets. This figure
plots time series of fraction of LC debt owned by foreigners for sample emerging markets. Data
sources are described in Section 2.3.
of external debt. While the “Original Sin” hypothesis seemingly holds in the very strict sense that
most emerging market debt issued in international markets is still in FC, it is mostly likely due to
sovereigns’ unwillingness rather than inability to tap international markets in LC. As discussed in
Du and Schreger (2013), a few emerging markets, such as Brazil, Colombia and Philippines, have
issued LC denominated bonds in the international market. These offshore bonds are traded at
significantly lower yields compared with onshore bonds. From a foreign investor’s perspective,
offshore LC bonds are safer assets because they are governed under international law and free
from capital control risk. If foreign investors are already willing to take onshore nominal risk, it is
difficult to argue why they would not want to hold offshore LC bonds.
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Figure 2.3: Ownership of Domestic Debt by Security Type in 2012. This figure plots the share of domestic
government debt by ownership and security type in the end of 2012. ‘Fixed” denotes fixed
or zero coupon nominal bonds; “Inflation” denotes inflation-linked real bonds; and “Floating”
denotes floating bonds. Data sources are described in Section 2.3.
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(a) April 2004
(b) December 2012
Figure 2.4: Ownership Structure of Peruvian Nominal Bonds (millions of nuevo soles). X-axis number of
years of remaining on maturity on a given bond. “10” indicates bonds with 10-15 years remain-
ingmaturity, “15” years 15-20 years, and “20” refers to bonds withmore than 20 years remiaining
maturity. Vertical axis is millions of nuevo soles. The bars are sums of ownership across bonds
within a given maturity bin. Data sources are described in Section 2.3.
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2.4 Measuring Nominal Bond Risks
2.4.1 Definition of Nominal Bond Betas
We use Bloomberg fair value (BFV) curves to compute excess holding period return on the
constant maturity 10-year bond yield in emerging markets from 2005 to 2012.4 The BFV curves
are estimated using individual LC sovereign bond prices traded in the secondary markets. Since
sufficient numbers of bonds spanning different maturities are needed for yield curve estimation,
the availability of the BFV curve is a good indicator for the overall development of LC nominal
bond market. Countries such as Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela only have a handful of fixed-
rate bonds and hence do not have a BFV curve.
Given the log yield on a n-year bond traded at par ycnt = log(Ycnt), the log holding period
return on the bond is given by
rbc,n,t+∆t ≈ Dcnycnt − (Dcn − ∆t)yc,n−1,t+∆t,
where Dcn = 1−(1+Ycnt)
−n
1−(1+Ycnt)−1 is the duration of the bond (Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay, 1997). We
approximate yc,n−∆t,t+∆t by yc,n,t+∆t for the the quarterly holding period (∆t = 0.25). We let y1t
denote the three-month T-bill yield and then the excess return on LC bonds over the short rate is
given by
rxbn,t+∆t = r
b
c,n,t+∆t − yt1.
From a dollar investor’s perspective, we can rewrite excess return as
rxbn,t+∆t = [r
b
c,n,t+∆t − (yt1 − y∗t1)]− y∗t1.
The dollar investor can hedge away the currency risk of the holding period ∆t by going long a
U.S. T-bill and shorting a LC T-bill with the same market value as the LC bond. By doing so, any
movement in the spot exchange rate of the LC has the same offsetting first-order impact on the
bond position and the local T-bill position and hence cancels out. However, since the cash flow
4 Yield curves for Brazil and Israel are obtained from ANBIMA and the Central Bank of Israel, respectively. Since
Turkey issued 10-year bonds only recently, we use 5-year as benchmark instead for Turkey.
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is uncertain next period, a dollar investor may under or over hedge depending on the realization
of the bond price and incur a second-order hedging error. Therefore, LC excess returns provide a
first-order approximation of hedged dollar excess return of a LC bond over the U.S. T-bill. Since
currency risk is only hedged away for the holding period, the dollar investor still bears duration
risk of the LC bond.
Alternatively, a dollar investor can choose not to hedge the FX risk. The realized dollar un-
hedged excess return is equal to
rxb,$n,t+∆t = rc,n,t+∆t − (st+∆t − st)− y∗t1 = rxn,t+∆t + [(yt1 − y∗t1)− (st+∆t − st)],
where st denote the spot exchange rate of LC. The unhedged excess return on the LC bond is equal
to equal to LC excess returns plus the realized return on the carry trade strategy of going long in
LC T-bill funded by shorting a dollar T-bill.
We use three measures to compute nominal bond returns. First, we compute the local bond
beta βLi for each country i by regressing LC bond excess return rx
b,i
t+∆t on local equity excess returns
rxm,it+∆t:
rxb,it+∆t = α
L
i + β
L
i rx
m,i
t+∆t + ￿
L
it.
Local betas measure risk exposure of local bond returns on local equity returns. Second, we com-
pute the hedged global beta βGi for each country i by running LC bond excess returns on the S&P
excess returns rxm,SPt+∆ :
rxb,it+∆t = α
G
i + β
G
i rx
m,SP
t+∆t + ￿
G
it .
From a global investor’s perspective, the global beta gives the first-order approximation of the
risk loading of LC bond returns on global equity returns after hedging out currency risk for the
holding period. Finally, if the dollar investor does not hedge the currency risk, in addition to the
bond global beta βGi , the investor takes additional currency exposure β
$
i such that
(yit1 − y∗t1)− (sit+∆t − sit) = α$i + β$i rxm,SPt+∆t + ￿$it.
The total exposure of unhedged bond position for the global investor is equal to βGi + β
$
i .
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2.4.2 Cross-country Variations in Nominal Bond Risk
Table 2.1 reports country-level correlation between LC bond excess returns and U.S. Treasury
bond excess returns and between LC equity excess returns and S&P excess returns. Over the
past eight years, equity excess returns in emerging markets are highly correlated with S&P excess
returns with the mean correlation equal to 74 percent. However, LC bond excess returns are much
less correlated with the U.S. Treasury bond excess returns with mean correlation only equal to 36
percent. Among the sample emerging markets, Hong Kong and Singapore have the highest bond
return correlation with the U.S., whereas Russia and Hungary have the lowest. In the developed
world, both equity and bond markets are highly correlated with the U.S. markets. The correlation
betweenG10 and the U.S. is equal to 82 percent for government bond excess returns and 86 percent
for equity excess returns. Compared with emerging market equities, emerging market LC debt
brings more scope for diversification for global investors.
Figure 2.5 reports local, global and currency betas for developed and emerging markets. The
order of the countries is sorted by their local betas. As we can see, all developed countries have
negative local betas for the sample period. In other words, nominal government bonds offer a
hedge for local equities. Among emerging markets, around half of the sample countries have
negative local betas and the rest have positive local betas. Hong Kong, Thailand and Singapore
have the lowest local betas whereas Colombia, Philippines and Indonesia have the highest local
betas. Since equity markets are highly correlated across countries, the cross-sectional pattern of
global betas follows the the pattern of local betas. The developed countries all have negative global
and local betas of similar magnitude, which reflects high synchronization between equity excess
returns. Among emerging markets, countries also have negative, zero or positive local and global
betas simultaneously. In terms of the magnitude, among the high betas countries, Mexico, Turkey,
Brazil and Colombia have significantly higher local betas than global betas. In these countries,
nominal bonds carry more systematic risk for local investors than for hedged global investors. As
for currency betas, all currencies except for the Yen, Hong Kong dollar and Chinese renminbi have
positive betas with the global equities. For an unhedged dollar investor, after adding up the global
and currency betas, unhedged LC bonds carry significantly positive betas for the majority of the
countries with five exceptions: Switzerland, Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore and China.
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Table 2.1: Equity and Bond Excess Return Correlation with U.S. Markets (2005-2012). The column “Bond”
reports correlation between LC bond excess returns over local T-bill rates and U.S. Treasury bond
excess returns over U.S. T-bill rates. The column “Equity” computes LC equity excess returns over
local T-bill rates and S&P excess returns over U.S. T-bill rates. Correlations are computed at daily
frequency for the quarterly holding period.
Emerging Markets Bond Equity G10 Currencies Bond Equity
Brazil 0.19 0.76 Australia 0.81 0.84
Chile 0.59 0.61 Canada 0.91 0.88
China 0.32 0.70 Switzerland 0.78 0.85
Colombia 0.22 0.54 Denmark 0.84 0.87
Czech Republic 0.49 0.76 Germany 0.86 0.89
Hong Kong 0.83 0.81 United Kingdom 0.87 0.93
Hungary -0.01 0.85 Japan 0.72 0.76
Indonesia 0.14 0.73 Norway 0.77 0.85
Israel 0.47 0.64 New Zealand 0.75 0.74
India 0.44 0.71 Sweden 0.84 0.83
Korea 0.54 0.81
Mexico 0.49 0.82
Malaysia 0.50 0.71
Peru 0.15 0.67
Philippines 0.21 0.67
Poland 0.37 0.85
Russia -0.28 0.79
Singapore 0.78 0.87
South Africa 0.47 0.74
Thailand 0.48 0.78
Turkey 0.13 0.72
EMMean 0.36 0.74 G10 Mean 0.82 0.86
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2.5 What Explains Nominal Bond Risk?
2.5.1 Bond Betas and Sovereign CDS Spreads
The cross-sectional heterogeneity in bond betas is highly correlatedwith sovereign CDS spreads.
Sovereign CDS contracts offer insurance for investors in the event of sovereign default. For devel-
oped countries, CDS contracts insure against defaults on all Treasury bonds denominated in local
currencies under domestic law. However, in emerging markets, CDS contracts are exclusively
linked to external debt denominated in foreign currencies. Countries such as Singapore and India
do not have any sovereign debt issued in the external mark and hence do not have CDS contracts.
All sovereign CDS contracts are denominated in U.S. dollars and hence the CDS spreads offer an
approximation for the shadow costs of issuing a U.S. dollar debt for different sovereign issuers.5
Despite the large common component driven by global factors in CDS spreads across countries,
the differential perceived sovereign default risk results in differential levels of CDS spreads.
We find that countries with high CDS spreads tend to have high nominal bond betas. This
can be first seen as rising CDS spreads for countries sorted on their local betas in Figure 2.5. To
visualize the relationship more directly, Figure 2.6 displays the scatterplots of local and global
betas of nominal bonds against mean sovereign CDS spreads. The cross-sectional correlation is
remarkably high at 92 percent between local betas and CDS spreads, and 83 percent between
global betas and CDS spreads. Currency betas are only weakly correlated with CDS spreads with
cross-sectional correlation equal to 31 percent.
Since returns on nominal bonds are largely driven by inflation and currency movements, one
hypothesis to explain the correlation between bond betas and CDS is that countries with higher
default risk tend to have higher inflation expectation during the downturns since the country is
more tempted to inflate and default reduce the real debt burden. Whereas for countries with low
default risk, inflation is procyclical and nominal bonds are hedge for equity returns.
5 US sovereign CDS contracts are denominated in euros,
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(b) Global Beta versus CDS
Figure 2.6: Bond Betas and Sovereign CDS Spreads. Figure 2.6(a) plots bond local betas against sovereign
CDS spreads. Figure 2.6(b) plots global betas of LC bonds against sovereign CDS spreads.
Emerging markets are denoted by solid dots and G10 currency countries are denoted by dia-
monds. Betas are defined in Section 2.4.1.
2.5.2 Cyclicality of Inflation Expectation
We hypothesize that the cross-country heterogeneity in LC bond betas might be a result of
the differing cyclicality of monetary policy across our sample countries. If investors believe that
during bad times the country will inflate to reduce the real burden of debt, then they believe
nominal bonds will pay off poorly exactly when market returns are low. If, on the other hand,
deflation (or less inflation) is expected during bad times then LC bondswill act as a hedge (or a less
risky asset) against market returns. We view this as a cross country application of the argument
presented in Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2013).
To measure the expected pro-cyclicality of inflation expectations, we regress the change in the
CPI inflation rate predicted by forecasters on the change in their predicted real GDP growth rate.
In countries where investors believe that monetary policy will be used for fiscal purposes, we
expect forecasters to revise their inflation expectations up when the revise their real GDP growth
rate forecasts down.6
Each month, professional forecasters surveyed by Consensus Economics forecast inflation and
GDP growth for the next calendar year. We use revisions of inflation and GDP forecasts each
month relative to forecasts made three months ago to infer shocks to investors’ expectation of
6 We could do a similar exercise with consumption growth, but this would reduce the sample size.
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inflation and output. We pool all revisions for 2006 through 2013 (so that the forecasts themselves
were all made post-2005), and run the country by country regressions
∆π˜t = β0 + βπ,y∆y˜t + ￿t (2.1)
where t indicates the date the revision is made. Country subscripts are suppressed to keep the
notation more concise. The revisions to inflation forecasts (∆π˜t) and GDP growth forecasts (∆y˜t)
are measured as percentage changes of forecasts made at t + h compared to forecasts made at
t.7 The coefficient βπ,y measures the cyclicality of inflation expectation and is the coefficient of
interest. For now, we examine forecast revisions over 3 month periods.
As can be seen in Figure 2.7, at the three month horizon, we find that countries in which LC
debt has a high beta with the local market tend to have a lower βπ,y, meaning that investors expect
less procyclical inflation rates in countries with high bond betas. A similar pattern is observed at
the one and six month horizon. The cross-sectional relationship between bond betas and forecast
betas holds even better when we use unhedged global betas to measure nominal risk.
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(b) Forecast Beta versus Unhedged Global Beta
Figure 2.7: Forecast Beta and Bond Beta. Figure 2.7(a) plots forecast betas on bond local betas. Figure 2.7(b)
plots forecast betas on bond global betas. Emerging markets are denoted by solid dots and G10
currency countries are denoted by diamonds. Betas are defined in Section 2.4.1 and Section 2.5.2.
7 Forecasts are originally made in percentages. We rescale the variable x to xˆ ≡
￿
1+
x
100
￿
. Revisions x˜ are defined
x˜ ≡ xˆt − xˆt−h
xˆt−h
. Forecasts are generally made monthly, but for some countries in the mid-90s were made in the mid-
1990s.
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2.6 Implications of Nominal Risk on Sovereign Portfolios
We next use this same measure of inflation cyclicality and examine whether it can explain the
growth of LC bond markets and the cross country heterogeneity. To do so, we use two sources of
aggregate data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The first data source concerns
the percentage of domestic debt that is fixed coupon, floating rate, inflation indexed or linked to
the exchange rate. This data comes from the BIS Working Group questionnaire and is calculated
using all types of domestic debt, not just central government debt. When calculating the fraction
of government debt that is fixed coupon, we assume that the fraction of fixed government debt
is equal to the fraction reported in the survey.8 The second source of data is on the amount of
domestic and external central government debt outstanding comes from the BIS Debt Securities
Statistics. The classification of the data was recently overhauled in early 2013 but we continue to
use the old classification.
In Table 2.2, we regress the fraction of all domestic debt that is in LC fixed rate on a version
of βπ,y. In order to capture the time series component, instead of pooling across the whole period,
we consider 3 month revisions across overlapping two year periods. The variable timing is such
that only forecasts made in the two years prior to the realization of the dependent variable are
used. Because we do not have a strong a priori view on whether this variable should be more
successful in explaining the cross-section or time series, we run these regressions using a variety of
combinations of year and country fixed effects. As can be seen in Table 1, the forecast revision beta
has strong explanatory power for the cross section, with and without year dummy and remains
significant at the 5% level with country FE and country and year FE. We then introduce two other
variables that would be expected to explain the fraction of fixed coupon nominal debt: the level
and volatility of inflation. For the level of inflation, we use the previous year’s annual inflation
and for volatility we use a 24 month rolling average of year-on-year inflation rates. While a higher
inflation rate is associated with a lower level of fixed coupon debt, inflation volatility is not. Our
forecast beta variable remains significant and positive, meaning that increases in the correlation
8 This is a potential source of bias in Table 2.3. We do not have strong evidence that the currency composition of
domestic corporate and public debt are the same.
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Table 2.2: Fixed Coupon LC Debt as a Fraction of Domestic Debt. Dependent variable is the share of
fixed coupon LC debt as a percentage of total LC debt for the BIS Working Group annual survey.
Inflation/GDP beta is the coefficient βπ,y in Equation 2.1. Annual Inflation Rate is the year-on-
year inflation rate during the past year. Inflation Volatility (24m) is the standard deviation of the
year-on-year inflation rate over the past 24 months.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inflation/GDP beta 15.81*** 18.32*** 2.796** 2.690** 12.73*** 12.77*** 1.836**
(4.509) (4.779) (1.312) (1.114) (3.161) (3.179) (0.793)
Annual Inflation Rate -108.3*** -113.7*** -35.45*
(36.97) (36.54) (19.35)
Inflation Volatility (24m) 110.8 160.8
(154.2) (136.5)
Constant 66.92*** 67.18*** 20.16*** 15.81*** 74.55*** 73.54*** 13.66
(6.474) (9.943) (0.912) (4.973) (13.91) (14.42) (8.421)
Observations 301 301 301 301 247 247 247
R-squared 0.129 0.162 0.868 0.886 0.235 0.236 0.908
Year FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
between inflation and GDP forecast revisions are associated with higher fractions of debt in fixed
coupon.
In Table 2.3, we examine whether our forecast revision beta can explain the fraction of LC fixed
coupon debt as a fraction of total sovereign debt. We calculate our dependent variable by mul-
tiplying the stock of domestic debt from the BIS Debt Securities Statistics by the fraction of fixed
coupon LC debt in domestic debt, and dividing by total outstanding sovereign debt. The results
are largely similar to the results in Table 2.2, however the results are slightly weaker, perhaps
because the survey data does not refer only to sovereign debt.
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Table 2.3: Fixed Coupon LC Debt as a Fraction of Total Sovereign Debt. Dependent variable is the share
of fixed coupon LC debt as a percentage of total outstanding sovereign debt. This variable is
constructed by multiplying the fraction of fixed coupon debt as a fraction of domestic debt by the
amount of domestic debt outstanding, an dividing by the entire stock of sovereign debt, domestic
and external. Inflation/GDP beta is the coefficient βπ,y in Equation 2.1. Annual Inflation Rate
is the year-on-year inflation rate during the past year. Inflation Volatility (24m) is the standard
deviation of the year-on-year inflation rate over the past 24 months.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inflation/GDP beta 11.87*** 13.53*** 2.555* 1.950 9.121*** 9.074*** 1.267
(3.881) (4.200) (1.427) (1.135) (3.056) (3.098) (0.913)
Annual Inflation Rate -96.01** -95.08** -21.95
(34.25) (33.09) (16.72)
Inflation Volatility (24m) -4.246 21.79**
(10.39) (9.398)
Constant 49.66*** 46.94*** 17.33*** 8.755 60.03*** 60.45*** 6.097
(6.705) (10.85) (0.992) (6.361) (13.28) (13.97) (10.29)
Observations 243 243 243 243 220 220 220
R-squared 0.102 0.135 0.837 0.866 0.204 0.204 0.894
Year FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
2.7 General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Portfolio Choice
2.7.1 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we use a simple two-period general equilibriummodel to better understand the
observed empirical patterns that countries with higher default risk on FC debt also have higher
LC nominal bond risk and lower fractions of nominal bonds in their portfolios. We begin by pre-
senting a simple framework where a benevolent government issues debt to finance a project. The
sovereign has the choice of issuing LC or FC debt. The government lacks commitment and optimal
monetary and fiscal policies will not be time consistent in our model. LC debt is vulnerable to ex
post inflation, and both FC and LC debt are vulnerable to ex post default. We solve the model by
backwards induction. Once we solve for the government’s policy functions in the second period,
we can solve for the government’s optimal policy in the first period. The government’s decision
in the first period involves choosing the quantity of bonds to issue in LC or FC.
We examine this problem in stages. First, we solve the second period policy functions when
the government cannot default on its FC debt but it can inflate away its LC debt. Then we solve for
the policy functions when both types of debt can be defaulted on but only LC debt can be inflated
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away. With these policies functions solved in closed form, we then analyze the government’s first
period problem by focusing on the benchmark case that all borrowing is external.
We include two extensions of the baseline model that we see as important components of fu-
ture research. First, we highlight the role of risk aversion in affecting the currency composition of
sovereign debt. Second, we discuss an extension of the benchmarkmodel to allow the government
to finance domestically to alleviate the time inconsistency due to external borrowing.
2.7.2 Second Period Problem
No Default
Throughout, we assume a benevolent government that maximizes the utility of the represen-
tative agent:
max
D,π
log (c)− θπ, (2.2)
where c is consumption in the final period, π ∈ [0, 1] is the inflation tax, the net inflation rate
divided by one plus the net inflation rate. θ is the utility cost of inflation. D is an indicator for
default, taking the value 1when the country defaults and 0 otherwise. The governmentmaximizes
utility subject to its budget constraint being satisfied. When the government cannot default on its
debt, the budget constraint is given by
τy = (1− π)b+ b$, (2.3)
where y is output, τ is the tax rate on output, b is LC debt and b$ is FC debt. Individual consump-
tion is given by non-taxed output and domestic holdings of LC debt net of inflation:
c = (1− τ)y+ (1− π)bh,
where bh is domestic holdings of government debt. Defining foreign holdings of LC debt as
b f ≡ b − bh and imposing that the government’s budget constraint is satisfied, we can rewrite
consumption of the representative agent as
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c = y− [(1− π)b f − b$] (2.4)
Because domestic holdings of LC debt are paid for with tax revenue, they have no impact on the
optimal inflation rate chosen in the second period. Instead, the optimal inflation rate will be a
function of output y, foreign holdings of LC debt b f , and foreign holdings of FC debt, b$.
First, we consider the case without default. The government maximizes utility subject to the
budget constraint. There will be three regions, when the inflation tax is equal to zero (as deflation
provides no benefit), when the inflation tax is equal to 1 (hyperinflation) and when the inflation
tax is in the intermediate range. We can characterize the optimal policy function as a piecewise
function
π∗ =

1 i f y < y
1− y−b$b f + 1θ i f y ≤ y ≤ y¯
0 i f y > y¯
(2.5)
where
y¯ = b f
￿
1+
1
θ
￿
+ b$, y =
b f
θ
+ b$.
We can understand these cutoffs as follows: if output is above y¯, the constant marginal cost of
inflation θ exceeds themarginal benefit of increased consumption that such inflation could achieve
through reducing the real debt burden. At when y = y¯, the marginal cost and benefit are equalized
at an inflation rate of zero. Therefore, for all levels of output greater than y¯, the marginal cost of
inflation will be strictly greater than the benefit and so the optimal inflation rate is equal to zero.
This threshold is increasing in both LC and FC debt held by foreigners, but it is increasing faster
in holdings of LC debt. This is because the burden of LC debt can be directly inflated away, but
inflation only eases the burden of repaying FC debt by reducing the other repayments that need
to be made. In addition, the threshold is decreasing in the cost of inflation, as a higher cost of
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inflation reduces the utility gain from inflation and thus enlarges the space where zero inflation is
optimal.
Hyperinflation, on the other hand, is optimal when output is below y. When output is below
this level, the marginal benefit of additional consumption exceeds the marginal cost of inflation
when the inflation tax rate is already at its maximumvalue, π = 1. This threshold is also increasing
in both LC and FC debt.
For interior realizations of output in between y and y¯, optimal inflation equates the marginal
utility cost of additional inflation (θ), to the marginal utility of consumption gained by reducing
the real value of debt payments through inflation. Because the marginal cost of inflation is a
constant given our linear cost function, in this interior solution, the representative agent receives
a constant consumption, and utility gains from additional output come through reduced inflation.
Defaultable Debt
Next, we add sovereign default to the framework above. Following Arellano (2008), we adopt
the non-linear default cost function
yd =

y i f y < yˆ
yˆ i f y ≥ yˆ
.
This cost function imposes that if a country defaults, all output above a threshold yˆ is seized if
output is initially above this threshold, and no output is lost if the country defaults when output
is below this given threshold. Under this default cost specification, the country would find it
optimal to choose full default on LC and FC debt if default is ever chosen. In addition, the country
will also choose zero inflation upon default. This feature of the model can be relaxed if we allow
partial default or specify a differential default technologywith respect to LC and FC debt to induce
selective default. The only distinction between LC and FC debt is that in non-default states, the
country can choose inflation to erode the real value of LC but not FC debt. The linear inflation cost
and the Arellano type default technology together yield closed-form policy functions.
The problem of determining the default regions is one of simply checking whether the utility
the representative agent receives when defaulting, log
￿
yd
￿
, exceeds the utility she would be re-
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ceive if the country did not default and followed the optimal inflation policy in Equation 2.5. This,
in turn, depends on the relative cost of inflation and default, as well as the level and currency com-
position of the outstanding debt. Depending on the level of external debt in LC, we summarize
default and inflation policy functions into the following three cases:
1. If b f < θyˆ,
D∗ =

1 i f y < y˜1
0 i f y ≥ y˜1
π∗ = 0.
2. If θyˆ ≤ b f ≤ θ exp(θ)yˆ,
D∗ =

1 i f y < y˜2
0 i f y ≥ y˜2
π∗ =

0 i f y < y˜2
1− y−b$b f + 1θ i f y˜2 ≤ y ≤ y¯
0 i f y > y¯
.
3. If b f > θ exp(θ)yˆ,
D∗ =

1 i f y < y˜1
0 i f y ≥ y˜1
π∗ =

0 i f y < y˜3
1 i f y˜3 ≤ y < y
1− y−b$b f + 1θ i f y ≤ y ≤ y¯
0 i f y > y¯
.
where the three default thresholds are given by
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y˜1 ≡ exp(θ)yˆ+ b$
y˜2 ≡ b fθ log
￿
θyˆ
b f
￿
+ b f +
b f
θ
+ b$
y˜3 ≡ yˆ+ b f + b$
In the first case, because the country has a very low LC debt stock, the marginal benefit of
inflating debt away is low, and so there are no output realizations for which the country prefers
to inflate fully instead of explicitly default. LC and FC debt become perfect substitutes since the
government never uses the option to inflate away LC debt in equilibrium. In the second case,
when the country has an intermediate level of LC debt and output is above the default threshold
y˜2, the country would choose zero or positive inflation, but never hyperinflation. In the third case,
the county has high levels of LC debt. When output is above the default threshold y˜3, there is a
full range of possibility for optimal inflation, ranging from zero to hyperinflation depending on
the output realization and portfolio composition.
Figure 2.8 graphically summarizes government policy in the final period. The graph includes
three surfaces in the LC debt level on the x-axis, FC debt on the y-axis and Output on the z-axis.
The three surfaces, labeled “Zero Inflation”, “Hyperinflation” and “Default”, plot the important
output thresholds. If output is above the Zero Inflation surface, then there will be no default or
inflation for a given amount of LC and FC debt. As would be expected, this surface is increasing
in both FC and LC debt, meaning that the more LC and FC debt a country has, the higher the
output realization needed to make it optimal for the country to choose not to inflate or default.
The second surface is the Hyperinflation surface. If output is below above this surface, and below
the Zero Inflation surface for a given distribution of external LC and FC debt, then the country
will choose an intermediate level of inflation to lower the real burden of debt repayment. The
preferred level of inflation is decreasing in output, so one can think of there being a continuum of
surfaces for inflation rates equal to a constant rate between the Zero Inflation and Hyperinflation
surfaces. Finally, the third and bottom surface is the Default surface. For given LC and FC debt
stocks, if output is between the Hyperinflation and Default surfaces, the country will hyperinflate
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away its LC debt, but still pays back FC debt. If output is below the threshold defined by the
Default surface, than the country will default on LC and FC debt.
Figure 2.8: Inflation and Default Policy Functions. This figure plots optimal inflation and default thresh-
olds for output given any debt portfolio. Details are given in Section 2.7.2.
2.7.3 First Period Problem: External Debt Only
With the final period policy functions fully characterized, we can now examine the first period
problem. We will begin by looking the simplest case, where a government has to finance a fixed
and exogenous amount z by borrowing from foreign lenders and only has to choose the currency
composition of the debt. The government internalizes the fact that it will re-optimize in the second
period according to the policy functions solved for above. Therefore, the general problem of the
government can then be written as
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max
b f ,b$
E[log(c1)− θπ1]
s.t. z ≤ qb f + q$b$
π1 = π1
￿
y1, b f , b$
￿
D1 = D1
￿
y1, b f , b$
￿
q$ = E[M∗1(1− D1)]
q = E[M∗1(1− D1)(1− π1)]
where M∗1 gives the stochastic discount factor of foreign lenders and π1 (·) and D1 (·) denote the
ex-post policy functions.
Solution to Optimal External Portfolio
We first solve this problem under the assumption of lender risk neutrality (M∗1 = 1) , and a
log-normal distribution for output
y1 = exp
￿
￿
y
1
￿
, ￿y ∼ N ￿µ, σ2￿ .
Because the optimal choice of LC and FC and debt will generally not have a closed form solution,
we solve the government’s portfolio choice problem numerically for a range of external financing
needs, z. It is worth noting that the lack of commitment to repay the debt gives rise to a natural
borrowing limit. Once LC and FC reach the threshold, higher debt levels reduce revenue raised
due to increasing inflation and default risk.
Because the model is stylized, we try to avoid taking a strong stand on the relative costs of
inflation and default and generally report our solutions for a wide range of inflation costs θ. Our
first result can be found in Figure 2.9, where we show that the optimal fraction of LC debt is
decreasing in the amount that needs to be financed.9 The intuition for this result is that LC debt
is valuable for it’s state contingency but it is costly because the temptation to repudiate the debt
9 When the country is indifferent between LC and FC debt at very low levels of LC debt (Case 1 in Section 2.7.2), we
assume that it chooses LC debt.
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in every state is factored into its price ex ante. Therefore, a higher face value of debt needs to be
issued if lenders expect the debt to always be repudiated. Because inflation is costly, a government
might be able to benefit from the limited commitment available from FC debt. What we see in the
figure is that as more debt needs to be raised, the time inconsistency problem is worsened, and so
the cost begins to outweigh the benefits from state contingency, and so the government chooses to
issue more FC debt.
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Figure 2.9: Share of LC Debt vs. Amount of Revenue Raised. This figure plots the share of LC debt chosen
in the equilibrium portfolios against the total revenue raise for different values of inflation costs
θ. Details are given in Section 2.7.3.
In Figure 2.10(a), we see that the government’s optimal portfolio choice interacts in interesting
ways with the optimal inflation rate. While throughout much of the parameter space expected
inflation is increasing for countries with lower inflation credibility θ, we see that for countries with
very low inflation costs and high borrowing needs, mean inflation could actually be lower than
for some countries with higher inflation costs. This is because an optimizing government with
low credibility might respond to their lack of commitment by issuing so much more FC debt that
it becomes less likely inflate away its debt. However, throughout much of the parameter space,
we have the more intuitive result that expected inflation is increasing in the amount of revenue
that needs to be raised as a larger debt burden makes it more tempting to inflate for any level of
output.
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Figure 2.10(b) plots the mean default rate for the four different levels of inflation cost for given
amounts of borrowing. It is important to remember that at for every amount of revenue raised
the currency composition of the debt stock differs for the different levels of inflation cost. In this
figure, we see that the default probability is increasing in the amount of revenue raised, but we
do not have a consistent ordering of default probabilities for a given amount of external financing
raised. There are several forces balancing against each other. On one hand, countries with lower
inflation costs are more inclined to choose inflation rather than default to reduce their LC debt
burden for the same portfolio. On the other hand, countries with lower inflation costs also choose
a portfolio with more FC debt in the equilibrium, which makes default more likely.
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(a) Expected Inflation
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(b) Probability of Default
Figure 2.10: Expected Inflation and Default for Equilibrium Portfolios. The two figure plotted expected
inflation and expected default at equilibrium portfolios against different revenue levels for dif-
ferent values of inflation costs θ. Details are given in Section 2.7.3.
The Role of Risk Aversion
Under this simple framework, countries with higher external financing needs have higher
levels of expected inflation and default rates. In addition, the model can match the fact presented
in Figure 2.6 that countries with higher external default risk also have higher LC bond betas. For
each equilibrium portfolio at different debt levels, Figure 2.11(a) plots the LC bond beta, inflation
beta and default beta, measured as the betas of regressing LC bond payoffs, realized inflation
and default on output realization, respectively. The default beta is negative and monotonically
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decreasing with respect to external financing needs, as the country is more likely to default when
debt burden is high. The inflation beta is also negative and generally decreasing in debt burden.
When debt burden is low, the country has low inflation betas in absolute values, despite the fact
that a large fraction of debt is denominated in LC. As the debt burden increases, the degree of
counter-cyclicality of inflation depends on two opposing forces. First, high marginal utility of
consumption makes the country chooses high inflation. Second, the country optimally chooses a
lower fraction of LC debt at high level, which decreases the marginal gain of inflation in reducing
the real debt burden and makes outright default more attractive. As a result, we see that at very
high debt level, the inflation beta can shrink with the level of debt. The LC bond beta incorporates
both inflation risk and default risk, and is monotonically increasing in the level of debt.
These betas have important effects on the currency composition of the sovereign portfolios
when risk-averse lenders face systematic default or inflation risk. In Figure 2.11(b), we consider a
simple risk-averse pricing kernel
M∗ = exp(−γ￿1 + γ2σ2/2),
where ￿t is the same N
￿
µ, σ2
￿
innovation to output. After introducing a slight amount of risk
aversion: γ = 0.5, the country becomes much more debt intolerant. As they are now charged a
risk premium in equilibrium, they are able to raise less revenue for a given face value of debt. In
addition, for an amount of revenue raised, the risk premium significantly reduces the fraction of
LC debt at any feasible debt level. This is because the additional state-contingency of LC bonds
becomes more costly as lenders charge the country an inflation risk premium in addition to the
default risk premium.
Domestic and External Borrowing
Finally, we consider the case where the government can choose to finance z domestically but
doing so crowds out domestic investment. To illustrate the key intuition, we impose a simple
assumption that the government can finance bh from domestic residents and put of the rest of the
endowment in investment. By doing so, we have abstracted from solving the domestic investors’
portfolio problem between holding LC bonds and capital, which is an important component of
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Figure 2.11: The Role of Risk Premium. Figure 2.11(a) plots bond the LC bond beta, the inflation beta and
default beta with respect to output fluctuations for different debt levels. Figure 2.11(b) shows
the effect of lenders risk aversion in reducing the fraction of LC debt in the sovereign portfolio.
Details are given in Section 2.7.3.
continuing work. The government prefers to borrow from domestic residents because they suffer
a lesser time inconsistency problem than borrowing from foreigners. However, borrowing do-
mestically comes at a cost, as residents are left with less resources to invest in capital, lowering
future output. While it may seem unnatural to allow foreigners to invest in domestic debt but
not equity, this assumption could be motivated by Gertler and Rogoff (1990) type frictions, where
capital investment is subject to moral hazard frictions. Under this setup, the government problem
becomes
max
bh,b f ,b$
E [u(c1)− θπ1]
such that
c1 =

Akα − [(1− π1)b f − b$]. i f D1 = 0
yd1 i f D1 = 1
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y0 = bh + k
z ≤ qb f + q$b$ + bh
q$ = E[M∗1(1− D∗1)]
q = E[M∗1(1− D∗1)(1− π∗1)]
For now, we once again assume risk-neutral foreigners. We let A ∼ LN (1, 1) and α = 1/3,
so that investment in capital is sufficiently attractive given the endowment y0 = 1. Under the
first best with commitment, the country invests all the endowment in capital and finances the en-
tire debt externally. However, external financing comes with a time consistency problem. When
the country decides how much to borrow from domestic residents, it has to weigh the cost of re-
ducing investment against the gain of alleviating the time inconsistency problem. As shown in
the curve marked by the diamond sign in Figure 2.12, when the the debt level is low, the gov-
ernment finances all the debt domestically. As the total financing needs increase, the return on
capital becomes sufficiently attractive if too little endowment is left for investment after borrow-
ing domestically and thus the country finds it optimal to start borrowing externally despite the
cost associated with time inconsistency. The option to finance some borrowing domestically shifts
the currency composition of the sovereign’s external portfolio toward LC debt in equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, as shown in Figure 2.13, the mean default rate is lower at any debt level if the country
has the option to finance domestically even at the cost of output loss. The mean inflation rate is
also lower with domestic financing at low levels of debt. However, at high levels of total debt,
countries with a domestic financing option endogenously choose higher fractions of LC debt in
the external portfolio and can potentially choose to run higher inflation.
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Figure 2.12: Share of LC External Financingwith Endogenous Output. The green line with diamonds plots
the share of domestic financing in total debt. The red line with asterisks plots the share of LC
debt in the external portfolio if all the debt is financed externally. The blue line with circles
plots the share of LC debt in the external portfolio, while the total debt is partially financed
domestically. Details can be found in Section 2.7.3.
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(b) Expected Default
Figure 2.13: Inflation and Default with Domestic Financing. The two figure plot expected inflation and
expected default at equilibrium portfolios against different debt levels. The red line with aster-
isks refers to the case that all debt is financed externally. The blue line with diamonds refers to
the case the case that fractions of the debt can be financed domestically. The Details are given
in Section 2.7.3.
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2.8 Conclusion
LC debt now represents a large fraction of emerging markets’ sovereign external debt. We
document empirically that the nominal risk of LC bonds is strongly correlated with default risk
on FC external debt. Countries more likely to default on external debt also have significantly
larger LC bond betas with local and global equity returns. Using forecasting data , we provide
empirical evidence that the cross-sectional variations in nominal bond risk are highly correlated
with perceived cyclicality of inflation and currency risk. Variations in LC nominal risk help explain
the observed patterns of currency composition of sovereign debt portfolios. Countries with higher
inflation risk and inflation risk premia tend to have lower fractions of LC nominal debt in their
total sovereign debt portfolio.
To explain the sources of these empirical findings, we propose a simple general equilibrium
framework with the endogenous portfolio choice between LC and FC debt. In the absence of
commitment to debt repayment or state-contingent inflation rules, the equilibrium portfolio re-
flects the tradeoff between additional state contingency offered by LC debt and better inflation
commitment induced by FC debt. We show that countries with higher external financing needs
endogenously choose lower fractions of LC debt in equilibrium, and are associated with higher
levels of default and inflation risk. The option to finance domestically can help alleviate the time
inconsistency problem due to external borrowing and is an important component of ongoing re-
search.
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3. NONPARAMETRIC HAC ESTIMATION FOR TIME SERIES DATAWITH MISSING
OBSERVATIONS1
3.1 Introduction
While use of the Newey and West (1987) estimator and its Andrews (1991) implementation
have become standard practice for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust inference,
analogous methods for series with missing observations are far from standardized. When data are
missing, the Newey-West formulas do not immediately apply, and the formula for calculating the
lagged autocorrelations that are required terms in conventional HAC formulas must be adjusted.
Current practices for working with missing data include treating the missing observations as
non-serially correlated, or imputing or ignoring the missing observations. To our knowledge,
there has not been formal justification of HAC estimation for robust inference in these contexts,
and the effect of employing these work-around methods on the resulting inferences is generally
unexplored in applied work. In this paper, we provide formal justification for two methods of
HAC estimation, and we compare these two methods to other existing methods. We demonstrate
that treating the data as equally spaced is preferred under very general conditions, and that treat-
ing the missing observations as non-serially correlated may be preferred in instances with small
sample sizes or low autocorrelation. In general, we find that our two newly formalized methods
are preferred to imputation.
Especially when our aim is to adjust inferences for serial correlation, it seems counterintuitive
that we can either treat the data as equally spaced or treat the missing observations as non-serially
correlated, since these procedures require us to depart from the original time structure or autocor-
relation structure of the data. However, we show that these procedures both provide consistent
estimators of the long-run variance of the observed series with missing data. Though many have
1 Joint with Deepa Dhume, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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suggested that we infer the spectrum of the underlying data from the observed data using the
Parzen estimator, we show that the Parzen estimator is not the correct object for inference testing.
Rather, we show that our Amplitude Modulated estimator (which treats the missing as non-serially
correlated) and Equal Spacing estimator (which treats the observed as equally spaced) are extremely
simple to implement and can be used to generate asymptotically valid inferences.
These insights are particularly valuable given the ad hoc approaches widely found in the ap-
plied literature. For example, researchers often use imputation procedures to fill in the missing
data. Imputation seems to expand the set of observations used for analysis, or at least prevents
us from dropping data when some covariates are unobserved. However, because imputed data
series are often smoothed versions of the underlying unobserved series, they will often lead to
asymptotically valid but extremely poor finite sample performance. Furthermore, researchers us-
ing these methods rarely adjust their inferences for this induced serial correlation.
Additional evidence of the confusion in the literature stems from the implementation of the
Newey-West HAC estimator in the popular statistical package, Stata. The newey2 command im-
plements Newey-West to obtain the standard error of the coefficient in a regression using time se-
ries or panel data. When observations are missing, the option “force” can be applied. This option
will apply our Equal Spacing estimator to time series data and apply our Amplitude Modulated
estimator to panel data. However, it should be possible to implement either the Equal Spacing
estimator or the Amplitude Modulated estimator for time series data. Furthermore, the program
will not apply the Amplitude Modulated estimator at all when some lags are unobserved. This
condition is likely an artifact of the literature on estimating the long-run variance of the underly-
ing series, which develops estimators that generally require all lags to be observed (Clinger and
Van Ness, 1976; Parzen, 1963). Yet for robust inference, we show that the Amplitude Modulated
and Equal Spacing estimators do not require all the lags to be observed.
A primary goal of this paper is to help researchers select the correct estimation procedure in
applied work. To that end, we follow the style of Petersen (2009), which provides guidance for se-
lecting standard errors in finance panel data sets. We formally present the Amplitude Modulated
and Equal Spacing estimators of the long-run variance of the observed series, and we review their
asymptotic properties. We contrast these estimators with the Parzen estimator of the long-run
variance of the underlying series. After presenting these theoretical contributions, we offer intu-
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ition for why the estimators work and how they are related to each other. To generate guidance
for choosing the correct estimator, we conduct Monte Carlo simulation results for various sample
sizes, correlation structures, and fractions of observations that are missing. In addition to testing
our estimators using randomly missing data, we demonstrate the applicability of these estimators
to a deterministic cyclical missing structure, as with daily financial data, which usually cover 5 of
7 days of the week. Finally, we discuss an empirical application using recursive regressions for
commodities futures returns to demonstrate how the choice of estimator can affect the conclusion
of empirical tests.
As a preview, our results demonstrate that the Amplitude Modulated and Equal Spacing es-
timators are both consistent under random and deterministic missing structures. In finite sam-
ples, we find that for the same fixed bandwidth, the Equal Spacing estimator is generally less
biased than the Amplitude Modulated estimator, but has larger variances. Consequently, the
Equal Spacing estimator is preferred when autocorrelation is high, as the bias will dominate the
mean squared error in these cases. Conversely, when autocorrelation is low, variance dominates
the mean squared error, and the Amplitude Modulated estimator is preferred. The precise cut-
off between these cases depends on the sample size, and whether automatic bandwidth selection
procedures are implemented.2
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1.1 discusses some examples
of missing data problems for which imputation and equal spacing methods have been applied,
and provides a brief review of some of the related econometrics literature. Section 3.2 provides
an overview of our estimators by applying them in a simple setting with missing observations.
Section 3.3 formally defines the estimators and discusses their asymptotic and finite sample prop-
erties. Section 3.4 presents the application of these estimators to inference in a regression setting
with missing observations. Section 3.5 describes the Monte Carlo simulations based on these esti-
mators and the results. Section 3.6 presents an empirical application of the estimators using data
on commodities returns. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
2 To make it easier for researchers to apply these estimators, we have posted Matlab code for both estimators on
our websites. We also have posted a basic simulation code that reports empirical rejection rates, size-adjusted power,
bias, and variance for the Equal Spacing, Amplitude Modulated, Impuation, and (full sample) Newey-West estimators.
Researchers can use the simulation code to evaluate the performance of the estimators under customized sample size,
autocorrelation, and missing structure before choosing which estimator to implement.
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3.1.1 Relation to the Literature
This paper extends the HAC covariance literature to applications with missing observations.
In general, the most commonly used HAC covariance matrix is the one proposed by Newey
and West (1987) and further developed by Andrews (1991). The Newey-West estimator equals
a weighted sum of lagged autocovariance matrices, in which the weights are calculated using
the Bartlett kernel. Newey and West (1987) show that this estimator is positive semi-definite and
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. Andrews (1991) and Newey and West (1994)
investigate the finite sample properties of these estimators and propose data-dependent band-
widths. Though some papers have proposed variants of the estimators discussed in these seminal
papers, the estimators applied in most of the current literature remain largely unchanged from
their original form.
There have been earlier attempts to estimate HAC covariance matrices when some observa-
tions are missing. The Parzen (1963) paper on spectral analysis for data series with missing ob-
servations focuses on estimating the autocovariances of the underlying process in the presence
of missing observations, based on a specific cyclical structure of missing data. We contribute to
this literature by pointing out that for robust inference, we generally require an estimate of the
long-run variance of the observed series rather than the underlying. We differentiate between the
Amplitude Modulated estimator and the Parzen estimator. Following Parzen (1963), both of these
estimators involve recasting the observed series as an amplitude modulated series in which the
value of the underlying series is set to zero when observations are missing. The observed time
structure of the data is respected, and the lagged autocovariances are estimated using only the
lagged pairs which are fully observed. We show that while the Amplitude Modulated estimator
is a consistent estimator of the long-run variance of the observed series, the Parzen estimator is a
consistent estimator of the long-run variance of the underlying series. Alongwith these theoretical
results, we provide simulation results that demonstrate consistency of the t-statistic constructed
using the Amplitude Modulated estimator.
We also argue to extend the set of missing data structures to which these estimators can be ap-
plied. Other researchers have attempted to apply Parzen’s work to a variety of missing data struc-
tures, including the Bernoulli structure of randomly missing variables and more general cyclical
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patterns of missing observations (Scheinok, 1965; Bloomfield, 1970; Clinger and Van Ness, 1976;
Dunsmuir and Robinson, 1981a,b). While the literature hasmoved beyond Parzen’s original appli-
cation, it still is focused on applications with randomly missing observations. Yet, many common
applications of missing data techniques are for data that have a deterministic missing structure.
Our theoretical results and simulation exercise demonstrate that as long the missing data structure
satisfies our independence assumption, we can apply the Amplitude Modulated and Equal Spac-
ing estimators to settings in which the pattern of missing observations is deterministic instead of
random. This extends the set of possible applications to include business daily data, for example,
in which weekends could be considered missing data.
More recently, Kim and Sun (2011) construct a HAC estimator for the two-dimensional case
robust to spatial heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The focus of the paper is not on missing
data, and they do not distinguish the difference between the spatial spectrum of the underlying
versus the observed process. However, they discuss the applicability of their method to irregularly
observed spatial data. Reducing the spatial HAC on the irregular lattice to one-dimensional time
series produces an estimator very similar to our Amplitude Modulated estimator. We clarify the
subtlety between the underlying and observed spectrum and develop the Amplitude Modulated
estimator in the context of time series with missing data.
Setting the theory aside, many researchers use imputation techniques when facedwithmissing
observations in practice. For example, one common use of imputation is to temporally disaggre-
gate data to generate quarterly data from annual series, or monthly data from quarterly series.
The Denton method of imputation smooths data when generating these series by minimizing
first-differences or second-differences (Denton, 1971). Relatedly, the Chow-Lin method uses a re-
lated indicator series that can be used to interpolate, distribute, or extrapolate data (Chow and
Lin, 1971, 1976). When this method is used, some properties of the indicator series, including se-
rial correlation, will be transferred to the imputed series. Even the simplest method of imputing
data by naive linear interpolation will induce autocorrelation in the imputed series. Studies based
on Monte Carlo simulations suggest that even for reasonably large sample sizes, inference meth-
ods based on Newey-West HAC covariance estimators result in significant overrejection when the
serial correlation is high (den Haan and Levin, 1997). In an imputed series, the induced high au-
tocorrelation exacerbates this distortion. Yet, researchers using these methods rarely adjust their
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inferences for this induced serial correlation (for two such examples, see Eaton, Kortum, Neiman,
and Romalis (2011) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009)). We show in our Monte Carlo sim-
ulations and our empirical application that our estimators are simple alternatives that avoid the
problems associated with imputation.
To avoid the complication of adjusting HAC estimators for the method and extent of impu-
tation, some researchers simply ignore the missing observations. Formally, this method amounts
to relabeling the time index and treating observations as though they are equally spaced in time.
While this method has no previous formal justification to our knowledge, it has been widely ap-
plied. For example, observations of daily financial data are generally treated as equally spaced
consecutive observations, irrespective of their actual spacing in time (examples include Acharya
and Johnson (2007), Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009), Jorion and Zhang (2007), Pan and Single-
ton (2008), and Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009)). Yet, for prices that are affected by developments in
global markets with different business weeks or national holidays, the lack of price data on week-
ends and holidays could be treated as missing observations. In this paper, we formalize this Equal
Spacing estimator and demonstrate its asymptotic consistency and finite sample performance.
In light of the existing confusion in the literature on HAC estimation with missing data, we
provide our Equal Spacing and Amplitude Modulated estimators as alternatives. We discuss the
finite sample properties of these estimators and provide simulation results that offer insight into
the bias and variance tradeoffs between the two estimators, so that practitioners can make an
informed choice before applying either one.
3.2 A simple example
To fix ideas, in this section we introduce each of our estimators in the context of a simple ex-
ample using three weeks of daily gasoline prices. We reserve for the next section a more detailed
discussion of the asymptotic and finite sample properties of the estimators and the practical con-
siderations involved in choosing among them. Suppose we have gasoline price data {zt} for the
first three weeks of the month as shown in Figure 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Daily Gasoline Prices.
Mon Tues Weds Thurs Fri Sat Sun
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7
z8 z9 z10 z11 z12 z13 z14
z15 z16 z17 z18 z19 z20 z21
For clarity of exposition, suppose these data have already been demeaned, so that we have
E(zt) = 0. To estimate the long-run variance of the series {zt}, we can apply the standard
Newey-West estimator:
ΩˆNW = γˆ(0) + 2
m
∑
j=1
w(j,m)γˆ(j),
where the Bartlett kernel, w(j,m) = 1− [j/(m+ 1)] if j ≤ m and w(j,m) = 0 if j > m, is used to
weight the sample autocorrelations at each lag j:
γˆ(j) =
1
T
T
∑
t=j+1
zt−jzt,
In our example, we can estimate the first lagged autocorrelation for the gasoline price series as:
γˆ(1) =
1
21
[z1z2 + z2z3 + ...+ z20z21].
Similarly, we estimate the third lagged autocorrelation as:
γˆ(3) =
1
21
[z1z4 + z2z5 + ...+ z18z21].
Note that the denominator in both cases is the total number of observations, T, rather than the
number of observed lags, T − j.
Now suppose we have only business daily data, with missing data on weekends as shown in
Figure 3.2.
When some data points are missing, we have a few choices for how we estimate the lagged au-
tocovariances, γˆ(j), that are components of the long-run variance, Ωˆ. Especially in the context
of business daily data, one very common procedure is to ignore the missing data. In this case,
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Table 3.2: Daily Gasoline Prices with Missing Observations.
Mon Tues Weds Thurs Fri Sat Sun
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 . .
z8 z9 z10 z11 z12 . .
z15 z16 z17 z18 z19 . .
we would treat the observed prices as equally spaced in time. When estimating the first lagged
autocovariance for our Equal Spacing estimator, we would treat the jump from Friday to Monday
(e.g. day 5 to day 8) as a one day lag:
γˆES(1) =
1
15
[z1z2 + z2z3 + z3z4 + z4z5 + z5z8 + z8z9 + z9z10 + ...+ z18z19].
Similarly, the third autocovariance would be estimated as:
γˆES(3) =
1
15
[z1z4 + z2z5 + z3z8 + z4z9 + z5z10 + z8z11 + z9z12 + z10z15 + ...+ z16z19].
Since we have effectively reduced the sample size by ignoring the missing days, the denominator
for each estimated lagged autocovariance is the total number of observed data points, or 15 in our
example.
Alternatively, we could estimate the lagged autocovariances using only the instances in which
we observe data with the right spacing. We call this the Amplitude Modulated estimator, because we
are effectively modulating, or setting to 0, the value (or amplitude) of the series on the missing
days. Using this estimator, to estimate the first lagged autocovariance in our example, we would
use the lag from day 4 to day 5 and then skip to the lag from day 8 to day 9:
γˆAM(1) =
1
15
[z1z2 + z2z3 + z3z4 + z4z5 + z8z9 + z9z10 + ...+ z18z19].
The third autocovariance would be estimated using all observed three day lags, including the
three day lags between Friday and Monday:
γˆAM(3) =
1
15
[z1z4 + z2z5 + z5z8 + z8z11 + z9z12 + z12z15 + z15z18 + z16z19].
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In this method, the denominator for each lag is again the total number of observed data points, as
in the the Equal Spacing estimator.
While we focus on these two estimators throughout most of the paper, for comparison, our
simulations will also implement two alternatives that are not preferred. The first alternative is the
Parzen estimator, after Parzen (1963). It is constructed like the Amplitude Modulated estimator,
except that we adjust the denominator to equal the number of times we observe data with the
right spacing:
γˆPZ(1) =
1
12
[z1z2 + z2z3 + z3z4 + z4z5 + z8z9 + z9z10 + ...+ z18z19].
The third autocovariance would be estimated as:
γˆPZ(3) =
1
8
[z1z4 + z2z5 + z5z8 + z8z11 + z9z12 + z12z15 + z15z18 + z16z19].
Finally, we will implement our Imputation estimator, which is the Newey-West estimator applied
to the filled series, {zIt}, constructed by linearly imputing the missing data. In our example with
business daily gasoline prices, the first and third lagged autocorrelations can be estimated as:
γˆIM(1) =
1
21
[z1z2 + ...+ z4z5 + z5zI6 + z
I
6z
I
7 + z
I
7z8 + z8z9 + ...+ z18z19 + z19z
I
20 + z
I
20z
I
21]
γˆIM(3) =
1
21
[z1z4 + z2z5 + z3zI6 + z4z
I
7 + z5z8 + z
I
6z9 + z
I
7z10 + z8z11 + ...+ z16z19 + z17z
I
20 + z18z
I
21].
3.3 Long-Run Variance of Time Series with Missing Observations
In this section, we formalize our main estimators and describe their asymptotic and finite sample
properties.
3.3.1 Missing Data Structure
Consider a second-order stationary time series {zt}∞t=1 with ∑∞j=0 |γz(j)| < ∞ and E(zt) = µ
and an indicator series {gt}∞t=1 such that gt = 1 if zt is observed and gt = 0 if zt is missing.
Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumptions on the missing data structure:
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Assumption 1. Independence: We assume that the underlying series {zt} is independent of the series
{gt}. In other words, for any positive integer n < ∞ and any sequence t1, ..., tn, the random variable z ≡
(zt1 , ..., ztn) and g ≡ (gt1 , ..., gtn) satisfy the condition that Pr(z−1(A)∩ g−1(B)) = Pr(z−1(A))Pr(g−1(B))
for any two n-dimensional Borel sets A, B ￿ Rn.
Assumption 2. Existence: limT→∞(S/T) = α and limT→∞[1/S]∑Tt=j+1 gtgt−j = κ(j) both exist.
Assumption 1 requires that the missing process is independent of the underlying data, so
that missing data do not induce bias in the parameter estimates. Assumption 2 requires that the
fractions of observed converges in probability, and the asymptotic ratio of the number of observed
lag j to total number of observations exists. Under these assumptions, we allow very general
stochastic or deterministic missing data processes. We give two commonly observed missing data
structures as follows:
Bernoulli missing: The series {gt}∞t=1 has an i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution, in which each gt takes
value 0 with probability p and value 1 with probability 1− p.
Cyclically missing: Given a series {zt}∞t=1 , we can divide the series into cycles which are each
of length h > 2. In the first cycle of length h, we have k missing observations for some integer
k < h. Define the set of time indexes of these missing observations, S = {s1, ..., sk}, where the
integers sk ∈ [1, h] for all k. For t ≤ h, gt = 0 if and only if t ∈ S. In a cyclically missing
structure, for t > h, we have gsk+hl = 0 for all integers l = 1, 2, ...,∞, and gt = 1 otherwise.
The indicator series {gt} is stochastic for Bernoulli missing and deterministic for cyclical missing
once the missing pattern is known for any h consecutive elements.
3.3.2 Newey-West Estimator
First, we review the standard Newey-West estimator that applies to time series without missing
observations. Suppose that zt is continuously observed at t = 1, ..., T with E(zt) = µ. We let
γz(j) = E[(zt − µ)(zt−j − µ)] denote the j-th lagged autocovariance. Under the standard assump-
tion that zt is second-order stationary with ∑∞j=0 |γz(j)| < ∞, we have the standard results that
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1√
T ∑
T
t=1(zt − µ) d→ N(0,Ω), where the long-run variance of the underlying process zt is equal to
Ω =
∞
∑
j=−∞
γz(j). (3.1)
The Newey-West HAC estimator for Ω is given by
ΩˆNW = γˆz(0) + 2
m
∑
j=1
w(j,m)γˆz(j),
where γˆz(j) = 1T ∑
T
t=j+1(zt − z¯T)(zt−j − z¯T) and z¯T = (1/T)∑Tt=1 zt. In the Newey-West formula,
the lagged autocovariances, γˆz(j), are weighted by the Bartlett kernel, w(j,m) = 1− [j/(m+ 1)]
for j ≤ m and w(j,m) = 0 otherwise, to ensure a positive semi-definite covariance matrix. Under
fairly general technical assumptions, as long as limT→∞ m(T) = ∞ and limT→∞
￿
m(T)/T1/4
￿
= 0,
we have ΩˆNW
p→ Ω (Newey and West, 1987). The choice of optimal bandwidth m is given by
Andrews (1991) and Newey and West (1994) who further explore the properties of alternative
choices for the bandwidth and kernel and the finite sample properties of these estimators.
3.3.3 Long-Run Variance of the Underlying Process - Parzen Estimator
In the presence of missing observations, we follow Parzen (1963) and recast the series as an
amplitude modulated version of some underlying full series. We define the amplitude modulated
series, {z∗}, as z∗t = gtzt. Using the amplitude modulated series {z∗t }, Parzen (1963) suggests the
following estimator for the autocovariance of the underlying series {zt}:
γˆPZz (j) =
∑Tt=j+1(z∗t − gtz¯∗T)(z∗t−j − gt−j z¯∗T)
∑Tt=j+1 gtgt−j
,
if ΣTt=j+1gtgt−j > 0. Dunsmuir and Robinson (1981a) establishes γˆPZz (j)
p→ γz(j) provided that z∗t
is asymptotically stationary.
Under the special case that limT→∞ ∑Tt=j+1 gtgt−j > 0 for all j, we can use the observed data to
construct our Parzen estimator, which is a Newey-West type consistent estimator of the long-run
variance of the underlying process zt:
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ΩˆPZ = γˆPZz (j) + 2
m
∑
j=1
w(j,m)γˆPZz (j)
p→ Ω
While this object may be useful in some instances, it is incorrect for inference testing. First, Dun-
smuir and Robinson (1981b) study the case in which w(j,m) = 1, and point out that ΩˆPZ may not
be positive semi-definite.3 Secondly, as we further demonstrate, the long-run variance of the un-
derlying process differs from the long-run variance of the observed process. Though the Parzen
estimator is formed using observed data only, it is a consistent estimator of the variance of the
underlying process. Consequently, inference on the observed data will be invalid if we use the
Parzen estimate of the variance.
3.3.4 Long-Run Variance of the Observed Process
Let S = ∑Tt=1 gt be the total number of the observed. The sample mean is given by z¯∗T =
1
S ∑
T
t=1 z∗t . Asymptotic mean and variance of z¯∗T is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. z¯∗T
p→ µ and Ω∗ ≡ limT→∞ S · E(z¯∗T − µ)2 = ∑∞j=−∞ κ(j)γz(j).
Proof. Given E(gt) = limT→∞(S/T) = α and gt is independent of zt, we have E(z∗t ) = E(gt)E(zt) =
αµ. We can rewrite limT→∞ z¯∗T = limT→∞
1
S ∑
T
t=1 z∗t = limT→∞ TS
1
T ∑
T
t=1 z∗t .We know that limT→∞(S/T) =
α. By the law of large numbers, we have limT→∞ 1T ∑
T
t=1 z∗t = αµ. Therefore, limT→∞ z¯∗T = µ. We
also have
S · E(z¯∗T − µ)2 = [1/S]E
￿
T
∑
t=1
gt(zt − µ)
￿2
= [1/S]E
￿
T
∑
t=1
(zt − µ)2g2t + 2
T−1
∑
j=1
T
∑
t=j+1
(zt − µ)(zt−j − µ)gtgt−j
￿
= [T/S)]
￿
γz(0)E
￿
1
T
T
∑
t=1
g2t
￿
+ 2
T−1
∑
j=1
γz(j)E
￿
1
T
T
∑
t=j+1
gtgt−j
￿￿
.
3 In our simulations, we implement the estimator using Bartlett kernel weights tomaintain comparability with results
for ES and AM. However, this does not guarantee that the estimator will be positive semi-definite.
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Define κ(j) ≡ limT→∞[1/S]∑Tt=j+1 E(gtgt−j), the share of times lag j is observed. Given limT→∞(T/S) =
1/α and E
￿
(1/T)∑Tt=j+1 gtgt−j
￿
= limT→∞(1/T)∑Tt=j+1 gtgt−j = ακ(j), we have
Ω∗ = lim
T→∞ S · E(z¯
∗
T − µ)2 =
∞
∑
j=−∞
κ(j)γz(j). (3.2)
Therefore, the long-run variance of the observed amplitude modulated process, i.e., Ω∗, is a
weighted sum of the original autocovariances, with the weights being the asymptotic ratio of the
number of the observed lags to the total number of the observed, S. Comparing equations (3.1)
and (3.2), when zt is observed at all t, i.e., gt = 1 for all t, then Ω∗ = Ω. In the presence of missing
observations, if all autocovariances are positive, we have κ(j) ≤ 1. Then the long-run variance
of the amplitude modulated process is always weakly smaller than the long-run variance of the
underlying process, Ω∗ ≤ Ω.
Amplitude Modulated Estimator
To estimateΩ∗ in finite samples with S observed, a natural candidate is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. A consistent estimator of Ω∗ is given by
Ωˆ∗ = γˆz∗(0) + 2
T−1
∑
j=1
γˆz∗(j)
where γˆz∗(j) = [1/S]∑Tt=j+1(z∗t − gtz¯∗T)(z∗t−j − gt−j z¯∗T).
Proof. We note that
γˆz∗(j) = [1/S]
T
∑
t=j+1
(z∗t − gtz¯∗T)(z∗t−j − gt−j z¯∗T)
=
T
S
1
T
T
∑
t=j+1
(zt − z¯∗T)(zt−j − z¯∗T)gtgt−j
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Since limT→∞ T/S = 1/α, limT→∞ E(zt− z¯∗T)(zt−j− z¯∗T) = γz(j) and limT→∞ E(gtgt−j) = ακ(j)we
have
γˆz∗(j)
p→ κ(j)γ(j).
Therefore, Ωˆ∗
p→ Ω∗.
However, Ωˆ∗ is not guaranteed to be positive semi-definite, which is not desirable for infer-
ence. We can use a kernel-based method to ensure the covariance estimator is positive semi-
definite:
ΩˆAM = γˆz∗(0) + 2
m
∑
j=1
w(j,m)γˆz∗(j).
We followNewey andWest (1987) and illustrate with the most commonly used kernel, the Bartlett
kernel.
Proposition 5. Using the Bartlett kernel, w(j,m) = 1− [j/(m+ 1)] if j ≤ m and w(j,m) = 0 if j > m,
suppose (i) the bandwidth m satisfies limT→∞ m(T) = +∞ and limT→∞[m(T)/T1/4] = 0. Then ΩˆAM is
positive semi-definite and ΩˆAM
p→ Ω∗.
Proof. We follow proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in Newey and West (1987) by defining ht ≡ z∗t − gtµ
, hˆt ≡ z∗t − gtz¯∗T and replace all T in the denominator in Newey and West (1987) with S.
Our estimator ΩˆAM is almost equivalent to applying the Newey-West estimator to the ampli-
tude modulated series. However, we make two minor modifications to the components γˆz∗(j) =
[1/S]∑Tt=j+1(z∗t − gtz¯∗T)(z∗t−j − gt−j z¯∗T). First, we subtract z∗t by gtz¯∗T instead of E(gt)z¯∗T, so that the
difference (z∗t − gtz¯∗T) equals zero for unobserved data. In the case of a mean-zero series, this mod-
ification would not be required. Secondly, since we want to use ΩˆAM to make inferences about
the mean of the observed process z¯∗T, we divide the sum by S instead of T so that our inference
procedure remains consistent.
Equal Spacing Estimator
Instead of casting the time series with missing observations as an amplitude modulated pro-
cess, an alternative method is to ignore the missing observations and treat the data as equally
97
spaced over time. We define the function ι(t) as the mapping from time index t to the new equal
spacing time domain s: ι(t) = ∑t￿=1 g￿. We use this mapping to relabel the time indices of the ob-
served values from the series {zt} to create the series {zESs } for s = 1, ..., ι(T), in the equal spacing
time domain. The sample mean of the observed series is given by z¯EST =
1
S ∑
S
s=1 zESs .
Proposition 6. z¯EST
p→ µ and ΩES ≡ limT→∞ S · E(z¯EST − µ)2 = Ω∗.
Proof. We let ∆j
ES
s ≡ ι−1(s)− ι−1(s− jES) be a function that maps the time gap (jES) between zs and
zs−jES in the equal spacing domain to the time gap (j) in the time domain of the underlying process
{zt}. Using the indicator function I(·), we define λjES(j) = limT→∞ 1S ∑Ss=1 I(∆j
ES
s = j), which
equals the frequency that the observed lag jES maps to lag j in the original time domain. Then
we can rewrite the Equal Spacing autocovariance in terms of the autocovariance of the underlying
process:
γzES(j
ES) = lim
T→∞ E(zs − z¯
ES
T )(zs−jES − z¯EST )
=
∞
∑
j=−∞
λj
ES
(j)γz(j)
Applying the same standard results as in Equation 3.1 to the equal spacing series, we have:
ΩES =
∞
∑
jES=−∞
γzES(j
ES)
=
∞
∑
jES=−∞
∞
∑
j=−∞
λj
ES
(j)γz(j)
=
∞
∑
j=−∞
 ∞∑
jES=−∞
λj
ES
(j)
 γz(j)
=
∞
∑
j=−∞
κ(j)γz(j) = Ω∗.
The second to last equation holds because
∞
∑
jES=−∞
lim
T→∞
1
S
S
∑
s=1
I(∆j
ES
s = j) = lim
T→∞
1
S
T
∑
t=1
gtgt−j.
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To estimate Ω∗ using the equally spaced series in finite samples, we can use
ΩˆES = γˆzES(0) + 2
m
∑
j=1
w(jES,m)γˆzES(j
ES)
where
γˆzES(j
ES) =
1
S
S−1
∑
j=1
(zESs − z¯EST )(zESs−j − z¯EST ).
Proposition 7. ΩˆES is PSD and ΩˆES
p→ Ω∗.
Proof. Positive semi-definiteness of ΩˆES can be established using same argument in the proof of
Theorem 1 in Newey and West (1987). Using their notation, we let hˆs = zESs − z¯EST . To prove
consistency, since
γˆzES(0) + 2
s(T)−1
∑
jES=1
γˆzES(j
ES) = γˆz∗(0) + 2
T−1
∑
j=1
γˆz∗(j)
and w(j,m)
p→ 1 for all j, ΩˆES and ΩˆAM estimators are asymptotically equivalent. We know
ΩˆAM
p→ Ω∗ by proposition 5, and hence, ΩˆES p→ Ω∗.
The Equal Spacing estimator is particularly simple to implement, because it only requires re-
labeling the time index of a series with missing observations to ignore the gaps and treat the data
as equally spaced over time. Once this is done, the Equal Spacing estimator amounts to applying
the standard Newey-West estimator to the equally spaced series.
3.3.5 Finite Samples
Although ΩˆAM and ΩˆES are both asymptotically consistent, finite sample performance might
differ due to different weighting on autocovariance estimators. We use the standardmean squared
error (MSE) criterion to to evaluate the performance of the estimator Ωˆi where i ∈ {AM, ES}.
MSE(Ωˆi) = Bias2(Ωˆi) +Var(Ωˆi)
=
￿
E(Ωˆi −Ω∗)
￿2
+ E[(Ωˆi − Ω¯i)2]
where Ω¯i = E(Ωˆi). Consider the case that mAM = mES ≡ m. The lag length in the original
time domain is weakly greater than that in the equal spacing domain: j = ι−1(s)− ι−1(s− jES) ≥
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jES. Under the same fixed bandwidth m, there are two main differences between ΩˆAM and ΩˆES.
First, since the kernel weight is decreasing in the lag length for the Newey-West estimator, ΩˆES
assigns weakly higher weight on all autocovariance estimators compared to ΩˆAM. To see this
more explicitly,
ΩˆES =
m
∑
jES=1
w(jES,m)
S
S
∑
s=jES+1
(zs − z¯∗T)(zs−jES − z¯∗T)
To write it in the original time domain, we have
ΩˆES =
m
∑
jES=1
w(jES,m)
S
T
∑
t=j+1
(zt − z¯∗T)(zt−j − z¯∗T)
where t = ι−1(s) and j = ι−1(s)− ι−1(s− jES) ≥ jES. We compare ΩˆES with ΩˆAM,
ΩˆAM =
m
∑
j=1
w(j,m)
S
T
∑
t=j+1
(zt − z¯∗T)(zt−j − z¯∗T)gtgt−j.
When gtgt−j = 1, we havew(jES,m) ≥ w(j,m) since the weighting function decreases in lag length
and j ≥ jES. Therefore, given the same bandwidth, ΩˆES puts weakly more weight than ΩˆAM on
each observed pairwise product (zt − z¯∗T)(zt−j − z¯∗T). Second, for the same fixed bandwidth m,
ΩˆAM only estimates autocovariancewith lag length up tom in the original time domain, while ΩˆES
also includes observations for lags greater than m the original time domain. These two differences
have different implications on the relative variance and bias of the two estimators.
As discussed in den Haan and Levin (1997), Newey-West type kernel-based estimators suffer
from three sources of finite sample bias. First, the summation in the autocovariance estimator is
divided by the sample size, instead of the actual number of observed lags. We expect this source
of bias to be more severe for ΩˆES because ΩˆES includes higher-order lags that are not included in
ΩˆAM and puts more weight on these high-order biased lagged autocovariance estimators. How-
ever, this bias decreases rapidly as the sample size increases. Second, the kernel-based method
assigns zero weights to lags with orders greater than T. This source of bias is the same for ΩˆES
and ΩˆAM.
The third and most significant source of bias is driven by the fact that kernel-based estimators
under-weight the autocovariance estimators. They assign weights to autocovariance estimators
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that are less than unity and are declining toward zero with increasing lag order j. Compared with
the long-run variance of the amplitude modulated series, Ω∗, the bias of ΩˆAM arising from this
source is given by
Bias(ΩˆAM) =
T−1
∑
j=−(T−1)
[1− w(j,m)] γz∗(j).
For a fixed bandwidth, the higher the serial correlation, the more severe the bias. The estimator
ΩˆES can reduce this kernel-based bias because ΩˆES always assigns weakly higher (or closer to
unitary) weight to all autocovariance estimators as compared to ΩˆAM.
For variance of the estimators, we always have Var(ΩˆES) > Var(ΩˆAM) because ΩˆES includes
more high-order lags that are relatively poorly estimated. Therefore, the tradeoff between vari-
ance and bias determines the relative finite sample performance of ΩˆAM and ΩˆES. The pre-
vious discussion uses a fixed bandwidth. Andrews (1991) and Newey and West (1994) pro-
pose data-dependent choice of the bandwidth that aims to optimize the mean-variance trade-
off. We apply the automatic bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Newey and West (1994)
to the AM and ES processes. As we will demonstrate using Monte-Carlo simulations, under
both fixed and automatic bandwidth selection, for small sample size and low autocorrelation,
MSE(ΩˆES) > MSE(ΩˆAM). For moderate sample size or high autocorrelation, we always have
MSE(ΩˆAM) > MSE(ΩˆES).
3.4 Regression Model with Missing Observations
We can apply asymptotic theory developed in the previous section to a regression model with
missing observations. Suppose we have the time series regression, where yt and ut are scalars, xt
is a k × 1 vector of regressors, and β is a k × 1 vector of unknown parameters. Suppose further
that
￿
1
T ∑
T
t=1 xtx
￿
t
￿−1 p→ Σ−1xx and E(ut|xt) = 0, but the ut’s have conditional heteroskedasticity
and are possibly serially correlated. In the presence of missing observations, we let gt = 1 if yt
and all components of xt are observed and gt = 0 if yt or any component of xt is missing. Then
we can re-express the regression in terms of amplitude modulated processes,
y∗t = x∗t β+ u∗t , t = 1, . . . , T,
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where y∗t = gtyt, x∗t = gtxt and u∗t = gtut. We require the orthogonality condition, E(u∗t |x∗t ) = 0.
The standard result for the OLS estimator is given by
βˆAM − β =
￿
T
∑
t=1
x∗t x∗
￿
t
￿−1￿ T
∑
t=1
x∗t u∗t
￿
. (3.3)
Alternatively, without recasting the series as an amplitude modulated process, we ignore all ob-
servations for which gt = 0 and assume all observed values are equally spaced in time. Therefore,
the estimated regression becomes
yESs = x
ES
s β+ u
ES
s , s = 1, . . . , S
and
βˆES − β =
￿
S
∑
s=1
xESs x
ES￿
s
￿−1￿ S
∑
s=1
xESs u
ES
s
￿
. (3.4)
Comparing equations 3.3 and 3.4, we can easily see that AM and ES give the same coefficient
estimates:
βˆAM = βˆES ≡ βˆ.
We normalize βˆ using the number of observed data, S, and then we have
√
S(βˆ− β) =
￿
1
S
T
∑
t=1
x∗t x∗
￿
t
￿−1￿
1√
S
T
∑
t=1
x∗t u∗t
￿
.
Given that
￿
1
T ∑
T
t=1 xtx
￿
t
￿−1 p→ Σ−1xx in the absence of missing observations and xt and gt are inde-
pendent,
￿
1
S ∑
T
t=1 x∗t x∗
￿
t
￿−1
also converges in probability. We let
￿
1
S ∑
T
t=1 x∗t x∗
￿
t
￿−1 p→ Σ−1x∗x∗ . Using
the notation from the previous section, we define zt ≡ xtut and let z∗t ≡ gtzt denote the amplitude
modulated series and zESs denote the ES series. Then we have
z¯∗T ≡ 1S
T
∑
t=1
z∗t =
1
S
S
∑
t=1
zESs .
We know E(zt) = E(z¯∗T) = 0 using the orthogonality condition.
Proposition 8. The asymptotic distribution of the OLS estimator is given by
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√
S(βˆ− β) d→ N(0,Σ−1x∗x∗Ω∗Σ−1x∗x∗),
where Ω∗ = ∑∞j=−∞ κ(j)γz(j) and κ(j) = limS→∞ 1S ∑
T
t=j+1 E(gtgt−j).
To estimate ∑−1x∗x∗ , we can use
Σˆ−1x∗x∗ =
￿
1
S
T
∑
t=1
x∗t x∗
￿
t
￿−1
=
￿
1
S
S
∑
s=1
xESs x
ES￿
s
￿−1
p→ Σ−1x∗x∗ .
Proposition 9. We define
ΩˆAM = ΓˆAM0 +
m
∑
j=1
w(j,m)[ΓˆAMj + Γˆ
AM￿
j ],
where ΓˆAMj = (1/S)∑
T
t=1 z∗s z∗
￿
s−j,
ΩˆES = ΓˆES0 +
m
∑
j=1
w(j,m)[ΓˆESj + Γˆ
ES￿
j ],
where ΓˆESj = (1/S)∑
S
s=1 zESs zES
￿
s−j. Then we have Ωˆ
AM p→ Ω∗ and ΩˆES p→ Ω∗. For inferences, the
t-statistic based on ΩˆAM is given by
tAMk =
βˆk − β0￿
VˆAMkk /(S− k)
d→ N(0, 1),
where VˆAMkk is the (k, k)-th element of Vˆ
AM = Σˆ−1x∗x∗ΩˆAMΣˆ
−1
x∗x∗ . Alternatively, the t-statistic based on Ωˆ
ES
is given by
tESk =
βˆk − β0￿
VˆESkk /(S− k)
d→ N(0, 1),
where VˆESkk is the (k, k)-th element of Vˆ
ES = Σˆ−1x∗x∗ΩˆESΣˆ
−1
x∗x∗ .
3.5 Simulation
In the Monte Carlo simulations that follow, we study the properties of our Amplitude Modu-
lated and Equal Spacing estimators using a simple location model. To evaluate these estimators
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under a variety of circumstances, we generate data with various levels of autocorrelation and for
a range of sample sizes. We test our estimators under the two missing structures described in Sec-
tion 3.3.1, the Bernoulli missing structure and the deterministic cyclically missing structure. We
implement the estimators using a standard fixed bandwidth for our benchmark results, and also
provide results that implement the automatic bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Newey
andWest (1994). Our primary evaluation criteria are the empirical rejection probability of the test,
and the power of the test against an appropriate alternative.
3.5.1 Data Structure
The inference procedures are tested on a simulated data series {yt} that is generated using a
simple location model:
yt = β+ ￿t
￿t = φ￿t−1 + ηt
where ηt i.i.d. ∼ N (0, 1) and ￿0 = 0
For each of N = 100, 000 iterations, we use β = 0 and generate a data series {y1, ..., yTmax} with a
sample size of Tmax = 24, 000. Since we run tests over a range of sample sizes for each estimator,
we use the first T observations in each iteration for T ∈ {120, 360, 1200, 4800, 12000, 24000}. To test
these methods for a range of autocorrelation parameters, φ, we generate data separately for φ ∈{0,
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. The regressor in this model is a constant 1, and we conduct simulation exercises
under different missing structures for the dependent variable {yt}, which are described below.
For each iteration, we generate a series {gt}, which indicates for each t whether yt is observed.
Finally, we generate the series {y∗t }, where y∗t = gtyt.
Given this data, we estimate the parameter of interest, βi, and the estimator for the covariance
matrix, Ωˆi, for each estimator i ∈ {NW, ES, AM}. We also perform simulations for two additional
methods. First, we implement the imputation method, in which the missing yt are linearly im-
puted before the standard Newey-West estimator is applied to the filled series {yIt}. Secondly, we
implement the Parzen estimator from Section 3.3.3. Since the estimator ΩˆPZ is not positive semi-
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definite, we calculate the rejection rate using the number of rejections divided by the number of
simulations in which ΩˆPZ > 0.
We use these estimators to calculate the t-statistic, tiβ, used for a test of the null hypothesis H0 :
β = 0 against the two-sided alternative, Ha : β ￿= 0. We choose a 5% level of significance and reject
the null hypothesis when |tiβ| > 1.96. For the standard estimations, we use a fixed bandwidth of
m = 4(T/100)(2/9). We also apply the automatic bandwidth selection procedure of Newey and
West (1994) to the Newey-West, Equal Spacing, Amplitude Modulating, and Imputation methods.
Results are reported for simulation exercises under a variety of sampling schemes. Our bench-
mark sampling scheme is one with a Bernoulli missing structure as described in Example 1 of
Section 3.3.1. For these simulations, the series {gt} has an i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution with fixed
probability of missing, p = 6/12. For comparison, we also provide two variants in which the
probability of missing is set to 4/12 and 8/12.
We also simulate data under four data structures with cyclically missing observations, as de-
scribed in Example 2 of Section 3.3.1. For these, we choose a cycle length of 12, with 6 or 8 observa-
tions missing each cycle. In these simulations, the missing structure is cyclical in that we generate
a single pattern of missing observations for the first cycle, and apply this same pattern to every
cycle of 12 observations. Additionally, the pattern is deterministic in the sense that we apply the
same pattern of missing observations for all iterations in the simulation. This sampling structure
reflects the potential application of these methods to monthly data with missing observations. For
example, because commodities futures contracts expire only some months of the year, the data
on monthly commodities returns will have the same missing pattern each year. Another common
application is for daily financial data, in which the same 2 weekend days are missing in each cycle
of 7 days.
Under a deterministic cyclical missing structure, it is possible to have cases for which certain
lagged autocovariances in the original time series domain are never observed. As we noted in
the introduction, the popular statistical software Stata forbids implementation of the Amplitude
Modulated estimator under this case, even when using the “force” command. Yet, our theoretical
results do not require all the lags to be observed to generate asymptotically correct inference us-
ing the ES and AM estimators. Consequently, we perform simulations for deterministic cyclical
missing structures under both cases: all lags are observed at least once, or some lags are never
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observed. We show that the finite sample performance does not differ much between these two
cases, and neither case differs much from the results under the Bernoulli missing structure.
In our first two cyclical missing structures, we set the cyclical pattern of observed data such
that each lagged autocovariance can be estimated from the observed data. In our cyclical structure
with 6 of 12 missing, we observe {z3, z6, z8, z9, z10, z11}, and then observe the same pattern of
observations for each cycle of length 12. In our next cyclical structure, we have 8 of 12 missing.
We observe {z3, z4, z7, z9} in the first cycle, and the same pattern for each cycle after that. For our
final two cyclical missing structures, we require the observed data to be spaced within the cycle
such that at least one lag is never observed. In our structure with 6 of 12 missing, we observe
{z1, z3, z5, z8, z10, z12} in the first cycle. Under this structure, the sixth lag is never observed. For
our cyclical structure with 8 of 12 missing, we observe {z2, z3, z6, z12}, so that the fifth lag is never
observed.
3.5.2 Evaluation Criteria
The primary evaluation criteria for these estimators is the empirical rejection probability of the
tests. The empirical rejection probability measures the likelihood that null hypothesis is rejected
when it is in fact true (Type I error). Each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation represents one
hypothesis test, and the reported rejection probability reflects the fraction of iterations for which
the t-statistic was large enough in magnitude to reject the null hypothesis.
We also provide measures of the power of the test, as well as measures of the bias and vari-
ance of the estimators. The power of the test measures the probability that the null hypothesis
is rejected when the alternative hypothesis is true. Since we find empirical rejection probabilities
that can be much higher than the 0.05 benchmark, we calculate the size-adjusted power for ease
of comparability. Following Ibragimov and Mueller (2010), we set the alternative hypothesis to
Ha : βa = 4/
￿
T(1− φ2). To calculate the power, we first calculate tiβa , which is analogous to tiβ
for each i, except that we subtract βa instead of β0 in the numerator. For example,
tNWβa =
βˆNW − βa￿
VˆNWkk /T
.
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Next, we calculate an adjusted critical value, tcrit0.05, which is the t-statistic at the 5th percentile of our
simulations. This value is equal to the critical value for which the empirical rejection probability
would have been exactly 0.05 under our simulation procedure. To calculate the size-adjusted
power, we calculate tiβa under the alternative hypothesis above and reject when |tiβa | > tcrit0.05.
Finally, in order to understand the finite sample performance, we study the empirical mean
squared error of our estimators by decomposing it into the empirical variance and bias. Under the
benchmark Bernoulli case, we first calculate the value ofΩ∗ under our data generating process as:
Ω∗ = lim
T→∞(T/S)
∞
∑
j=−∞
γjE(gtgt−j)
= (1/p)
￿
p+ 2
∞
∑
j=1
p2φj
￿
Var(￿t)
=
￿
1+
2pφ
1− φ
￿￿
1
1− φ2
￿
where p is the probability of being observed. The second equation follows because (1) limT→∞ T/S =
1/p; (2) E(gtgt−j) = p if j = 0 and E(gtgt−j) = p2 if j ≥ 1. The third equation holds because
Var(￿t) = 1/(1− φ2). Returning to the MSE decomposition, we have:
￿MSE = ￿Bias2 + ￿Variance
=
￿
ˆ¯Ωi −Ω∗
￿2
+
1
N
N
∑
c=1
￿
Ωˆic − ˆ¯Ωi
￿2
,
where ˆ¯Ωi = (1/N)∑Nc=1 Ωˆic is the sample mean of all the covariance estimators and c indexes the
N = 100, 000 iterations. Note that for i = NW, we have p = 1. We use these measures to study
the finite sample properties of our estimators, especially to compare the AM and ES estimators.
The primary findings are reported in Tables 3.3 through 3.8.4
4 Full simulation results are available upon request.
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Table 3.3: Benchmark Results. This table reports for a range of sample sizes and autocorrelation parame-
ters the empirical rejection rate as defined in Section 3.5.2. Data follow our benchmark missing
structure, the Bernoulli structure with probability of missing 6/12. The Newey-West estimation
provided for comparison uses the full series of simulated data without any missing observations.
See Sections 3.3 and 3.4 for details on the estimators and the regression context, and Section 3.5.1
for details on the simulation parameters.
Empirical Rejection Rate
Autocorrelation (φ): 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Sample Size T=360
ES, fixed bw 6.0 7.0 8.0 10.7 23.1
AM, fixed bw 5.6 6.7 8.3 12.6 30.9
Parzen, fixed bw 6.6 4.6 4.5 6.1 19.2
Imputation, fixed bw 8.9 9.7 11.2 15.5 34.4
NW, fixed bw 5.6 7.2 9.1 14.2 33.7
Sample Size T=1200
ES, fixed bw 5.3 6.0 6.8 8.7 18.8
AM, fixed bw 5.2 6.0 7.2 10.6 26.7
Parzen, fixed bw 5.5 3.6 3.3 4.4 14.9
Imputation, fixed bw 8.1 8.5 9.6 13.1 29.9
NW, fixed bw 5.2 6.4 7.9 11.9 29.4
Sample Size T=24000
ES, fixed bw 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.6 11.0
AM, fixed bw 5.1 5.4 6.1 7.5 16.5
Parzen, fixed bw 5.1 3.0 2.3 2.2 6.3
Imputation, fixed bw 6.3 6.5 7.0 8.4 17.9
NW, fixed bw 5.1 5.6 6.3 7.9 17.5
3.5.3 Results
Table 3.3 provides the rejection probabilities for our two main estimators, the Equal Spacing
estimator and the Amplitude Modulated estimator. We provide results under a fixed bandwidth
and automatic bandwidth selection for each estimator, and for comparison purposes, present re-
sults for the application of the Newey-West estimator applied to the full series without missing
observations. Our benchmark missing data structure is the Bernoulli missing structure in which
observations are missing with probability p = 1/2. We focus on the results for the simulation with
T = 360, and also provide results for a large and very large sample size (T = 1200 or 24000).
Our simulation results provide evidence that the ES and AM estimators perform well in finite
samples. As is well known in the HAC literature, we find that the empirical rejection probability
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Table 3.4: Varying Missing Structure. This table reports for a range of autocorrelation parameters the em-
pirical rejection rate for a sample size of T = 360 under varying missing structures as described
in Section 3.5.1: the Bernoulli missing structure, the deterministic cyclical missing structure in
which all lags are observed, and the deterministic cyclical missing structure in which some lags
are never observed. The probability of missing is 6/12 for the Bernoulli structure, while the cycli-
cal structures have exactly 6 of 12 observations missing in each cycle. The Newey-West estimation
provided for comparison uses the full series of simulated data without any missing observations.
See Sections 3.3 and 3.4 for details on the estimators and the regression context, and Section 3.5.1
for details on the simulation parameters.
Empirical Rejection Rate
Autocorrelation (φ): 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Randomly missing, Bernoulli structure
ES, fixed bw 6.0 7.0 8.0 10.7 23.1
AM, fixed bw 5.6 6.7 8.3 12.6 30.9
Deterministic cyclically missing, All lags observed
ES, fixed bw 5.9 6.9 7.9 10.1 22.2
AM, fixed bw 5.4 6.5 8.0 11.9 30.1
Deterministic cyclically missing, Some lags unobserved
ES, fixed bw 6.0 6.5 7.5 9.8 22.1
AM, fixed bw 5.5 6.3 8.1 12.8 32.0
Full sample benchmark
NW, fixed bw 5.6 7.2 9.1 14.2 33.7
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can be a bit higher than 5.0 for small samples, even when there is no autocorrelation. In addition,
when the autocorrelation parameter is high, there can be quite a bit of overrejection even for very
large sample sizes (T = 24000). However, we do find that the rejection probability is falling
towards 5.0 as the sample size increases.
We also find evidence that our ES and AM estimators are well-behaved under deterministic
cyclically missing structures. In Table 3.4, we see little difference in the rejection rates under each
of our three data structures: randomly missing under a Bernoulli structure, deterministic cycli-
cal missing when all lags are observed, and deterministic cyclical missing when some lags are
unobserved.
Table 3.3 also provides the empirical rejection probabilities for the Parzen and Imputation es-
timators for T = 360 and T = 24000. As expected, the higher serial correlation induced by the
imputation procedure results in extremely high rejection rates as compared to the ES and AM es-
timators. We can also see in Table 3.3 that the results for the Parzen estimator substantiate our
argument that this estimator cannot be used for robust inference for series with missing obser-
vations. In our simulation with φ = 0 and T = 360, we found 20 instances (out of 100,000) in
which the non-PSD Parzen estimator returned a negative estimate of the variance. Additionally,
we find that the rejection probability is generally decreasing in the sample size but is U-shaped
with respect to the autocorrelation, and often underrejects for low levels of autocorrelation.5
Next we turn to a comparison of the finite sample properties of the ES and AM estimators.
In the results for the fixed bandwidth estimators in Table 3.5, we find that for T = 360, the AM
estimator is preferred for autocorrelation parameters φ ≤ 0.3, while the ES estimator is preferred
for series with higher autocorrelation. For larger samples, the ES estimator is preferred for a larger
range of φ, so that for T = 24000, we have that the ES estimator is preferred for all the simulations
with nonzero autocorrelations.
5 Interestingly, the test using the PZ estimator is well-behaved when the autocorrelation is 0. This is consistent with
our theoretical results, because when there is no autocorrelation, we have that the long-run variance of the underlying
and observed series are asymptotically equivalent. Consequently, we have that when there is no autocorrelation, ΩˆPZ
and ΩˆAM are asymptotically equivalent as well.
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Table 3.5: Finite Samples: Fixed and Automatic Bandwidth Selection. This table reports for a range of
sample sizes and autocorrelation parameters the empirical rejection rate and size-adjusted power
as defined in Section 3.5.2. Data follow our benchmark missing structure, the Bernoulli structure
with probability of missing 6/12. The Newey-West estimation provided for comparison uses the
full series of simulated data without any missing observations. See Sections 3.3 and 3.4 for de-
tails on the estimators and the regression context, and Section 3.5.1 for details on the simulation
parameters.
Empirical Rejection Rate Size-Adjusted Power
Autocorrelation (φ): 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Sample Size T=360
ES, fixed bw 6.0 7.0 8.0 10.7 23.1 78.9 63.5 49.2 32.7 14.0
AM, fixed bw 5.6 6.7 8.3 12.6 30.9 79.4 64.1 50.0 33.0 14.2
ES, auto bw 6.8 7.7 8.7 10.1 16.8 77.8 62.4 48.2 31.7 13.6
AM, auto bw 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.9 19.7 79.0 63.7 49.1 32.4 13.8
NW, fixed bw 5.6 7.2 9.1 14.2 33.7 97.6 82.3 62.2 38.1 14.7
NW, auto bw 5.9 7.4 8.1 10.0 19.8 97.5 81.5 61.2 37.2 14.4
Sample Size T=1200
ES, fixed bw 5.3 6.0 6.8 8.7 18.8 80.2 65.2 51.4 34.1 14.5
AM, fixed bw 5.2 6.0 7.2 10.6 26.7 80.4 65.5 51.5 34.3 14.6
ES, auto bw 5.5 6.3 6.9 7.4 10.8 79.9 64.9 50.5 33.5 14.2
AM, auto bw 5.3 6.1 6.4 7.4 12.6 80.2 65.2 51.0 33.9 14.4
NW, fixed bw 5.2 6.4 7.9 11.9 29.4 97.8 83.0 63.0 38.6 15.0
NW, auto bw 5.3 6.3 6.6 7.5 12.6 97.8 82.6 62.7 38.1 14.8
Sample Size T=24000
ES, fixed bw 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.6 11.0 80.2 65.4 51.0 33.8 14.4
AM, fixed bw 5.1 5.4 6.1 7.5 16.5 80.3 65.4 51.1 33.7 14.4
ES, auto bw 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.7 6.2 80.2 65.3 50.9 33.6 14.4
AM, auto bw 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.7 6.4 80.3 65.4 51.0 33.7 14.3
NW, fixed bw 5.1 5.6 6.3 7.9 17.5 97.8 83.1 63.0 38.6 14.9
NW, auto bw 5.1 5.4 5.5 5.6 6.4 97.8 83.1 63.1 38.7 14.9
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To better understand these results, we turn to Table 3.6, which reports the empirical bias and
variance for these two estimators under our benchmark simulations. As expected, when using
the same fixed bandwidth, the ES estimator has a higher variance than the AM estimator for each
sample size and autocorrelation. As discussed in Section 3.3.5, this is because compared to ΩˆAM,
the ΩˆES estimator includes more high-order lags that are relatively poorly estimated.
With regard to the bias, the ES estimator has better performance for higher autocorrelation
parameters, though this effect is mitigated and sometimes reversed in small samples. The poor
small sample performance is driven by the first source of bias discussed in Section 3.3.5, that the
summation in the autocovariance estimator is divided by the sample size rather than the actual
number of observed lags. This bias declines rapidly as the sample size increases. In contrast,
the bias behind the overrejection for high autocorrelations is driven by the underweighting of
high-order lagged autocovariances. Since the ES estimator places a higher weight on high-order
autocovariances, it has lower bias than the AM estimator when the autocorrelation is high. As the
sample size grows and the first source of bias becomes less important, the ES estimator is preferred
for a larger range of autocovariance parameters.
This bias and variance tradeoff changes when we implement automatic bandwidth selection.
The results in Table 3.5 indicate that under this procedure, the AM estimator has a lower rejection
probability and is thus preferred at all but the highest level of autocorrelation, for every sample
size. To provide further context for this result, Table 3.7 reports the average selected bandwidth
for each simulation. We know from denHaan and Levin (1997) that using a higher bandwidth will
increase the variance of the estimator while decreasing the bias. Given that the AM estimator has
a lower variance than the ES estimator when using a fixed bandwidth, it is not surprising that the
automatic bandwidth selection typically chooses a higher bandwidth for the AM estimator than
for the ES estimator. The incremental improvement in the bias between the fixed and automatic
bandwidth selection is larger for the AM estimator than for the ES estimator. Consequently, under
automatic bandwidth selection, the ES estimator is only preferred for extremely high autocorrela-
tion, when the bias of the AM estimator is much higher than that of the ES estimator.
Turning to the size-adjusted power, we find in table Table 3.5 that the power of the two esti-
mators is roughly equivalent. Comparing our two main estimators, we have that the power of
the AM estimator is generally stronger than that of the ES estimator. Just as for the Newey-West
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Table 3.7: Automatically Selected Bandwidths. This table reports for a range of autocorrelation parame-
ters and sample sizes the mean of the bandwidth selected by the Newey and West (1994) proce-
dure described in Section 3.5.1. Data follow our benchmark missing structure as described in the
Bernoulli structure with probability of missing 6/12. The Newey-West estimation provided for
comparison uses the full series of simulated data without any missing observations. See Sections
3.3 and 3.4 for details on the estimators and the regression context, and Section 3.5.1 for details on
the simulation parameters.
6 of 12 missing
Autocorrelation (φ): 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
T=360, Fixed bandwidth: m(T)=5
ES, auto bw 5.9 5.1 5.0 6.4 10.0
AM, auto bw 5.4 5.0 6.4 9.8 13.0
NW, auto bw 5.4 5.4 8.0 11.4 14.1
T=1200, Fixed bandwidth: m(T)=6
ES, auto bw 6.4 6.0 7.0 10.8 17.2
AM, auto bw 6.2 6.7 10.5 16.5 22.2
NW, auto bw 6.2 8.1 13.2 18.8 23.9
T=24000, Fixed bandwidth: m(T)=12
ES, auto bw 13.2 14.6 20.2 33.3 65.2
AM, auto bw 13.2 18.0 31.8 55.7 94.0
NW, auto bw 13.2 23.5 39.0 62.3 98.3
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Table 3.8: Varying Fraction ofMissings. This table reports for a range of autocorrelation parameters the em-
pirical rejection rate and size-adjusted power for a sample size of T = 360 under varying probabil-
ity of missing observation. Data follow our benchmark missing structure as described in Section
3.5.1, the Bernoulli structure with probability of missing 4/12, 6/12, or 8/12. The Newey-West
estimation provided for comparison uses the full series of simulated data without any missing
observations. See Sections 3.3 and 3.4 for details on the estimators and the regression context, and
Section 3.5.1 for details on the simulation parameters.
Empirical Rejection Rate Size-Adjusted Power
Autocorrelation (φ): 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
4 of 12 missing
ES, fixed bw 5.9 7.0 8.2 11.3 26.6 89.2 72.7 56.2 35.8 14.5
AM, fixed bw 5.6 6.9 8.6 13.1 32.4 89.4 73.2 56.6 36.2 14.6
ES, auto bw 6.4 7.5 8.5 9.7 17.4 88.7 72.0 55.0 34.9 14.0
AM, auto bw 5.9 7.2 8.0 9.8 19.8 89.2 72.5 55.6 35.5 14.2
6 of 12 missing
ES, fixed bw 6.0 7.0 8.0 10.7 23.1 78.9 63.5 49.2 32.7 14.0
AM, fixed bw 5.6 6.7 8.3 12.6 30.9 79.4 64.1 50.0 33.0 14.2
ES, auto bw 6.8 7.7 8.7 10.1 16.8 77.8 62.4 48.2 31.7 13.6
AM, auto bw 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.9 19.7 79.0 63.7 49.1 32.4 13.8
8 of 12 missing
ES, fixed bw 6.4 7.1 7.8 9.6 18.7 61.0 50.5 41.2 29.1 13.6
AM, fixed bw 5.6 6.4 7.6 11.2 28.3 62.5 51.9 42.5 29.9 13.9
ES, auto bw 7.8 8.4 9.1 10.5 15.7 57.6 48.2 39.6 27.7 13.1
AM, auto bw 5.9 6.6 7.6 9.5 19.4 61.9 51.4 41.8 29.2 13.6
Full sample benchmark
NW, fixed bw 5.6 7.2 9.1 14.2 33.7 97.6 82.3 62.2 38.1 14.7
NW, auto bw 5.9 7.4 8.1 10.0 19.8 97.5 81.5 61.2 37.2 14.4
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results, we have that the power falls as the autocorrelation increases, and that the size-adjusted
power does not vary as the sample size increases. Unsurprisingly, we can see that the power of
the test under the missing structure is weaker than for the full series, due to the smaller observed
sample size. This effect is mitigated at high autocorrelation, however, and we can see that under
very high autocorrelation, the power is roughly equal for the Newey-West application to the full
series and for the application of our two estimators to the series with missing observations.
Finally, Table 3.8 presents results for varying fractions of missing observations. At low auto-
correlation, the rejection rate increases as the fraction of missing observations increases. This is
likely driven by the first source of finite sample bias discussed in Section 3.3.5, which gets worse
as the fraction of missing observations increases. In contrast, at high autocorrelation, the rejection
rate falls as the fraction of missing observations increases. This effect is likely due to the fact that
when a higher fraction of observations is missing, the observed process is less persistent, and the
estimators are better able to overcome the underweighting of the higher order autocovariances.
Putting these two effects together, we have that the AM estimator is preferred for a larger range of
autocorrelation parameters when a higher fraction of data is missing. This is consistent with our
previous finding, that the AM estimator is preferred when the serial correlation is low.
Overall, these simulation results are consistent with our theoretical findings. We show that the
ES and AM estimators both are well-behaved for random and deterministic missing structures.
In general, the ES and AM estimators are preferred to imputation methods, which may induce
serial correlation in the imputed series, resulting in more severe bias and overrejection. In finite
samples, we find that for the same fixed bandwidth, the ES estimator is generally less biased than
the AM estimator, but has larger variance. Consequently, the ES estimator is preferred when au-
tocorrelation is high, as the bias will dominate the mean squared error in these cases. Conversely,
when autocorrelation is low, variance dominates the mean squared error, and the AM estimator is
preferred.
3.6 Empirical Application: Recursive Tests for a Positive Sample Mean
In this section, we present an application of our estimators to test for positive returns to in-
vesting in commodities futures contracts. While commodities tend to have positive returns on
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average, they also have extremely high volatility. We apply our methods to construct the sample
mean and standard error of the returns series, and test whether the returns are statistically dis-
tinguishable from zero. Due to the structure of commodities futures contracts, the time series of
returns have missing observations, and are therefore a natural application for our estimators.
Commodities futures contracts specify the quantity and price of a commodity to be traded
on a predetermined expiration date at some point in the future. While some commodities have
contracts expiring every month, many have contract months that are irregularly spaced through-
out the year. For example, copper futures contracts were available for only March, May, July,
September, and December until full monthly coverage began in 1989. Consequently, if we want to
calculate the monthly return to investing in commodities futures over a long sample period, our
monthly returns data will either reflect a fluctuating time-to-maturity, or will be an incomplete
series with irregularly spaced missing observations.
For each commodity, we calculate the return as the percentage change in the price of the con-
tract over the three months prior to the contract’s expiration. For instance, we calculate the return
to the December contract as the change in price from the last trading day in August to the last
trading day in November. Since we want our returns series to reflect the change in the price over
the same time-to-maturity, we are only able to calculate this return in the months immediately
preceding contract expiration. For copper, this means we will have only five observations each
year.6 The existence of irregularly spaced commodities futures contracts results in a deterministic
cyclical pattern of missing observations in the constant-maturity returns series. Contract avail-
ability and spacing differs across commodities, but tends to remain constant year to year for each
commodity.
In this application, we calculate the sample mean for three representative commodities: cop-
per, soybean oil, and lean hogs.7 We apply our Equal Spacing, Amplitude Modulated, and Impu-
tation estimators to calculate the HAC standard error of the sample mean, and test the hypothesis
that the sample mean is significantly different from zero at the five percent level of significance.
Under the Imputation method, the missing observations are linearly imputed, while the Equal
6 We restrict the full sample for copper to the period with missing contract months, 1960-1989.
7 We selected one representative commodity from each of the major commodity types (metals, animal, and agricul-
tural). We omit the energy commodities, as these commodity contracts do not have missing contract months.
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Spacing and Amplitude Modulated estimators use only the observed data to calculate the mean
and standard error. Because it does not provide robust results, we do not provide inference results
using the Parzen estimator.
In addition to performing the t-test for the full sample, we use a recursive method to compare
our three methods across various sample sizes. For each commodity, we first calculate the sample
mean and standard error over the first twelve months of the sample, and perform a t-test of the
mean for just this sample window. We then recursively perform the same test for an expanding
sample window, adding one month at a time until the full sample is covered. Lastly, we also
perform the same type of recursive tests starting with the last twelve months of the full sample. In
this backwards recursive test, we use an earlier starting month in each iteration until the sample
window again covers the full sample. Having the forward and backwards recursive results allows
us to note any structural shifts that may have occurred over time. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depicts the
results, and Table 3.9 provides an overview of rejection rates over the full set of recursive results.
Figure 3.2 shows the sample mean and 95% confidence intervals constructed using the Im-
putation and Equal Spacing methods. (The Amplitude Modulated estimator is omitted from the
figure for clarity.) The means are very similar across the two methods for most sample windows.
The primary difference is that as expected, the Imputation method estimate of the standard er-
ror is generally smaller than the Equal Spacing and Amplitude Modulated estimates, resulting in
a higher rejection rate for Imputation. In the figure, we have shaded the samples for which the
hypothesis is rejected under the Imputation method but not rejected under Equal Spacing. The
fraction of shaded iterations ranges from 3.2% for lean hogs to 18.2% for copper in the forward
recursive results. In the backwards recursive results, the fraction of shaded iterations ranges from
0% for soybean oil to 18.4% for copper.
It is unsurprising that the Imputation method results in a higher rejection rate relative to the
Equal Spacing and Amplitude Modulated methods. While in many cases naive imputation is
likely to bias the parameter of interest, we have tried to construct an example with little to no bias.
However, since the imputed observations are constructed using the observed data rather than
drawn from the underlying distribution of data, we note that the standard error of the imputed
series is likely lower than the standard error of the observed series. Additionally, the induced high
serial correlation of the imputed series will make it likely that the standard error of the imputed
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series will be underestimated by the Newey-West estimator. For all of these reasons, it is likely that
we will have overrejection in hypothesis testing. Without knowing the true mean of the series, in
this applicationwe cannot knowwhichmethod gives us the “right” conclusion for a larger fraction
of the tests. Yet, the examples illustrate that the Imputation and Equal Spacing methods can lead
to different conclusions in a number of cases, depending on the available data.
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Figure 3.1: Time Series of Returns.
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Figure 3.2: Recursive Test Results - Sample Mean and Error Bands. This figure plots the recursive sample
mean and 95% confidence intervals for the imputation and equal spacingmethods. The recursive
sample mean is calculated as the mean of returns over the period from the start of the sample to
sample end date (plotted on the x-axis). Shaded areas indicate recursive samples for which the
imputation method finds statistical significance while the equal spacing method finds none.
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Figure 3.3: Backwards Recursive Test Results - Sample Mean and Error Bands. This figure plots the back-
wards recursive samplemean and 95% confidence intervals for the imputation and equal spacing
methods. The backwards recursive sample mean is calculated as the mean of returns over the
period from the end of the sample to sample start date (plotted on the x-axis). Note that the
sample size is increasing with earlier start dates, moving left to right on the plot. Shaded areas
indicate recursive samples for which the imputation method finds statistical significance while
the equal spacing method finds none.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides two simple solutions to the common problem of conducting heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust inference when some observations are missing. Our defi-
nitions of the Amplitude Modulated and Equal Spacing estimators are simply formal descriptions
of ad hoc practices that are already in use. Yet, by formalizing these procedures, we are able to pro-
vide theoretical results that clear up some of the existing confusion in the literature. By studying
the estimators and their properties, we provide justification for their past application to daily busi-
ness data and through common statistical software packages such as Stata. We also justify their
application under a wide variety of missing data structures, including deterministic and cyclical
missing structures.
Our theoretical discussion of the estimators highlights a few main conclusions. After estab-
lishing the difference between the long-run variance of the underlying and observed series, we
demonstrate that our Amplitude Modulated and Equal Spacing estimators both are consistent for
the long-run variance of the observed series. This distinction is important, as we also show that
we require the long-run variance of the observed series to construct t-statistics for inference, such
as in a regression setting. In addition to discussing the asymptotic properties of the estimators, we
provide some discussion of their finite sample properties, based on our previous understanding
of the finite sample properties of HAC estimators more generally.
We also provide simulation results and apply our estimators to a real world problem involving
missing data in commodities futures returns. These results provide further evidence supporting
our description of the asymptotic and finite sample behavior of the estimators. In addition, the
results of these exercises are used to draw conclusions that can provide guidance to practitioners
who need to decide between the estimators for applied work. Though this paper focuses on ap-
plying the estimators in a time series setting, they can also be naturally extended for application
in a panel setting. We leave this extension for future work.
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A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 A Real-World Example
Figure A.1 illustrates a concrete example of swapping an LC yield into a dollar yield using
CCS. Let S denote the spot peso/dollar exchange rate. Suppose a dollar-based investor lends to
the Mexican government by purchasing LC bonds traded at par with notional amount equal to S
pesos. If the government does not default, she will receive y percent coupons at each coupon date
and the principal of S pesos at maturity. Without any currency hedging, even if the bond does
not default, the dollar payoff is uncertain since both the coupons and the principal are subject to
exchange rate risk. If the dollar investor does not wish to bear the currency risk, she can enter
into a CCS package with a swapmaker (e.g., a bank) to lock in a dollar yield. The details are as
follows. At the inception of the swap, the dollar investor gives 1 dollar to the bank. In exchange,
she receives S pesos from the bank to lend to the Mexican government. At each coupon date,
the dollar investor passes the y percent fixed coupons she receives in pesos from the Mexican
government to the bank and receives y− ρ percent fixed coupon in dollars, where ρ is the fixed
peso for dollar swap rate. At the maturity of the swap, the investor gives the S pesos in principal
repaid by the government to the bank and gets 1 dollar back. Therefore, the net cash flow of the
investor is entirely in dollars. The CCS swap package transforms the LC bond into a synthetic
dollar bond that promises to yield y− ρ percent.
A.2 Yield Curve Construction
Zero-coupon LC and FC yield curves for our sample countries are obtained or constructed
from three main sources.1 First, our preference is to use zero-coupon LC curves constructed by
the central bank of government agencies when they are available. Second, when national data are
1 Full details on LC and FC yield curve construction are given in the data appendix Table A.3.
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unavailable, we use the Bloomberg Fair Value (BFV) curve. The BFV curves are par yield curves
estimated by Bloomberg on actively traded bonds using piecewise linear zero-coupon curves (Lee,
2007). These curves often serve as the benchmark reference rate in respective currencies. Traders
using the Bloomberg trading platform can easily select these BFV curves for asset swap analysis.
We use the standard Nelson-Siegel methodology to convert the par yield curves into zero curves
with the scaling parameter for the curvature factor fixed using the value in Diebold and Li (2006).
Finally, for countries without national data or BFV curves, and to ensure reliability of the ex-
isting BFV curves, we estimate zero coupon yield curves using the individual bond data. We col-
lected these data from Bloomberg by performing an exhaustive search for all available yields on
active andmatured bonds under <Govt TK> for our sample countries. We supplement Bloomberg
FC bond yield data with additional data from Cbonds. We use nominal, fixed-coupon, bullet
bonds without embedded options. LC curve estimation follows the Diebold and Li (2006) formu-
lation of Nelson and Siegel (1987) and FC curve estimation follows Arellano and Ramanarayanan
(2012) by fitting level, slope and curvature factors to the spread of zero-coupon FC curves over the
corresponding dollar, Euro (Bundesbank), Yen and Sterling zero-coupon Treasury yields, depend-
ing on the currency denomination of the FC bonds. As in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), we
perform yield curve estimation when there are at least four bond yields observed on one day. We
calculate yields using estimated parameters only up to the maximum tenor of the observed yields
to avoid problems from extrapolation. When the Bloomberg BFV curves exists, our estimated
yield curves track them very closely (details available upon request). However, since Bloomberg
has partially removed historical yields for matured bonds from the system, the BFV curves offer
more continuous series than our estimates. Therefore, we use BFV curves when they are avail-
able. For countries without BFV curves or earlier samples when BFV curves are not available, our
estimated zero-coupon curves are used instead.
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A.3 N-Period Extension
A.3.1 Risk-Free Rates
Given the global SDF − logMt+1 = −m∗t+1 = ψ0 − ψzwt − γξwt+1. The log price of an n-period
risk-free bond is given by:
−pnt = An + Bnzwt ,
where
Bn = φwBn−1 − ψ = −ψ[1− (φw)n]/(1− φw)
An − An−1 = ψ0 + Bn−1cw − (γ− Bn−1)2/2.
A.3.2 FC Bonds
We conjecture the price of a n-period FC bond is given by
−pFCnt = AFCn + BFCn zwt + CFCn zit.
Since pFCnt = Et(mt+1 + iFCt+1 + p
FC
n−1,t+1) + Vart(mt+1 + iFCt+1 + pFCn−1,t+1)/2, where iFCt+1 ≡ log(IFCt+1),
we can solve for the price of a n-period FC bond as the
BFCn = φ
wBFCn−1 + λFCw − ψ = (λFCw − ψ)[1− (φw)n]/(1− φw)
CFCn = φ
CCFCn−1 + λFCi = λ
FC
i [1− (φw)n]/(1− φw)
AFCn − AFCn−1 = ψ0 + λFC0 + BFCn−1cw + CFCn−1ci − (BFCn−1 + σFCλw − γ)2/2− (CFCn−1 + σFCλc )2/2
The expected excess returns on FC bonds is given by
Et(rFCn,t+1)− y∗1t +Vart(rFCn,t+1)/2 = −Covt(mt+1, rFCn,t+1) = γ(Bn−1 + σFCλw)
= γ
￿
(λFCw − ψ)1− (φ
w)n−1
1− φw + σ
FC
λw
￿
≡ γδFCn
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We can then compute the FC spread as
sFC/USnt =
1
n
￿
αFCn0 + λ
FC
w
1− (φw)n−1
1− φw z
w
t + λ
FC
i
1− (φi)n−1
1− φi z
i
t
￿
. (A.1)
A.3.3 LC Bonds
Again, we assume a downward sloping clientele demand for the n-period LC
dSLCnt /W = κn(−pSLCnt − βnt)
for κn > 0. We assume that βnt is also affine in factors. For analytical convenience, we parametrize
βn as
βnt = − p˜SLCnt + θn0 + θnczit + θnwzwt ,
where − p˜SLCnt = λ˜n0 + λ˜nczit + λ˜nwzwt is the swapped LC price that implies zero expected simple
excess returns on swapped LC bonds as follows:
− p˜SLCnt = −Et(iSLCt+1 + pSLCn−1,t+1)−Vart(iSLCt+1 + pSLCn−1,t+1)/2+ y∗1t
Thus, θn0, θnc and θnw measure deviations from zero expected returns in the absence of arbitrage.
We conjecture the equilibrium swapped LC price takes the form
−pSLCnt = − p˜SLCnt + bn0 + bnczit + bnwzwt = (λ˜n0 + bn0) + (λ˜nc + bnc)zit + (λ˜nw + bnw)zwt
Therefore, the expected simple excess returns on swapped LC is simply
EtrSLCt+1 − y∗1t +Vart(rSLCt+1 )/2 = (bn0 + bnczit + bnwzwt )− (τn0 − qn0).
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Solving the arbitrage’s portfolio problem gives2
bn0 =
κnθn0
κn + 1γa(1−ρ2rn)(σSLCn )2
+
qn0
κnγa(1− ρ2rn)(σSLCn )2 + 1
+
ρrn
σSLCn
σFCn
￿
(λFCw − ψ) 1−(φ
w)n−1
1−φw + σ
FC
λw
￿
κnγa(1− ρ2rn)(σSLCn )2 + 1
γ ≡ ωnθn0 + (1−ωn)(τn0 − qn0) + δSLCn γ(A.2)
bnc =
κnθnc
κn + 1γa(1−ρ2rn)(σSLCn )2
≡ ωnθnc
bnw =
κnθnw
κn + 1γa(1−ρ2rn)(σSLCn )2
≡ ωnθnw, (A.3)
where volatility and correlation of asset returns are given by
(σSLCn )
2 = [(λ˜n−1,w + bn−1,w) + σSLCλw ]
2 + [(λ˜n−1,c + bn−1,c) + σSLCλc ]
2 (A.4)
(σFCn )
2 =
￿
(λFCw − ψ)1− (φ
w)n−1
1− φw + σ
FC
λw
￿2
+
￿
λFCc
1− (φc)n−1
1− φw + σ
FC
λc
￿2
ρrn = [(λ˜n−1,w + bn−1,w) + σSLCλw ]
￿
(λFCw − ψ)1− (φ
w)n−1
1− φw + σ
FC
λw
￿
+[(λ˜n−1,c + bn−1,c) + σSLCλc ]
￿
λFCc
1− (φc)n−1
1− φw + σ
FC
λc
￿
. (A.5)
Since σSLCn and ρrn also depend on bn−1,w, local clientele demand θm−1,w and θm−1,c for m ≤ n also
affects volatility of swapped LC bond excess returns and correlation between swapped LC and
FC excess returns. The n-period equilibrium solution in A.3 is exactly analogous to the one-period
solution in Equation 1.1, and thus we can generalize Propositions 2 a to the n-period case.
2 For simplicity, we assume the arbitrageur arbitrages between swapped LC and FC bonds of the same maturity.
Allowing additional cross-maturity arbitrage for swapped LC bonds does not add more insights given FC bonds are
already integrated across different maturities.
130
 !!
Mexican  
Government 
Mexican  
Government 
Mexican  
Government 
USD 
investor! USD investor!! USD investor!!
Bank !Bank !Bank 
S pesos  
1 dollar !S pesos 
!! (S pesos) 
S pesos 
S pesos 
1 dollar   !
Start (t=0) Coupon Date (t=1, 2, 3, …, n) Maturity  (t=n) 
-1 dollar  !
! ! ! ! dollars  
!"#$%&'()!Illustration of Swap-Covered Local Investing!!
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Figure A.1: An Illustration of Swap Covered Local Currency Investment.This figure illustrates how a dol-
lar based investor can use a fixed peso for fixed dollar cross-currency swap package to fully
hedge currency risk for all coupons and the principal of a Mexican peso denominated LC bond
and receive fixed dollar cash flows. We let S denote the spot peso/dollar exchange rate at the
inception of the swap, y denote the yield on the peso bond, and ρ denote the fixed peso for fixed
dollar swap rate. By purchasing the peso bond while entering the asset swap, the LC bond is
transformed into a dollar bond with a dollar yield equal to y− ρ.
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Table A.1: Cross-Currency Swaps and Currency Forward Comparison, 2005-2011. This table reports sum-
mary statistics for 1-year fixed for fixed cross currency swap (CCS) rates and 1-year offshore
forward premium (Fwd) implied by outright forward contracts. Column 1 lists whether the cur-
rency swap is non-deliverable. Column 2 lists the name of the local floating leg against U.S. Libor
if the currency swap consists of a plain-vanilla interest rate swap and a cross-currency basis swap.
Corr(CCS,Fwd) reports correlation between swap rates and forward rates. The difference between
the two variables are reported in the last column (CCS-Fwd). Forward rates are from Datastream
and fixed for fixed CCS rates are computed by authors based on CCS and interest rate swap data
from Bloomberg. Data are at daily frequency for the sample periods 2005-2011.
Country NDS Floating Leg Corr(CCS,Fwd) CCS Fwd CCS-Fwd
Brazil Yes N/A 97.16 7.19 (1.28) 7.45 (1.28) -0.27 (0.30)
Colombia Yes N/A 99.19 3.52 (2.25) 3.57 (2.24) -0.05 (0.26)
Hungary No Bubor 99.16 3.75 (1.35) 3.80 (1.41) -0.04 (0.27)
Indonesia Yes N/A 97.79 5.67 (3.48) 5.61 (3.82) -0.06 (0.83)
Israel Yes Telbor 98.10 0.52 (0.74) 0.48 (0.74) 0.05 (0.13)
Mexico No TIIE 99.58 3.68 (1.24) 4.05 (1.32) -0.37 (0.14)
Peru Yes N/A 98.76 0.98 (1.38) 0.96 (1.42) 0.02 (0.22)
Philippines Yes N/A 97.25 1.96 (2.00) 1.83 (2.02) -0.13 (0.47)
Poland No Wibor 98.96 1.69 (1.62) 1.47 (1.51) 0.23 (0.25)
Turkey No N/A 98.69 9.36 (2.90) 9.51 (2.93) -0.15 (0.15)
Total 98.68 3.95 (3.42) 3.99 (3.54) -0.04 (0.40)
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Table A.2: Half of Bid-ask Spreads on FX Spots, Forwards and Swaps, 2005-2011. This table reports mean
and standard deviations of half of the bid-ask spreads of FX forward and CCS contracts in ba-
sis points for 10 sample countries at daily frequency from 2005 to 2011. Columns 1 to 4 report
half of annualized bid-ask spreads for FX forward contracts at 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. Column
5 reports the half of the bid-ask for the spread for the 5-year swap contracts. Annualized stan-
dard deviations are reported in the parentheses. Spot and Forward data use closing quotes from
WM/Reuter (access via Datastream) with the exceptions of Indonesia and Philippines for which
the offshore forward rates use closing quotes of non-deliverable forwards from Tullet Prebon (ac-
cess via Datastream). Swap rates are from Bloomberg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Country 1M Fwd 3M Fwd 6M Fwd 1Y Fwd 5Y CCS
Brazil 98.34 53.80 30.99 22.41 32.13
(17.1) (18.3) (15.0) (14.0) (13.5)
Colombia 123.37 68.71 42.23 30.19 16.24
(14.7) (12.3) (9.43) (10.8) (10.7)
Hungary 112.04 52.88 37.88 28.08 18.54
(10.8) (11.2) (14.5) (23.1) (14.2)
Indonesia 315.96 139.57 90.30 52.87 37.49
(69.8) (51.3) (47.3) (37.9) (23.1)
Israel 88.03 36.52 23.86 16.62 11.39
(12.9) (8.50) (6.78) (7.45) (4.31)
Mexico 31.20 12.88 8.58 6.12 8.59
(7.76) (5.65) (4.94) (6.12) (6.17)
Peru 100.25 47.61 29.39 23.87 16.00
(13.7) (10.0) (6.97) (6.92) (7.15)
Philippines 126.57 46.34 37.24 27.05 28.00
(7.69) (4.53) (5.72) (5.79) (14.7)
Poland 72.40 27.38 17.67 11.98 11.50
(8.56) (5.80) (6.86) (6.30) (8.33)
Turkey 126.76 59.79 41.72 25.85 11.00
(25.8) (19.4) (18.9) (15.2) (8.14)
Total 117.55 53.75 35.41 23.96 19.07
(33.3) (25.6) (23.5) (20.1) (15.7)
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